WIENER STUDIEN ZUR TIBETOLOGIE UND BUDDHISMUSKUNDE
HEFT 20

VITTORIO A. VAN BIJLERT

EPISTEMOLOGY AND SPIRITUAL AUTHORITY

THE DEVELOPMENT OF EPISTEMOLOGY AND LOGIC IN THE OLD NYĀYA AND THE BUDDHIST SCHOOL OF EPISTEMOLOGY WITH AN ANNOTATED TRANSLATION OF DHARMAKĪRTI'S PRAMĀṆAVĀRTTIKA II (PRAMĀṆASIDDHI) VV. 1–7

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PREFACE

This book was previously brought out as a PhD-thesis entitled "The Buddha as a Means of valid Cognition". Originally it had been my intention to add new findings to this edition, findings concerning the beginnings of Indian epistemology and logic, such as are found scattered in various texts antedating the Nyāya Sūtra, as well as further discussion on the interpretation of Buddhist logic. But certain technical problems and the bulk and nature of the new material prevented me from adding much to the present text. They will appear in a separate publication. Printing errors have been corrected as far as possible, although I am sure that some have escaped notice, for which I ask the indulgence of the reader. Certain numberings in the index will at first sight seem rather erratic, this is due to technical problems, but if the numbering is read in a specific mathematical order, the text-place can be easily found.

It remains for me to express my gratitude especially to the following persons who have contributed greatly to the making of this book: Dr. T.E. Vetter, Dr. J.C. Heesterman, Leiden, and Dr. E. Steinkellner, Dr. G. Oberhammer and their pupils, Vienna, for their scholarly comments on my translations and interpretation of certain passages; Mrs. Upinder Singh, Delhi, for checking my English; Mr. T. Meindersma, Groningen, for having been a willing victim of my classes on Indian epistemology and logic, the firm Tekstyle, Amsterdam for typesetting this book, and lastly my grandmother for her encouragement.

The Hague, 1988 V.A. van Bijlert

Abbreviations

AKBh	- Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam of Vasubandhu, ed. by P. Pradhan, Patna 1975, Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series vol. VIII
Burrow 1980	- Burrow, T., Sanskrit Mā- 'to ascertain', Transactions of the Philological Society, Oxford 1980, p. 135-140
Chakrabarti 1977	- Chakrabarti, Kisor Kumar, The Logic of Gotama, The University Press of Hawaii, 1977, Monograph No. 5 of the Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy
Chemparathy 1983	- Chemparathy, G., l'Autorité du Veda selon les Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, Louvain-La-Neuve 1983
D	- Derge edition
DhP	- Dharmottarapradīpa of Durvekamiśra, being a subcommentary on Dharmottara's Nyāyabinduṭīkā, ed. by Dalsukhbhai Malvania, Patna 1971[2], Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series, vol. II
DvNC II	- Dvadaśāraṃ Nayacakram of Ācārya Śrī Mallavādi Kṣamāśramaṇa with the commentary Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī of Śrī Siṁhasūri Gaṇi Vādi Kṣamāśramaṇa; part II, ed. by Muni Jambūvijaya-jī, Śrī Jain Ātmānand Sabhā-Bhāvnagar, 1976, Śrī Ātmānanda Jain Granthamālā Serial No. 94
Frauwallner 1933	- Frauwallner, E., Zu den Fragmenten buddhistischer Logiker im Nyāyavārttikam, WZKM 40, 1933, p. 281-304

Frauwallner 1935 - Frauwallner, E., Beiträge zur Apohalehre, WZKM 42, 1935, p. 93-102

Frauwallner 1954 - Frauwallner, E., Die Reihenfolge und Entstehung der Werke Dharmakīrti's, Asiatica, Festschrift F. Weller, Leipzig 1954, p. 142-154

Frauwallner 1957 - Frauwallner, E., Vasubandhu's Vādavidhiḥ WZKSO 1, 1957, p. 104-146

Frauwallner 1957a - Frauwallner, E., Review of the edition of PVBh in JAOS 77, 1957, p. 58-60

Frauwallner 1959 - Frauwallner, E., Dignāga, sein Werk und seine Entwicklung, WZKSO 3, 1959, p. 83-164

Frauwallner 1960 - Frauwallner, E., Devendrabuddhi, WZKSO 4, 1960, p. 119-123

Frauwallner 1961 - Frauwallner, E., Landmarks in the History of Indian Logic, WZKSO 5, 1961, p. 125-148

Frauwallner Gesch II - Frauwallner, E., Geschichte der Indischen Philosophie, II. Band, Otto Müller Verlag, Salzburg 1956

Goekoop 1967 - The Logic of the invariable concommitance in the Tattvacintāmaṇi, Reidel, Dordrecht 1967

GOS - Gaekwad Oriental Series

Gupta 1962 - Gupta, B., Die Wahrnehmungslehre in der Nyāyamañjarī, Bonn 1962

Hattori 1968 - Dignāga, On Perception, being the Pratyakṣapariccheda of Dignāga's Pramāṇasamuccaya, transl. and ann. by Masaaki Hattori, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1968

Hayes 1980 - Hayes, Richard P., Diṅnāga's Views on Reasoning (Svārthānumāna), JIPh 8, 1980, p. 219-277

IIJ - Indo-Iranian Journal

JAOS - Journal of the American Oriental Society

JBORS - The Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society

JIPh - Journal of Indian Philosophy

Katsura 1975 - Katsura, Shoryu, New Sanskrit Fragments of the Pramāṇasamuccaya, JIPh 3, 1975, p. 67-78

Katsura 1984 - Katsura, Shoryu, Dharmakīrti's theory of truth, JIPh 12, 1984, p. 215-235

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Nagatomi 1967/1968 - Nagatomi, M., Arthakriyā, The Adyar Library Bulletin, No. 31-32, 1967-1968, p. 52-72

NB - see DhP

NBh - The Nyāyadarśana of Gotama with the Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana, ed. by Padmaprāsada Śāstrī and Harirāma Śukla, Varanasi 1983[3], Kashi Sanskrit Series 43

ND - Nyāyadarśanam, with Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya, Uddyotakara's Vārttika, Vācaspati Miśra's Tātparyaṭīkā and Viśva-nātha's Vṛtti, ed. by Taranatha Nyaya Tarkatirtha and Amarendramohan Tarkatirtha, Calcutta 1936-1944, Reprint Rinsen Sanskrit Text Series, I-2, Kyoto 1982

NM - Nyāyamukha of Dignāga

NS - Nyāya Sūtra, see NBh

NS (G) - Ganganatha Jha, M., The Nyāya-Sūtras of Gautama with Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya and Uddyotakara's Vārttika, Allahabad 1915, Indian Thought Series, No. 7, vol. I-IV

NS (R) - Die Nyāyasūtra's, Text, Übersetzung, Erläuterungen und Glossar von Walter Ruben, Leipzig 1928, Kraus Reprint Ltd. Nendeln, Liechtenstein 1966

NS (V) - The Nyāya Sūtras of Gotama, translated by M.M. Satisa Chandra Vidyabhushana, revised and ed. by Nandalal Sinha, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1981

NV - Nyāyavārttika of Uddyotakara, Kashi Sanskrit Series No. 33, Benares 1915-1916

ÖAdW - Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften

Oberhammer 1963 - Oberhammer, G., Ein Beitrag zu den Vāda-Traditionen Indiens, WZKSO 7, 1963, p. 63-103

Oberhammer 1964 - Oberhammer, G., Der Svābhāvika-sambandha, ein Geschichtlicher Beitrag zur Nyaya-Logik, WZKSO 8, 1964, p. 131-181

Oberhammer 1964a - Oberhammer, G., Pakṣilasvāmin's Introduction to his Nyāyabhāṣyam, Asian Studies, vol. II, No. 3, Dec. 1964, University of the Philippines. p. 302-322

Oberhammer 1966 - Oberhammer, G., Zur Deutung von Nyāyasūtram 1.1.5, WZKSO 10, 1966, p. 66-72

Oberhammer 1974 - Oberhammer, G., Die Überlieferungsautorität im Hinduismus, in: Offenbarung, Geistige Realität des Menschen, Wien 1974, p. 41-92

P - The Tibetan Tripitaka, Peking Edition, ed. by D.T. Suzuki, 168 vols, Otani University, Tokyo-Kyoto 1955-1961

Potter 1977 - Potter, Karl H. (ed.), Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, vol. II, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1977

PS - Pramāṇasamuccaya

PS I - see Hattori 1968

PS II - see Hayes 1980

PV - Pramāṇavārttika

PV I - The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti, The first chapter with the Autocommentary, ed. by Raniero Gnoli, Roma 1960, Serie Orientale Roma 23

PV II - Pramāṇavārttika II, Pramāṇasiddhi

PV I (Mi) - Pramāṇavārttika-kārikā (Sanskrit and Tibetan), ed. by Yusho Miyasaka, Acta Indologica II, Naritasan Shinshoji 1971/1972, p. 2-41

PV II trsl Vetter - PV II. 131-285, Der Buddha und seine Lehre in Dharmakīrtis Pramāṇavārttika, eingeleitet, ediert und übersetzt von Tilmann Vetter, Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universität Wien, Wien 1984, Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde, Heft 12

PV III - Pramāṇavārttika III, Pratyakṣapariccheda

PVBh - Prajñākaragupta's Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣya and Vārttikālaṅkāra, ed. by R. Sāṁkṛtyāyana, Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna 1953

PVin - Pramāṇaviniścaya

PVP - Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā: P 5717 (b), Tshad ma, Che, 1-390a.8; D4217, Tshad ma, Che 1b-326b

PVSV - Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti

PVSV (Mal) - Pramāṇavārttika, Svārthānumāna-Pariccheda by Dharmakīrti, ed. by Dalsukh Bhai Malvaniya, Varanasi 1959, Hindu Vishvavidyalaya Nepal Rajya Sanskrit Series, vol. 2

PVSVT - Ācārya Dharmakīrteḥ Pramāṇavārttikam (Svārthānumānaparicchedaḥ) svopajñavṛttyā, Karṇakagomiviracitayā taṭṭīkayā ca sahitam, ed. by Rāhula Sāṁkṛtyāyana, Kitab Mahal, Allahabad 1943; Reprint: Karṇakagomin's Commentary on the Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti of Dharmakīrti, Rinsen Book Co., Kyoto 1982, Rinsen Buddhist Text Series I

PVV - Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti: Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika with a commentary by Manorathanandin, ed. by R. Sāṁkṛtyāyana, JBORS 24-26

PVV(S) - Pramāṇavārttika of Acharya Dharmakīrti with the commentary 'Vritti' of Acharya Manorathanandin, crit. ed. by Swami Dvarikadas Shastri, Varanasi 1968, Bauddha Bharati Series 3

PVT - Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā Tib. translation in P 5718, Tshad ma, Je, 1-402a.8; Ñe, 1-348a.8; PVT I, Je 1b.1-Ñe 85b.2, PVT II, Ñe 85b.2-Ñe 187a.8

Randle - Randle, H.N., Indian Logic in the Early Schools, Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press London, New York, Bombay, Calcutta, Madras 1930, Indian Reprint, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1976

Randle Frag - Randle, H.N., Fragments from Diṅnāga, Indian Reprint, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi 1981

Ruben - see NS (R)

Steinkellner 1961 - Steinkellner, E., Die Literatur des Älteren Nyāya, WZKSO 5, 1961, p. 149-163

Steinkellner 1966 - Steinkellner, E., Bemerkungen zu Īśvarasenas Lehre vom Grund, WZKSO 10, 1966, p. 73-85

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Steinkellner 1971 - Steinkellner, E., Wirklichkeit und Begriff bei Dharmakīrti, WZKS 15, 1971, p. 179-211

Steinkellner 1973 - Steinkellner, E., Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścayaḥ, Zweites Kapitel: Svārthānumānam, Teil I, Tibetischer Text und Sanskrittexte, ÖAdW, Wien 1973

Steinkellner 1974 - Steinkellner, E., On the Interpretation of the Svabhāvahetuḥ, WZKS 18, 1974, p. 117-129

Steinkellner 1979 - Steinkellner, E., Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścayaḥ, Zweites Kapitel: Svārthānumānam, Teil II, Übersetzung und Anmerkungen, ÖAdW, Wien 1979

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TTP - see P

Tucci 1929 - Tucci, G., Pre-Dignāga Buddhist Texts on Logic from Chinese Sources, Baroda 1929, GOS

Tucci 1930 - Tucci, G., The Nyāyamukha of Dignāga, The oldest Buddhist Text on Logic, after Chinese and Tibetan Materials, Heidelberg 1930, Materialien zur Kunde des Buddhismus, 15. Heft

Vetter 1964 - Vetter, Tilmann, Erkenntnisprobleme bei Dharmakīrti, ÖAdW, Wien 1964

Vetter 1984 - see PV II trsl Vetter

Vip - Vādanyāyaprakaraṇa of Dharmakīrti with the commentary Vipañcitārtha of Śāntarakṣita, crit. ed. by Dwarikadas Shastri, Varanasi 1972, Bauddha Bharati Series 8

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Wezler 1979 - Wezler, A., Dignāga's Kritik an der Schlusslehre des Nyāya und die Deutung von Nyāyasūtra 1.1.5, ZDMG, Suppl. 1.3, 1969, p. 836-842

WZKM - Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes

WZKS - Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens

WZKSO - Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens

ZDMG - Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft

Introduction

In this book I present an interpretative translation with exhaustive commentary of Dharmakīrti's[1] Pramāṇavārttika (PV) II.1-7[2]. These seven verses put forward and briefly discuss two general definitions of the notion 'pramāṇa', 'means of valid cognition', the most basic notion in old Indian epistemology. Before Dharmakīrti wrote these verses, no general pramāṇa-definitions had been given in any of the older epistemological treatises. Therefore Pramāṇavārttika II.1-7 occupies a rather unique place in Indian epistemology.

The two definitions are meant to provide a sound epistemological basis for a long discussion in the rest of PV II on the specific causes and characteristics of the religious authoritativeness of the Buddha and the most important aspects of His doctrine, as well as the possibility and the boundaries of such an authoritativeness[3].

The conciseness of Dharmakīrti's style of writing, especially in PV II.1-7, forced me to provide the translation with supplementary words, phrases or even whole sentences between square brackets[4] in order to make for intelligible reading, as a mere word-for-word rendering would hardly convey any meaning. This method I have used throughout the book. Apart from PV II.1-7 itself, I have translated (for the first time in a European language) the relevant exegetic passages from the oldest commentary on PV II-IV, the Pramāṇavārttika-Pañjikā (PVP), of Dharmakīrti's direct pupil Devendrabuddhi[5]. My representation of what is taught in PV II.1-7 is thus supported and verified by a commentary which indigenous tradition explicitly or implicitly has always regarded as authoritative. In explaining PV II.1-7 I have also drawn on Dharmakīrti's first work, the Pramāṇavārttika (PV) I, together with the Pramāṇavārttika-Svavṛtti (PVSV), in which he has formulated for the first time his new system of logic, his philosophical semantics, and his ideas on the reliability of language as a means to communicate correct knowledge. Some notions in PV II.1-7 originated from Dharmakīrti's philosophical predecessors among whom Pakṣilasvāmin and Dignāga[6] stand out because of their original and fundamental contributions to epistemological and logical thought.

In my commentary on PV II.1-7 I quote important passages from these authors in order to show the extent to which Dharmakīrti has used their ideas in this own doctrine.

In the first chapter I describe the epistemology and logic of the Nyāya-Sūtra (NS)[7] and the Nyāya-Bhāṣya (NBh). The NS is one of the earliest purely philosophical treatises which consistently defines its basic concepts and makes the discussion on the sources of correct knowledge its prime concern. It is also the source of a specific scheme of inferential reasoning that later culminated in Dignāga's system of logic. The NS has to a great extent provided the terminology and theoretical framework of subsequent epistemology, logic and dialectics. The NBh discusses (for the first time) the possibility of acquiring correct knowledge, its verifiability and its practical use. Furthermore, it propounds a logic more refined than that of the NS and submits (also for the first time) some epistemological criteria to verify metaphysical statements.

My second chapter shows how the immediate predecessors of Dharmakīrti, the Buddhist philosophers Vasubandhu[8] and Dignāga, improved on the epistemology and logic of the NBh. Vasubandhu wrote two small treatises on epistemology, logic and dialectics, the Vādavidhāna and the Vādavidhi. In these works he offers a theory of perception that is slightly different from that of the NBh, but more importantly, he creates a completely coherent system of logic by drawing the necessary conclusions from some logical doctrines that had remained scattered and unconnected in the NBh. Vasubandhu's system is described in the first part of chapter II. The second part is devoted to Vasubandhu's philosophical successor Dignāga. Dignāga summed up his own theories on epistemology, logic, dialectics and philosophical semantics in the Pramāṇasamuccaya (PS), a handbook which became the main source of advanced epistemology and logic for Buddhist as well as non-Buddhist philosophers until it was eventually superseded by Dharmakīrti's works. I describe Dignāga's epistemology and logic almost exclusively by quoting relevant passages from the PS. In relation to his logic, I also quote from an earlier work of his. In this way the reader can get a clear picture of (a) the development from Vasubandhu to Dignāga and

(b) he has before him those doctrines of Dignāga on which Dharmakīrti has built his own system.

In chapter III I present an outline of Dharmakīrti's first attempt at formulating a new and effectual system of logic. Taking Dignāga's logic as his starting-point, Dharmakīrti greatly simplifies its inferential procedure and shows how the logical connexion of concepts must have its basis in reality.

Dharmakīrti had not yet formulated his own theory of perception (the first pramāṇa in Dignāga's as well as his own epistemology) when he wrote PV I and PV II. He discusses perception at length in PV III, which was composed after PV II. Therefore it is very likely that Dharmakīrti, while putting forward his pramāṇa-definitions in PV II.1-7[9], still used as his main point of departure what Dignāga had said about perception as pramāṇa in PS I. Hence I have not devoted a separate chapter to Dharmakīrti's perception-theory, but in commenting on the perceptional aspect of the pramāṇa-definitions in PV II.1-7 I am often referring to the relevant passages dealing with perception in PS I.

The first three chapters as a whole should be regarded as a rather lengthy general introduction to the translation[10] of PV II.1-7. Chapter II and III should be regarded as a commentary on the notion pramāṇa as it is defined in PV II.1ab. For this reason I do not elaborately explain this word again in the actual commentary in chapter IV which contains the translation and interpretation of PV II.1-7.

Untill now, there has been only one publication that exclusively deals with the pramāṇa-definitions and discussions of PV II.1-7[11], namely the article by Sh. Katsura, "Dharmakīrti's Theory of Truth", which appeared in 1984. In this article Katsura presents an interpretative translation of PV II.1-6 with a philosophical commentary of his own in which he explains the two definitions and summarizes Dharmakīrti's ontological and epistemological views. The article is a useful general introduction to the epistemological problems PV II.1-6 raises. Still, it does not make my representation of PV II.1-7 in this book superfluous, as I try to describe those epistemological and logical developments that have led to Dharmakīrti's theory, translate parts of the oldest commentary on PV II and show how Dharmakīrti uses his two pramāṇa-definitions to lay down the epistemological and religious authority of the Buddha.

NOTES

1. The famous Buddhist philosopher Dharmakīrti lived 600-660 AD according to Frauwallner 1961, p. 137-139, but Lindtner 1980 proposes ca. 530-600 AD. Lindtner's proposal, which is not universally accepted, rests on the assumption that Dharmakīrti was the author of a Tattvaniṣkarṣa from which some verses are quoted in Bhavya's Madhyamakaratnapradīpa.

2. This chapter is also called Pramāṇasiddhi, 'The establishing of (the Buddha as) a means of valid cognition'. About the order in which the four chapters of PV were written cf Frauwallner 1954, p. 143, 145, 148-149. This order of the chapters was kept by the old commentators (the earliest of whom is Devendrabuddhi). The late commentator Manorathanandin changed the received order in the following way: chapter I becomes III, II becomes I, III becomes II, IV remains IV. Manorathanandin's order is retained, curiously enough, in Miyasaka's edition of the PV, PV (Mi). In the present book the original pre-Manorathanandin order is kept.

3. I refrain from giving a detailed exposition as Vetter 1984, p. 13-35 already deals with the contents of PV II in a very readable and thoroughgoing manner.

4. This procedure of interpretative translation is adopted by Vetter in his translation of PV II.121c-279 (PV II trsl Vetter).

5. According to Frauwallner 1961, p. 145 Devendrabuddhi lived ca. 630.689 AD.

6. According to Frauwallner Gesch II, p. 22 and Steinkellner 1961, p. 151 the Brahmanic Nyāya philosopher Pakṣilasvāmin could have lived in the 5th cent AD. He is the author of the influential Nyāya-Bhāṣya (NBh), the earliest commentary on the Nyāya-sūtra (NS) that has survived. The Buddhist philosopher Dignāga who lived ca. 540 AD (according to Frauwallner 1961, p. 137) wrote quite a number of works (cf Frauwallner

1959, p. 83, 139-164). His most famous book is the Pramāṇa-samuccaya (PS).

7. The Nyāya-Sūtra is the oldest systematic handbook on epistemology and metaphysics (cf Ruben, p. XV-XVI) and was written probably in the 1st or 2nd cent AD (cf Tucci 1929, p. XXIIIf and Potter 1977, p. 220).

8. This Vasubandhu should have lived ca. 400-480 AD (Frauwallner 1961, p. 129). Thus, he is either a bit later than, or contemporary with, Pakṣilasvāmin.

9. In the present book, only the first seven verses of PV II are being translated and discussed. A second publication will contain the translation and interpretation of PV II.8-34 which contains, among other things, a refutation of various proofs of the existence of a supreme Creator-God. Dharmakīrti refutes these proofs with the help of his own system of logic as put forward in PV I and the PVSV.

10. The epistemological and logical English terminology that is used throughout this book to translate the Sanskrit terms derives mostly from the following works: S. Chandra Vidyabhusana, A History of Indian Logic, Calcutta 1920, reprint Delhi 1979; H.N. Randle, Fragments from Dignāga, London 1926, reprint Delhi 1981; G. Tucci, The Nyāyamukha of Dignāga, Heidelberg 1930; S. Mookerjee and H. Nagasaki, The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti, Nalanda, Patna 1964; C. Goekoop, The Logic of Invariable Concomitance in the Tattvacintāmaṇi, Reidel, Dordrecht 1967; M. Hattori Dignāga, On Perception, Harvard 1968; E. Steinkellner, On the Interpretation of the Svabhāvahetuḥ, WZKS 18, 1974, p. 117-129.

11. Before Katsura 1984, we find a few valuable remarks on this passage in Vetter 1964, p. 27-28, 31-32, Steinkellner 1982, p. 10-13 and there is the Japanese translation of the whole PV II by T. Kimura, Dharmakīrti Shūkyō Tetsugaku no Genten Kenkyū, Tokyo 1981 (but cf also the remark on it in Vetter 1984, p. 7).

I The Beginnings of Systematic Epistemology and Logic

1.1 The highest Good

The first Indian school of thinking which explicitly teaches that the supreme good, defined as emancipation from all suffering, can be the object of rational inquiry and which, moreover, propounds a system of epistemology, logic and dialectics in order to give definite shape to this rational inquiry, seems to be the old Nyāya-school[1]. The oldest written document of that school is the Nyāya Sūtra (NS), a text consisting of some 530 aphoristic sentences (sūtras) arranged in 5 chapters, in which the basic concepts of the school are defined and discussed. Tradition has it that the text was written or edited by the somewhat mythical figure Akṣapāda Gotama, but there is no certainty concerning this personality or when he lived[2]. Although the NS combines heterogeneous philosophical notions such as ultimate liberation (in the religious sense) with natural philosophy, epistemology, logic and dialectics, we find in this text a much stronger tendency towards systematic exposition and coherency than in the philosophical writings that preceded it[3].

Even though the NS was a more consistent philosophical work than previous works and created the conceptual framework of much of subsequent epistemological and logical thinking, definite form to the old Nyāya-philosophy was given by Pakṣilasvāmin Vātsyāyana in his Nyāya Bhāṣya, the earliest extant commentary on the NS. We do not exactly know when Pakṣilasvāmin lived or where, but it must necessarily be after the date of composition of the NS and some time before Vasubandhu, one of the first known Buddhist logicians who improved upon the epistemology, logic and dialectics of the NS and the NBh[4]. On the authority of Frauwallner, we believe Vasubandhu the logician to have lived between around 400-480 AD (cf Frauwallner 1961, p. 129-131); thus Pakṣilasvāmin wrote his commentary any time before 480 AD (if we allow for the possibility of these two having been contemporaries)[5]. Pakṣilasvāmin not only

quite accurately interprets the NS-aphorisms themselves, he also sets forth many important new theories in addition to some seminal ideas found in the aphorisms he is explaining. The NS by its systematic framework and the NBh by its formulating some fundamental epistemological and logical principles for the first time, gave the impetus to the Buddhists (Vasubandhu, Dignāga and even to some extent Dharmakīrti) to develop their own form of "Nyāya", their own systematic treatment of epistemology, logic and dialectics (cf Steinkellner 1961, p. 150-152).

True knowledge (tattvajñāna) is of great importance to the adherent of the Nyāya-philosophy and hence the school lays a great deal of stress on epistemology and logic. However, true knowledge is not sought for its own sake; it is valued as a necessary condition for acquiring the supreme good in life[6]. We find this in NS 1.1.1, an aphorism which at first sight simply reads like a table of contents:

pramāṇaprameyasaṁśayaprayojanadṛṣṭāntasiddhāntāvayavatar-kanirṇayavādajalpavitaṇḍāhetvābhāsacchalajātinigraha-sthānānāṁ tattvajñānān niḥśreyasādhigamaḥ,

'The obtainment of the supreme good [proceeds] from the knowledge of the truth [ie true knowledge] of [ie concerning] (1) the means of valid cognition, (2) the objects [deserving] to be cognized [through those means of valid cognition], (3) doubt, (4) motive, (5) generally accepted fact, (6) established tenet, (7) the members [of the syllogism], (8) reasoning, (9) ascertainment, (10) discussion, (11) sophistry, (12) [capricious] faultfinding, (13) fallacious [logical] reasons, (14) deliberate misunderstanding, (15) futile rejoinders and (16) grounds for losing [an argument]'. These sixteen topics as a whole define the specific nature of the Nyāya-philosophy as mainly consisting of epistemology, logic and dialectics. The true knowledge of this philosophy enables one to attain (adhigama) to the highest good (niḥśreyasa), afterwards defined as complete freedom from suffering; it is said in the NS 1.1.22, tadatyantavimokṣo 'pavargaḥ, 'The complete liberation from that [ie from suffering] is

[final] emancipation'[7]. The ablative case tattvajñānāt in NS 1.1.1 suggests that true knowledge is not the instrument itself by which the highest good is obtained, for in that case we expect the instrumental case tattvajñānena, but that true knowledge is an indispensable prerequisite for obtaining the highest good, so that the good really proceeds from the knowledge[8]. The next sūtra describes how the highest good as final emancipation arises from true knowledge:

duḥkhajanmapravṛttidoṣamithyājñānānām uttarottarāpāye tadanantarāpāyād apavargaḥ

(NS 1.1.2),'When, of suffering, birth, activity, moral flaws and false knowledge, every next [item which is mentioned here] disappears, then it [ie every item which is mentioned] immediately [before, and which is the result of every next item] disappears [and] thereby emancipation [is won]'.

What is meant in this aphorism is that these five should disappear in the reverse order. Pakṣilasvāmin makes this quite clear in his commentary:

yadā tu tattvajñānān mithyājñānam apaiti, tadā mithyājñānāpāye doṣā apayanti, doṣāpāye pravṛttir apaiti pravṛttyapāye janmāpaiti janmāpāye duḥkham apaiti, duḥkhāpāye cātyantiko 'pavargo niḥśreyasam iti,

'When on account of knowledge of the truth [ie true knowledge] false knowledge disappears, then at the disappearance of false knowledge moral flaws disappear; at the disappearance of moral flaws activity disappears, at the disappearance of activity [a new] birth disappears; at the disappearance of [a new] birth suffering disappears; and at the disappearance of suffering everlasting emancipation, the supreme good [is won] (NBh 20.3-5)'. Since false knowledge indirectly causes suffering -- according to NS 1.1.2 and the commentary thereon --, it follows that true knowledge, being the contrary of false knowledge, ultimately ends all suffering, as is maintained in the NBh-passage[9].

Although the source of tattvajñāna is not specified in the NS, it is necessarily so that true knowledge ori-

ginates from a source which can be nothing else but the <u>means</u> of valid cognition, the <u>pramāṇas</u>. For true knowledge of a thing, true cognition of reality, is acquired -- as will be explained in the sequel -- through the means of valid cognition[10], a term which renders the Sanskrit word '<u>pramāṇa</u>', also meaning 'measure', 'standard', 'criterion' and 'authority'[11].

1.2 Theory of Knowledge, the four means of valid cognition

Before describing the epistemology and logic of the NS, I will quote the statements made by Pakṣilasvāmin on the function and advantages of correct knowledge. In the opening phrase of the NBh he says:
<u>pramāṇato 'rthapratipattau pravṛttisāmarthyād arthavat pramāṇam</u>,
'A means of valid cognition possesses the object, because of the appropriateness of [human] activity [with regard to the object] when the object is cognized through a means of valid cognition (NBh 1.5)'. The correct knowledge brought forth by a means of valid cognition enables the cognizer to act with regard to objects, and enables him (or her) to make the appropriate choices concerning these objects. The veracity of the cognition is gauged precisely from this ability to make the right choices; practical utility is thus the measuring-rod of truth. The NBh continues:
<u>pramāṇam antareṇa nārthapratipattiḥ, nārthapratipattim antareṇa pravṛttisāmarthyam. pramāṇena khalv ayaṃ jñātā-rtham upalabhya tam artham abhīpsati jihāsati vā. tasye-psājihāsāprayuktasya samīhā pravṛttir ucyate. sāmarthyaṃ punar asyāḥ phalenābhisambandhaḥ. samīhamānas tam artham abhīpsan jihāsan vā tam artham āpnoti jahāti vā. arthas tu sukhaṃ sukhahetuś ca, duḥkhaṃ duḥkhahetuś ca. so 'yaṃ pramāṇārtho 'parisaṃkhyeyaḥ prāṇabhṛdbhedasyāparisaṃ-khyeyatvāt</u>.
'Without a means of valid cognition there is no cognition of an object, without cognition of an object there is no appropriateness of [human] activity. For, when a cognizer has cognized an object with a means of valid cognition, he

either wishes to obtain that object or to avoid it. The striving of him who is [thus] instigated by the wish to obtain or to avoid is called "activity". And furthermore, the appropriateness is this [activity's] connexion with a result. He who is striving, being desirous of obtaining or avoiding an object, [finally] obtains that object or avoids it. As to the object, it is happiness and a cause of happiness, as well as suffering and a cause of suffering. And the [number of] object[s] for the means of valid cognition is limitless, owing to the fact that there are innumerable kinds of sentient beings (NBh 2.1-3.1)'. Correct knowledge has practical value inasmuch as it permits us to choose between what gives happiness and what will cause grief. What is to be abandoned is that which gives us pain and misery. With true knowledge we can get to know the causes of pain and remove them.

Pakṣilasvāmin points in the foregoing statements to a more secular, practical use of the Nyāya, a use nowhere explicitly mentioned in the NS. For in the NS the only good seems to be liberation from suffering in the highest religious sense (cf NS 1.1.1-2). Pakṣilasvāmin on the other hand, without in the least detracting from the ultimate religious goal, explicitly shows how the Nyāya philosophy can also help us in making the proper choices in daily life. The universal applicability of the Nyāya is implied in the assertion that 'the [number of] object[s] for the means of valid cognition is limitless, owing to the fact that there are innumerable kinds of sentient beings (NBh 3.1-2)'. And we find elsewhere in the NBh:

<u>yam artham abhīpsan jihāsan vā karmārabhate tenānena sarve prāṇinaḥ sarvāṇi karmāṇi sarvāś ca vidyā vyāptāḥ tadāśrayaś ca nyāyaḥ pravartate</u>,

'The object which one wishes to obtain or to avoid [and for the sake of which] one undertakes action, that [very object] pervades all sentient beings, all actions and all [forms of] learnedness. And the Nyāya [as system] operates with that [aforementioned object one wishes to obtain or avoid] as its basis (NBh 8.1-3)'. All activity and learning eventually aim at procuring the desirable and shunning

the undesirable.

The utility of correct knowledge being in this way established, we will now have to elaborate on the production of knowledge by the four means of valid cognition. NS 1.1.3 enumerates them:

pratyakṣānumānopamānaśabdāḥ pramāṇāni,

'The means of valid cognition are: perception, inference, comparison [based on analogy] and [reliable] statement'. This implies that these four instruments produce all the knowledge we can possibly acquire. Perception here primarily means sensory perception, ie direct perception by the eyes, ears, nose, tongue and touch. Inference is a judgement following on direct perception and revealing objects indirectly, objects that are not perceived at the time of inferring. Pakṣilasvāmin glosses:

anumānam, mitena liṅgenārthasya paścānmānam anumānam,

'Inference: the subsequent cognition of an object, with the help of a property [of that object] which is [already] known [through a means of valid cognition], is an inference (NBh 10.18)'. Thus the internal process of deductive reasoning as it happens in one's mind is briefly described. To give one famous example: if someone sees smoke on a mountaintop, he can infer that there is fire on the mountain, for he knows that wherever there happens to be smoke there is fire. He does not see the fire directly on the mountain, he 'sees' it indirectly through the coincidental smoke. Hence it is a cognition subsequent to (paścād) another cognition. Comparison means to know a new thing through its similarity to a given thing, a similarity which was previously described by a person who saw the new thing himself.

upamānaṃ sārūpyajñānaṃ yathā gaur evaṃ gavaya iti,

Comparison [based on analogy] is knowledge of the sameness of form: "a bos Gavaeus is like a cow", (NBh 24.2)'. Reliable statement gives verbal information on things we do not presently perceive or infer ourselves. śabdaḥ śabdyate anenārtha ity abhidhīyate jñāpyate, 'Reliable statement: by it an object is verbally expressed, thus it [the object] is pointed out, made known (NBh 24.4)'.

1.3 Perception

Every form of cognition starts with the direct perception of an object by the senses. In so far as perception conveys true knowledge, it is to be regarded as a means of valid cognition.

indriyārthasannikarṣotpannaṁ jñānam avyapadeśyam avyabhicāri vyavasāyātmakaṁ pratyakṣam,

'Knowledge which arises from the contact of the senses with an object, is perception [as a means of valid cognition, in so far as that knowledge is] not [yet] expressible [in language], not erroneous and consisting in [the] ascertainment [of what that object really is] (NS 1.1.4)'. It is clear from the Sanskrit-sentence that sensory perception, pratyakṣa, is primarily defined as knowledge, jñāna, that issues from the senses and their objects, and secondarily (but no less important) as not expressible in language, avyapadeśya, etc. The contact of the senses with an object, indriyārtha-sannikarṣa, determines knowledge, such knowledge determines sensory perception in general, while 'not expressible in language', 'not erroneous' and 'consisting in ascertainment' determine the aforementioned perception as a means of valid cognition, pramāṇa.

In Gupta 1962, p. 26-27 it is suggested that this definition originally could have run:

indriyārthasannikarṣotpannaṁ jñanaṁ pratyakṣam,

while the other three qualifications were added later. It cannot be established with absolute certainty that this has really happened, but Gupta makes out a good case by referring to the older perception definition in Vaiśeṣika Sūtra III.1.18,

ātmendriyārthasannikarṣād yan niṣpadyate tad anyat,

"Was aus dem Kontakt von Seele, Sinnesorgan und Gegenstand entsteht, das ist etwas anderes (als die Schlussfolgerung)" (Gupta 1962, p. 27).

It seems to me that NS 1.1.4 also defines a means of cognition in general as not erroneous and consisting in ascertainment. The first qualification avyapadeśya, 'not expressible in language' can only refer to pratyakṣa as

pramāṇa, since the knowledge produced by the other means of valid cognition is of necessity expressible and expressed in language, viz the knowledge produced by inference, analogy and reliable statement. However, all four pramāṇas have to be non-erroneous and consisting in ascertainment, for if they were not so, they would cease to be means of valid cognition.

In the NBh the three specific qualifications of perception as pramāṇa are explained one by one. About the condition that perception should be a mode of knowing that is not yet expressible in language Pakṣilasvāmin writes;

yāvadarthaṁ vai nāmadheyaśabdās. tair arthasampratyayaḥ, arthasampratyayāc ca vyavahāraḥ. tatredam indriyārtha-sannikarṣād utpannam arthajñānaṁ rūpam iti vā rasaḥ ity evaṁ vā bhavati, rūparasaśabdāś ca viṣayanāmadheyam. tena vyapadiśyate jñānaṁ rūpam iti jānīte rasa iti jānīte nāmadheyaśabdena vyapadiśyamānaṁ sat śābdaṁ prasajyate, ata āha avyapadeśyam iti

(NBh, p. 28.1-29.1), 'Indeed, there are [so many] words [being] names [signifying objects] as there are [real] objects. By means of these [denotative words alone] [the perceiver gets] the [firm] cognition of objects and from the [firm] cognition of objects [proceeds on the part of the perceiver intentional] activity [with regard to these objects; therefore direct perception of objects is always determined by the denotative words for the objects]. As regards this [contention we say,] the object-knowledge that has arisen from the contact of a sense with an object thus becomes [afterwards for the perceiver the internal notion] "form" or "taste", and the words for form and taste are the [denotative] name of a [real, outer] thing. By the [denotative name] [perceptual] knowledge is expressed, [ie the perceiver] knows for himself "[this is a] form" or "[this is a] taste". While [this perceptual knowledge] is being expressed through a word which is a name [denoting an outer object], it [ie perceptual knowledge] [could wrongly] be considered verbal [knowledge, ie knowledge determined fully by words and not by the outer objects at all]. Therefore [in order to avoid such a mis-

taken view of perceptual knowledge] he [Akṣapāda] says "not [yet] expressible in language".

At the beginning of this passage it is suggested that knowledge is, and can only be, received through language, ie that there is no form of direct perception in which language is not involved. But the Bhāṣya refutes this view by saying that the impressions derived from the senses receive their names like "form" and "taste" afterwards in the mind of the perceiver. Those sensory impressions are the objects that are verbally designated, but they have no direct connexion with the words that denote them. In order to distinguish perceptual knowledge from all the other modes of knowing in which language is necessarily involved, it is said that perceptual knowledge is not expressible in language, ie it is an immediate and purely non-verbal form of cognition of outer objects.

In order to be pramāṇa this purely non-verbal knowledge should not be erroneous:

grīṣme marīcayo bhaumenoṣmaṇā saṃsṛṣṭāḥ spandamānā dūrasthasya cakṣuṣā sannikṛṣyante, tatrendriyārthasannikarṣād udakam iti jñānam utpadyate, tac ca pratyakṣaṃ prasajyate ity ata āha avyabhicārīti.

'In the hot season, rays of sunlight which are connected with the heat of the soil and are vibrating [because of the heat], come in contact with the eye of a [person, an observer] standing at a great distance. [And] there [in the observer] on account of the contact of the senses with the object, arises the judgement "water". Now that can also [wrongly] be considered perception [as pramāṇa], therefore [in order to avoid this wrong idea] he [Akṣapāda] says "non-erroneous" (NBh 30.1-3)'. Perceptual judgements that contain errors are obviously ineffective, as they give no valid information at all.

The last special characteristic of perception is its consisting in ascertainment:

dūrāc cakṣuṣā hy ayam artham paśyan nāvadhārayati dhūma iti vā reṇur iti vā. tad etad indriyārthasannikarṣotpannam anavadhāraṇajñānaṃ pratyakṣaṃ prasajyata ity ata āha vyavasāyātmakam iti,

'[If] this [observer] at a great distance is watching with his eye a thing and does not determine whether it be smoke or dust, [then] such indeterminate knowledge springing from contact of the senses with an object can [wrongly] be considered perception [as pramāṇa]; therefore [in order to avoid this error] he [Akṣapāda] says "consisting in ascertainment" (NBh 30.5-7)'. As long as a sensory impression remains indecisive, it cannot function as an instrument of valid knowledge and such indeterminate knowledge would be quite unsuitable for procuring what is desirable and avoiding the undesirable (cf NBh 1.1-2 quoted above).

1.4 Inference

We have already seen Pakṣilasvāmin's description of inference as 'the subsequent cognition of an object with the help of a property [of that object] which is [already] known through a means of valid cognition (NBh 24.1)'. Now, first we must look at the cryptic NS-definition of inference, which as yet seems to elude explanation. It runs: atha tatpūrvakaṁ trividham anumānaṁ pūrvavac cheṣavat sāmānyatodṛṣṭaṁ ca,
'And preceded by this [ie by sensory perception] there is three-fold inference, [namely inference] possessing [ie concerning] what was previous, possessing [ie concerning] the rest, and [inference based on that which is] seen from similarity (NS 1.1.5)'. This translation is only tentative. The first part of the definition does not present too many difficulties[12]. It is both conceivable and rational that inference takes place only on the basis of correct knowledge acquired through the senses, so that inference is 'preceded by that', tatpūrvakam. Pakṣilasvāmin's commentary on the initial part of this definition is easy to follow.
tatpūrvakam ity anena liṅgaliṅginoḥ sambandhadarśanaṁ liṅgadarśanaṁ cābhisaṁbadhyate,
'Preceded by that, this refers to seeing the connexion between a property and the property-bearer and to seeing the property [connected with the property-bearer] (NBh 33.3)'.

Thereupon Pakṣilasvāmin depicts the process of inference itself:

<u>liṅgaliṅginoḥ sambaddhayor darśanena liṅgasmṛtir abhisambadhyate. smṛtyā liṅgadarśanena cāpratyakṣo 'rtho 'numīyate</u>,

'The recollection of the property is related to [the fact that one] has seen that the property and the property-bearer are connected [with each other]. By bringing [that connexion] back to memory and seeing the property, an invisible object, [ie the presently invisible property-bearer] is inferred (NBh 33.4-5)'. If we would substitute, for example, fire for property-bearer and smoke for property, this assertion becomes clear. At a certain time we saw for ourselves that smoke and fire are connected; we have often observed fire producing smoke[13]. If we remember this, and after a while we see some smoke but no fire, we may infer the presence there of fire on the grounds of smoke. In short, we see thing A and thing B connected, the connexion being that of property-bearer and property. When at a certain time we see thing B alone, we infer thing A to be present as well. In the case of smoke and fire, smoke is considered to be the property of fire. One might question the admissibility of these substitutions, but consider the following use made by Pakṣilasvāmin of the terms property, <u>liṅga</u> and property-bearer, <u>liṅgin</u>.

<u>apratyakṣe liṅgaliṅginoḥ sambandhe kenacid arthena liṅgasya sāmānyād apratyakṣo liṅgī gamyate, yathecchādibhir ātmā, icchādayo guṇāḥ guṇāś ca dravyasaṁsthānāḥ, tad yad eṣāṁ sthānaṁ sa ātmeti</u>,

'When the connexion between property and property-bearer is not directly perceivable, a not-perceivable property-bearer is cognized in so far as the [same] property is common to some [other visible] object, as for instance: the soul [is connected] [with perceivable properties such as] desire etc. Desire etc. are [perceivable] attributes and [all] attributes have as their abode a substance. The locus of these [attributes such as desire etc.] is the soul [hence it is proved that the soul exists] (NBh 36.2-4)'. The property-bearer, <u>liṅgin</u>, in the example is the

soul, while the properties, liṅgāni, are the soul's attributes, guṇāḥ, such as desire etc.[14]. In a syllogism one would have to predicate the possession of a soul of some subject; eg this man possesses a soul on the grounds that he shows signs of desire etc. which must be regarded as attributes necessarily inherent in a substance. In the syllogism (as will be made clear later), the property-bearer and its properties are themselves considered properties of a subject, sādhya, of which some property is inferred on the grounds of the subject's possessing another property connected with the first property. So far, inference as described in the NS and the NBh does not give great difficulties of interpretation. The interpretation of NS 1.1.5 becomes problematic with the term 'threefold'.[15] This qualification is not explained in the Bhāṣya, so we may assume that Pakṣilasvāmin takes it to refer to the three qualifications enumerated in the sequel of this aphorism.

As for the terms 'possessing what was previous', pūrvavat, 'possessing the rest',śeṣavat, and 'seen from similarity', sāmānyatodṛṣṭa, Pakṣilasvāmin gives two divergent explanations. A remarkable fact indeed, and indicative of the confusion that existed about these three terms already in Pakṣilasvāmin's time. The first set of explanations runs as follows:

pūrvavad iti, yatra kāraṇena kāryam anumīyate,
'Possessing what was previous, when an effect is inferred from a cause (NBh 34.1)'.

śeṣavat tat, yatra kāryeṇa kāraṇam anumīyate,
'Possessing the rest is that [inference] in which a cause is inferred from an effect (NBh 34.2)'. Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa, 'seen from similarity', is explained thus:

sāmānyatodṛṣṭam, vrajyāpūrvakam anyatra dṛṣṭasyānyatra darśanam iti, tathā cādityasya tasmād asty apratyakṣāpy ādityasya vrajyeti,
'Seen from similarity: seeing at one place an [object that was previously] seen at another place [while this seeing it now] is preceded by the movement [of the object] and thus, [seeing that] the sun [has changed position, one

infers] that on those grounds also the sun possesses motion [albeit] not immediately perceived (NBh 34-3.5)'. If objects are seen to always be in motion when they change places, it is possible to infer the motion of the sun because it changes its position in the sky during the day. 'Similarity', in all cases, is the observed change of position, and from this fact motion is inferred of things that are not actually seen to be moving.

In the next set of explanations Pakṣilasvāmin interprets pūrvavad quite differently.

athavā pūrvavad iti yatra yathāpūrvaṁ pratyakṣabhūtayor anyataradarśanenānyatarasyāpratyakṣasyānumānaṁ yathā dhūmenāgnir iti,

(NBh, p. 34.6-35.1), 'Or pūrvavad [means: that case] in which -- by seeing one of two [objects] of direct perception in the way (yathā) [they have] previously (pūrvam) [been seen] -- the other [thing that is now] not perceivable is inferred [to be present], as [the presence of] fire [that is now not seen is inferred] by [seeing] smoke'.

This explanation runs opposite to the first, which said pūrvavad meant inferring an effect from a cause. According to this second explanation, the "previous", pūrva, refers to the fact that previously two things were seen together, while the presence of the one thing that is now not directly perceived is inferred from the presence of the other connected thing that is perceived.

As regards śeṣavad, too, Pakṣilasvāmin gives an alternative explanation.

śeṣavan nāma pariśeṣaḥ sa ca prasaktapratiṣedhe 'nyatrāprasaṅgāc chiṣyamāṇe sampratyayaḥ,

'Possessing the rest means the remainder, and that is the firm conviction as regards [the only] remaining [logical possibility] in so far as one other [of several possibilities] is not absurd when [all] absurd [possibilities] have been negated (NBh 35.1-2)'. In this explanation śeṣavad is interpreted as "having the remainder" (śeṣa) in the context of NS 1.1.5. Moreover, this alternative interpretation deviates very much from the previous one, according

to which _śeṣavad_ refers to the inference of a cause from an effect.
The second explanation of _sāmānyatodṛṣṭa_ is given in the passage already quoted in connexion with the terms 'property' and 'property-bearer' in NBh 36.2-4. There it is maintained that a property-bearer which is not directly perveived can be inferred to exist on the grounds that it has properties similar to those of a perceivable property-bearer. The "invisible" property-bearer is "seen" (_dṛṣṭa_) from its similarity to (_sāmānyataḥ_) "visible" property-bearers. This explanation differs from the previous one of _sāmānyatodṛṣṭa_; for in the first, in NBh 34.3-5, the property-bearer was not invisible but a property of it, motion, was invisible. In the second explanation the properties are visible but the property-bearer is not visible.

In the concluding paragraph on inference, Pakṣilasvāmin remarks:
sadviṣayaṁ ca pratyakṣaṁ sadasadviṣayaṁ cānumānam,
'The realm of perception is that which is [now manifestly] present; the realm of inference is that which is [now] present as well as that which is not present [now] (NBh 37.1)'.
kasmāt ? traikālyagrahaṇāt, trikālayuktā arthā anumānena gṛhyante bhaviṣyatīty anumīyate bhavatīti cābhūd iti ca, asac ca khalv atītam anāgataṁ ceti,
'Why ?, Because [inference] grasps the [totality of the] three times. Objects connected with the three times [past, present and future] are grasped by inference, [because] it is inferred "[this] will be", "[this] is [now]" and "[this] was", and indeed [a thing of] the past and [of] the future are not present [now] (NBh 37.1-3)'. This seems to summarize the discussion on the three types of inference by suggesting that the threefoldness refers to the fact that we can draw inferences about things in the past, present and future[16].

1.5 Comparison based on analogy

The third means of valid cognition is comparison based on analogy, upamāna. It is defined thus:
prasiddhasādharmyāt sādhyasādhanam upamānam
(NS 1.1.6), 'Comparison [based on analogy] is the demonstration of a probandum [ie a thing that is to be demonstrated or indicated] on the grounds that [the probandum] possesses [in some degree] the same properties as a [thing or property-bearer that is] well known [to the hearer to whom the analogy is pointed out]'. Pakṣilasvāmin has already briefly explained comparison in NBh 24.2 cited above, 'Comparison [based on analogy] is knowledge of the sameness of form: "a bos Gavaeus is like a cow'. On the NS-definition itself he comments:
prajñātena sāmānyāt prajñāpanīyasya prajñāpanam upamānam iti. yathā gaur evaṁ gavaya iti,
'Pointing out of what is to be pointed out in so far as the [thing to be pointed out] is similar to a known thing, is [called] comparison [as for instance when we say]: "a bos Gavaeus is like a cow" (NBh 37.6-7)'. And moreover:
yathā gaur evaṁ gavaya ity upamāne prayukte gavā samānadharmam artham indriyārthasannikarṣād upalabhamāno 'sya gavayaśabdaḥ sañjñeti sañjñāsañjñisambandhaṁ pratipadyata iti,
'After the comparison "a bos Gavaeus is like a cow" has been employed [by a speaker], a person who cognizes from the contact of the senses with the object [ie by pratyakṣa] a thing whose properties are similar to those of a cow, knows the connexion between the designation and the designated, namely: the word bos Gavaeus is the designation of this [cowlike animal] (NBh 38.2-3)'. Comparison, or rather, gaining knowledge of an unknown thing through testimony and the perceivable resemblance of the unknown thing to a known thing does not constitute what at first sight seems to be an inference. For by inference we come to know a hitherto unknown property of a given subject from seeing another intimately connected property. And since we observed that the two properties were always

connected, we legitimately infer the first property to be present in the subject. The two properties themselves are known to us, the subject is known, but the relation of one of the properties to the subject is not known; it is inference that makes such a relation known. As for comparison, we know one particular object and its properties, whereas there may be a multitude of objects that partly resemble our known object. Another expert person has to point out to us such an unknown object by saying it greatly resembles the known thing. This speaker must of necessity know both objects. We know only one, but as soon as we see an object closely corresponding to the speaker's description (and our recollection of the known thing), we know that we have discovered the unknown thing. Through comparison we proceed from a known object to an unknown object on the strength of our perception and reliable testimony, whereas in inference we proceed from two known objects to an unknown relation between one of these two with a third known object. The basis of inference and comparison remains sensory perception, the fundamental means of valid cognition.

1.6 Reliable Statement

The fourth and last means of valid cognition is a way of knowing objects solely by verbal designation. Of course the perceiver must perceive the statements which contain this knowledge with his own organ of hearing, but the new knowledge that is brought to him does not come into being through his own sensory perception as in inference and comparison. The latter could be regarded as a combination of perception and a reliable statement, because the first element in that cognitive process, the object to which the unknown object is compared (by a reliable speaker) is known, and needs to be known, through sensory perception. In the case of a reliable statement, the object is fully unknown to the hearer and the validity of the knowledge rests entirely on the validity of the statement and hence on the reliability of the speaker.

NS 1.1.7 defines reliable statement as a means of valid cognition in this way: āptopadeśaḥ śabdaḥ, '[Reliable] statement is the instruction of an expert'. The word āpta has various meanings among which 'expert', 'trustworthy', 'reliable' and 'skilful'. It is intended in this aphorism that the reliability of the statement or instruction depends on the trustworthiness of the speaker and his expertise. Moreover, it is quite clear that not simply any statement could be pramāṇa, but only those that contain true information in the form of valid instruction. Pakṣilasvāmin writes about this aphorism;
āptaḥ khalu sākṣātkṛtadharmā yathādṛṣṭasyārthasya cikhyāpayiṣayā prayukta upadeṣṭā. sākṣātkaraṇam arthasyāptiḥ. tayā pravartata ity āptaḥ. ṛṣāryamlecchānāṁ samānaṁ lakṣaṇam. tathā ca sarveṣāṁ vyavahārāḥ pravartanta iti, 'Now, an expert is an instructor who has directly perceived the dharma [righteousness, the moral order in the cosmos] and who is urged by a desire to describe a thing as he has seen it. Expertise concerning a thing is the direct perception [of it] and he who acts with that [expertise] is an expert. [Expertise can be] the common characteristic of sages, honourable people [following the orthodox way of life according to the Vedas] and barbarians [those that do not follow the orthodox way of life, ie the foreigners]. And [it is a fact that] in this way [with the help of expertise] the [daily] affairs of all [beings] are carried out (NBh 40.1-3)'. A person who has directly perceived the dharma, a sākṣātkṛtadharmā, seems to denote Vedic ṛṣis, for the term occurs already with Yāska, the author of the Nirukta (cf Chemparathy 1983, p. 21, 78 note 20 which mentions some relevant literature on dharma and Oberhammer 1974, p. 50, note 29 on sākṣātkṛta-dharmatā). In the broader context evidently intended in the NBh, dharma seems simply to mean 'the true state of a thing or fact', 'the true nature of things'. The immediate experience of a thing or fact constitutes the expertise of the expert. In a rather democratic spirit the commentator acknowledges that all sorts of people, from Vedic seers to barbaric foreigners, can be an expert in something. In ac-

complishing many of our everyday concerns, we need practical information in the form of reliable statements made by those who know something thoroughly. And yet reliable statement, śabda, does not denote only practical information. The sūtra says:

sa dvividho dṛṣṭādṛṣṭārthatvāt,

'It [reliable statement] is of two kinds according to whether the object [it refers to] is [something] manifest [to the senses] or not manifest [to the senses] (NS 1.1.8)'. Pakṣilasvāmin comments:

yasyeha dṛśyate 'rthaḥ so dṛṣṭārthaḥ. yasyāmutra pratīyate so 'dṛṣṭārthaḥ. evam ṛṣilaukikavākyānāṁ vibhāga iti,

'If the object of a [statement] is [something] seen here [on earth], the [statement] refers to [something] manifest [to the senses]. If the [object] of a [statement] is experienced in the other world, the [statement] refers to [something] not manifest [to the senses]. In this way we divide the assertions of sages and ordinary people (NBh 41.1-2)'. The commentator continues:

kimarthaṁ punar idam ucyate ? sa na manyeta dṛṣṭārtha evāptopadeśaḥ pramāṇam arthasyāvadhāraṇād iti; adṛṣṭārtho 'pi pramāṇam arthasyānumānād iti,

'For what purpose is this [division] enunciated ? One should not think that the instruction of an expert is a means of valid cognition only [if] [the instruction] refers to something manifest because the object of the statement can be ascertained directly [by the senses]. Also a [statement] referring to something not manifest [to the senses] is a means of valid cognition because the object [of the statement can] be inferred [to exist] (NBh 41.2-4)'. The first kind of reliable statement gives information about visible things, and these statements can be validly made by both proficient sages and proficient common persons. We are capable of verifying such statements, as the objects they describe are always somehow visible to our senses. Thus, it is said that the object of this kind of statement can be ascertained directly. The second kind gives information on invisible things, especially of course on religious topics such as the hereafter

and final liberation from suffering. It is not possible for us to verify such statements directly by the senses, because the objects these statements refer to elude our perception. Hence it is maintained that the existence of those invisible objects can only be proved through inference, which probably means that we must infer the existence of those objects from the trustworthiness of the ones who speak about them as is asserted later in NBh 225.1-2.[17]

Observing the four pramāṇas in the given order of perception, inference, analogy and reliable statement, one discovers an increasing remoteness on the part of the perceiver from the object to be cognized. This would explain the particular order in which they are treated in the NS. This order implicitly evinces the increasing distance of the perceiver from the object, besides demonstrating the prime importance of direct perception in knowing reality. Perception is the most direct and closest way of cognizing an object. Inference is a correct but indirect form of cognition in which perception plays some part so that it is not as direct as perception. Comparison is still less direct than inference, since it requires the reliable testimony of another for its correct functioning, unlike inference which can be performed by oneself. Reliable statement functions entirely without our own perception, unlike comparison which requires that we perceived the object with which the unknown object is compared. We cannot perform the latter two acts of cognition without the outside help of a reliable speaker, while we can correctly carry out the former two acts of cognition by ourselves. Hence we can say that the order of pramāṇas, beginning with perception, suggests a decreasing directness, which means a greater cognitive distance from the object to be cognized. It is almost a truism that an accurate description of an object in no way equals the direct sensory perception of the object; for an accurate description is what reliable statement, <u>śabda</u>, really amounts to.

1.7 The Syllogism

It is through philosophical debate that the true nature of a fact is ascertained:
vimṛśya pakṣapratipakṣābhyām arthāvadhāraṇaṁ nirṇayaḥ, 'Ascertainment is determining a thing [concerning which] doubts have arisen [; determining is done in discussion] by means of a [philosophical] position and an adverse position (NS 1.1.41)'. Ideally, a philosophical debate proceeds in the form of a discussion (vāda) in which deductive arguments, syllogisms, are put forward;
pramāṇatarkasādhanopālambhaḥ siddhāntāviruddhaḥ pañcāvayavopapannaḥ pakṣapratipakṣaparigraho vādaḥ, 'Discussion consists in keeping up [a thesis] by means of a [philosophical] position and an adverse position [; in this keeping up] there is the establishing [ie the affirmation of something] and censure [ie the negation of something] through the means of valid cognition and reasoning [meant to know the truth about a knowable thing; and further, this keeping up a thesis] is not contrary [ie ought not to be contrary] to established tenets and [it] is accompanied by the five members [of the syllogism] (NS 1.2.1)'. In this definition of a genuine philosophical inquiry meant to find the truth about a thing, the instruments for getting valid knowledge, the four means of valid cognition, as well as the syllogism are explicitly mentioned. Even though, ultimately, the means of valid cognition produce all true knowledge, the syllogism is in fact -- according to this definition -- the moving force of dialectically putting forward a doctrinal point of dispute, for it is said that this putting forward, keeping up, parigraha, is accompanied by, upapanna, the five members of the deductive syllogism. Deduction means validly inferring a particular fact from given general facts which function as major and minor premises. It is regarded in the Nyāya as the supreme kind of reasoning, paramo nyāyaḥ (NBh 12.1). Pakṣilasvāmin writes:
kaḥ punar ayaṁ nyāyaḥ ? pramāṇair arthaparīkṣaṇaṁ nyāyaḥ. pratyakṣāgamāśritam anumānaṁ sānvīkṣā,

'But what is this nyāya (sound reasoning)? Nyāya (sound reasoning) is investigating an object with the means of valid cognition. Such investigation is [actually] inference based on perception and tradition [which when valid is reliable statement] (NBh 8.3-4)'. These words signify that the correct syllogism is an explicit inference.

A complete syllogism consists of five members:

pratijñāhetūdāharaṇopanayanigamanāny avayavāḥ,

'The members [of the syllogism] are: thesis, reason, example, application and conclusion (NS 1.1.32)'. I will now give the NS's definitions of these terms along with some of Pakṣilasvāmin's clarifications.

sādhyanirdeśaḥ pratijñā,

'The thesis means indicating what is to be demonstrated (NS 1.1.33)'. The thesis should specify the subject and the property of which it must be proved that it occurs in the subject: in other words, the thesis is a proposition which specifies the subject and the probandum.

prajñāpanīyena dharmeṇa dharmiṇo viśiṣṭasya parigrahavacanaṁ pratijñā,

'The thesis is keeping up [as a hypothesis] that a particular property-bearer is possessed of a property that is yet to be shown [to occur in that property-bearer] (NBh 81.7)'. And elsewhere, Pakṣilasvāmin says:

sādhyasya dharmasya dharmiṇā sambandhopādānaṁ pratijñārthaḥ,

'The purport of the thesis is accepting that there is a connexion of a property-bearer with a property that is to be proved [to occur in the property-bearer] (NBh 91.3)'. The example of a thesis given by Pakṣilasvāmin is:

anityaḥ śabda iti,

'Sound is non-eternal (NBh 81.8)'. This necessarily means all sounds, but unlike Aristotelian logic, NS- and NBh-logic do not use an explicit quantifier. Here, sound is the property-bearer, while non-eternity is the property of which we wish to prove that it occurs in the property-bearer, sound.

As such, this statement is not yet a piece of solid

knowledge; for being that it requires a valid logical reason, hetu. The next sūtra defines the reason: udāharaṇasādharmyāt sādhyasādhanaṁ hetuḥ, 'That [property, probans] which demonstrates the probandum is the logical reason in so far as the same property [the probans] occurs in the example (NS 1.1.34)'. It is necessarily implied here that the probans (hetu) occurs in the subject of which the other property, the probandum, must be proved to occur in it. If the probans would not be a property of the subject, the whole reasoning of the syllogism becomes nonsensical. The example in which the probans must occur too, is a commonly acknowledged fact, dṛṣṭānta; in the dṛṣṭānta brought forward as exemplification in the syllogism, the probans and probandum are seen together as related or connected (sambaddha) properties[18]. The commentary states:
udāharaṇasāmānyāt sādhyasa dharmasya sādhanaṁ prajñāpanaṁ hetuḥ, sādhye pratisandhāya dharmam udāharaṇe ca pratisandhāya tasya sādhanatāvacanaṁ hetuḥ. utpattidharmakatvād iti. utpattidharmakam anityaṁ dṛṣṭam iti,
'The reason is that which demonstrates [or] shows the property that is to be proved through similarity with the example; the reason is the verbal expression of the fact that the [particular property now occurring in the subject] is the probans, after it is remembered that the property [the probans] occurs in the subject and after it is remembered that it [also] occurred in the example. [As in the illustrative syllogism: sound is non-eternal] because it possesses the property of production [ie of being produced]. It is seen [and hence well-known] that [everything] which has the property of production is non-eternal (NBh 82.2-4)'. Pakṣilasvāmin clearly states that the probans, the hetu, is present in the subject. In the illustrative syllogism, 'the property of production' serves as probans; 'being non-eternal' is the probandum. Whatever is produced is acknowledged by all to be ephemeral, non-eternal. The only logical connexion between probans and probandum, according to Pakṣilasvāmin, is the fact that both are always seen (dṛṣṭa) together in the commonly ac-

knowledged fact (dṛṣṭānta) serving as example (udāharaṇa).

In order to be valid, the reason must not occur in examples in which the contrary of the probandum is found. Thus, for example, the property of production which is probans, must not be present in things that are eternal, which is the contrary of being non-eternal. Hence the NS declares: tathā vaidharmyāt, 'And in so far as that property [ie the probans] does not occur [in a contrary example] (NS 1.1.35)'. We have to supply the beginning of NS 1.1.34 to give the proper sense to this sūtra: 'That [property] which demonstrates the probandum is the reason [also] in so far as this property does not occur [in a contrary example]'; this would have been the complete formulation.

Pakṣilasvāmin explains it at some greater length:
udāharaṇavaidharmyāc ca sādhyasādhanaṁ hetuḥ,
'The reason is that which demonstrates the probandum also in so far as this property [the probans] is absent from [contrary] examples (NBh 83.2)'. For if the probans would also occur with a property contrary to the probandum, the probans would never conclusively prove the probandum and consequently the syllogism would sometimes fail.
Pakṣilasvāmin continues:
katham anityaḥ śabdaḥ utpattidharmakatvāt.
anutpattidharmakaṁ nityaṁ yathātmādi dravyam iti,
'How [as in our illustrative syllogism:] is sound non-eternal?; because it possesses the property of production. That which is eternal does not possess the property of production such as [all the unborn, eternal] substances beginning with the soul (NBh 83.2-3)'. Pakṣilasvāmin implies here that being a product and being impermanent always go together, and that being unborn and being eternal always go together, whilst being a product and being permanent or being unborn and being non-eternal never go together.

The validity of the syllogism is based on the example in which a commonly known fact is put forward in support of the logical reason. The definition of the example is as follows.

sādhyasādharmyāt taddharmabhāvī dṛṣṭānta udāharaṇam,
'A generally-accepted fact which possesses the property [to be demonstrated, the probandum] of the [subject] is a [valid] example [in the syllogism] in so far as the same property [the probans being a known property] of the subject occurs [in the generally-accepted fact] (NS 1.1.36)'. In this aphorism it is emphasized that the probans (hetu) must be found in the subject, as well as in the positive example where it occurs with the probandum. The positive example is a dṛṣṭānta which is positive because of the following two facts: a. in it occurs the probandum (taddharmabhāvin); b. in so far as it also possesses the probans, a known property of the subject (sādhyasādharmyāt), this dṛṣṭānta can function as a valid, true, and positive example in reasoning. The ablative sādhyasādharmyāt expresses the condition under which the dṛṣṭānta is positive, namely: the dṛṣṭānta which possesses the probandum should also possess the probans. The example is not simply an analogous instance cited to make the thesis more plausible, but the mentioning of a fact that is acknowledged to be true by all. One is tempted to say that what is implied here is: a dṛṣṭānta is a fact consisting in an indefinite number of cases where the probans and the prodandum have been seen together, not a fact consisting in one single case in which the probans and the probandum have been seen together. But this interpretation of dṛṣṭānta is not explicitly given in the NS, even though it is a very likely one. It seems that the syllogism as outlined in the NS itself already offers the framework of a sound deductive proof.

The phrase sādhyasādharmyāt Pakṣilasvāmin glosses as follows:
sādhyena sādharmyaṁ samānadharmatā,
'Sādharmya with the subject means being [endowed] with the same property [as the subject] (NBh 83.5)'. The 'same property' refers to the known property of the subject; this known property acts as logical reason because it is seen together with the property to be proved. In the dṛṣṭānta we notice that it is always the case that whenever there

is the probans there is the probandum.

The phrase *taddharma* is glossed:

tasya dharmas taddharmaḥ. tasya sādhyasya,

'*Taddharma* [means] the property of that; of that [means] of the subject (NBh 84.1)'. The property of the subject here refers to the property that is to be proved, of which it is said that it occurs in the *dṛṣṭānta*. The definition in the sūtra itself is constructed as follows: the generally-accepted fact has the probandum, and because it also has the probans, it serves as a valid example in the syllogism. To substantiate the importance of the *dṛṣṭānta* in syllogistic, deductive reasoning, I will quote the definition of *dṛṣṭānta* given in the NS with Pakṣilasvāmin's explanation. The sūtra defines,

laukikaparīkṣakāṇāṁ yasminn arthe buddhisāmyaṁ sa dṛṣṭāntaḥ,

'A generally-accepted fact is a thing of which ordinary people and [learned] investigators have the same cognition (NS 1.1.25)'. Thus a *dṛṣṭānta* is a thing, situation or fact that is accepted to be really the case by non-experts and experts alike. The term *dṛṣṭānta* by itself already evokes this idea of universal acceptance, for it literally means ascertainment, definite settlement (*anta*) seen, directly perceived, acknowledged (*dṛṣṭa*) [by all]. For example, everyone, non-experts and experts, knows that wherever there is smoke there is fire, or that everything created must some day perish, is non-eternal.[19]

Pakṣilasvāmin says somewhere about *dṛṣṭānta*:

atha dṛṣṭāntaḥ pratyakṣaviṣayo 'rthaḥ. yatra laukikaparīkṣakāṇāṁ darśanaṁ na vyāhanyate,

'Now *dṛṣṭānta* is a thing which is an object of direct perception concerning which the vision of both ordinary people and [learned] investigators is not confused (NBh 10.3-4)'. And a little further he describes the importance of the *dṛṣṭānta*:

tadāśrayāv anumānāgamau. tasmin sati syātām anumānāgamāv asati ca na syātām,

'Inference and tradition [consisting of reliable statements] are both based on a [*dṛṣṭānta*].

When this [dṛṣṭānta] is present, inference and [reliable] tradition are possible [ie can be regarded as pramāṇas], when the [dṛṣṭānta] is absent, [inference and reliable tradition] are impossible (NBh 10.4-5)'. These two passages explicitly state that a dṛṣṭānta should be used in drawing a correct inference; this means that a syllogism (in which dṛṣṭāntas are formulated) could simply be considered a verbalized inference. The idea that reliable statements (śabda, āgama) too, should be based on a dṛṣṭānta suggests that the ideal reliable statement is not different from syllogistic reasoning.

In the commentary on NS 1.1.25 Pakṣilasvāmin delineates the function of dṛṣṭānta in dialectical discussions and the syllogism;

dṛṣṭāntavirodhena hi pratipakṣāḥ pratiṣeddhavyā bhavantīti dṛṣṭāntasamādhinā ca svapakṣāḥ sthāpanīyā bhavantīti; avayaveṣu codāharaṇāya kalpata iti,

'For, the opposite positions must be contradicted through [their] disagreement with a generally-accepted fact, and one's own positions must be established through [their] agreement with a generally-accepted fact; and [moreover] in the syllogism [the generally-accepted fact] adequately serves as the example (NBh 73.2-3)'.

Returning to the discussion on the example, we find that Pakṣilasvāmin shows its use in the illustrative syllogism: sound is non-eternal because it has the property of production.

śabdo 'py utpattidharmakatvād anityaḥ sthālyādivad iti. udāhriyate dharmayoḥ sādhyasādhanabhāva ity udāharaṇam,

'Also sound, because it possesses the property of production, is non-eternal like [all produced] things [such as] vessels etc. By this [well-known fact] it is exemplified that the two properties function as probandum and probans; in this manner the example [works] (NBh 85.1-2)'. The well-known fact here, is that all visible and tangible objects like cooking vessels etc. are seen to be made by someone, and are seen to be subject to decay. It is implied although not clearly stated that the two properties are invariably concomitant[20].

To the phrase in NS 1.1.35 'And in so far as that property [the probans] does not occur [in a contrary example]' corresponds a definition of the contrary example. tadviparyayād vā viparītam (NS 1.1.37), 'Or [the example is] contrary in so far as the [generally-accepted fact constituting the example] is contrary [ie a generally-accepted fact which does not possess the probandum is a valid contrary example in so far as the probans does not occur in it either]'. It has been said in NS 1.1.35 that the probans should never occur with properties contrary to the probandum, which is the same as saying that the probans should not occur without the probandum. The contrary example shows that when the probandum is absent, the probans is likewise absent. Pakṣilasvāmin illustrates this through the familiar syllogism on sound:

anityaḥ śabda utpattidharmakatvāt. anutpattidharmakaṁ nityam ātmādi. so 'yaṁ ātmādir dṛṣṭāntaḥ sādhyavaidharmyād anutpattidharmakatvād ataddharmabhāvī; yo 'sau sādhyasya dharmo 'nityatvaṁ sa tasmin na bhavatīti,

'Sound is non-eternal because it possesses the property of production. [Every substance that] is eternal [like] the soul etc. does not possess the property of production. This generally-accepted fact, starting with [unborn, eternal substances like] the soul, while not possessing the property [the probandum] of the [subject, namely non-eternity] is [a valid logical example] in so far as in it [ie in the dṛṣṭānta] does not occur the property [the probans] of the subject, [that is to say] the property of production; ie this property [the probandum ie] non-eternity of the subject is not present in this [dṛṣṭānta] (NBh 86.1-3)'.[21]

The fourth step in the syllogism is called upanaya, 'application'.

udāharaṇāpeksas tathety upasaṁhāro na tatheti vā sādhyasyopanayaḥ,

'The application of the subject is [its] summing up based on the [positive and contrary] examples: either [something] is thus [the case], or it is not (NS 1.1.38)'. In the application, we must ascertain whether the property,

being present in the subject, is really the same property (as probans) we saw in the positive examples to be connected with the probandum, and in the contrary examples to be never connected with the contrary of the probandum, which implies that when the probandum is absent, the probans is absent. Application means that the general rule of the *dṛṣṭānta* and the particular fact of the *hetu* is applied to, literally brought near (*upa* and verb. root *nī*), the subject, *sādhya*; the latter is compared to the positive examples and found to possess the same property (probans) or compared to the contrary examples found to be totally different from them. In the *Bhāṣya* it is shown how the application is used,

'...*sthālyādi dravyam utpattidharmakam anityaṁ dṛṣṭaṁ tathā śabda utpattidharmaka iti sādhyasya śabdasyotpattidharmakatvam upasaṁhriyate*,

'It is seen that a substance [like] a vessel etc. which is non-eternal has the property of production, [and] thus [in the same way], sound has the property of production; in this manner, the fact that sound, the subject, possesses the property of production is summed up (NBh 87.3-4)'. This is the application based on a positive example; the application according to a contrary example runs as follows:

ātmādi dravyam anutpattidharmakaṁ nityaṁ dṛṣṭaṁ na tathā śabda iti: anutpattidharmakatvasyopasaṁhārapratiṣedhenotpattidharmakatvam upasaṁhriyate,

'It is seen that a substance [like] the soul etc. which is eternal does not have the property of production, [and] sound is not like that; in this way, the fact that [sound] has the property of production is summed up by means of a negation, being the summing up of the fact that [substances contrary to sound] possess the property of non-production [ie are never created] (NBh 87.5-6)'.

The last step in the syllogism is the conclusion: *hetvapadeśāt pratijñāyāḥ punarvacanaṁ nigamanam*,

'After [again] pointing out the reason, the repetition of the thesis [becomes] the conclusion [of the syllogism] (NS 1.1.39)'. In the application it was decisively estab-

lished that the subject resembles the positive examples in so far as the probans occurs in all; now it remains to come to the logical conclusion of the syllogism. By pointing out the reason -- the probans which was seen to be connected with the probandum -- and by stating that a certain subject is endowed with that probandum, the unfounded thesis is made into a proved assertion, a true proposition. Pakṣilasvāmin shows the workings of the conclusion in his syllogism on sound:
tasmād utpattidharmakatvād anityaḥ śabda iti nigamanam, 'Therefore [ie on the strength of the application and the dṛṣṭānta], because it possesses the property of production, sound is non-eternal, thus [runs] the conclusion (NBh 88.3-4)'.

The complete syllogism on the perishableness of sound has the following form:

thesis	: sound is non-eternal,
reason	: because it is produced,
positive example	: every substance that is produced is non-eternal,
counter example	: every substance that is not produced is eternal
application	: it is known that sound is produced, like all substances mentioned in the positive example, while it is also known that every eternal substance mentioned in the contrary example is not produced
conclusion	: therefore sound is non-eternal, because it is produced[22].

The deductive reasoning as set forth in this syllogism was not done in quite the same order in the mind of the speaker of the syllogism when he first drew the inference. He must have started from the generally-accepted fact, ie an object of direct perception (pratyakṣa), remembered this perceived fact and when a certain thing was not perceptible, he hit on the reason and consequently

inferred the imperceptible thing to be present. To give an an example: it is common knowledge that smoke is always produced by fire (this piece of knowledge is <u>dṛṣṭānta</u>); once a person who knows this sees smoke somewhere without fire, he infers (<u>hetu</u>) the necessary presence of fire on the strength of the remembered <u>dṛṣṭānta</u>. When he expresses his judgement in this syllogism, however, that same person first states as a thesis the fact he inferred, for he will wish to start by making clear what he is going to prove; only then will he give the reason and the commonly-known fact from which the conclusion, that was initially offered as a thesis, is drawn. Thus the order of steps in the Nyāya-syllogism is not a natural but an effective rhetorical one.

1.8 Trustworthiness of the speaker

It was shown above that reliable statements (<u>śabda</u>) are of two kinds. Firstly, statements about visible things, statements that might ideally take the form of correct syllogisms; and secondly, statements about invisible objects, statements that are incapable of direct verification. Especially as regards the latter, the truth of the statement is wholly dependent on the trustworthiness of the speaker, whereas the truth of the former kind of statement is verifiable by direct perception and by testing the logical validity if the statement is a syllogism.

True statements on invisible things ultimately refer to statements concerning religious beliefs and values that go beyond the ken of the empirical world. These values, like final emancipation and the liberation from suffering, are propagated by teachers of religion who have to be reliable if their doctrines are to be taken seriously. For the Nyāya-philosopher, the supreme religious values are those that are laid down by the ancient seers (<u>ṛṣi</u>) in the sacred texts of the Vedas. Hence, the follower of the Nyāya (in accordance with his own epistemology) will regard these holy texts as the trustworthy utterances (<u>śabda</u>) of reliable expert speakers (<u>āpta</u>). The trustwor-

thiness of the Vedas rests upon the trustworthiness of the ancient seers, while the trustworthiness of the latter must be inferred from their moral excellence. Religious authority can only come from ethical superiority and the usefulness of the religous precepts. In general, religious instruction will call attention to the supreme good of complete freedom from suffering, and reveal the way to that exalted goal. In NS 2.1.69 we find only one rationale of religious authority: the salutariness of the religious doctrine.

mantrāyurvedaprāmāṇyavac ca tatprāmāṇyam āptaprāmāṇyāt, 'And the fact that the [Vedas] are a means of valid cognition [ie have authority] like the fact that incantations and medical science are a means of valid cognition [ie have effective authority, is derived] from the fact that experts are a means of valid cognition (NS 2.1.69)'. The authority of the Vedas and the authority of the medical science and certain magical charms derive from the authority of their authors. Medical science and charms refer of course to reliable statements about something manifest to the senses (dṛṣṭārtha). The alleged effectiveness of a charm or medical prescription can be tested in daily life, its utility is perceptible to the senses. The Vedas are reliable statements about what is not manifest to the senses (adṛṣṭārtha). Both kinds have their proper utility; charms and medical prescriptions are meant to ward off temporary suffering, ie illnesses, while the Vedas are meant to remove suffering altogether, in that they describe the road to final emancipation, the highest good (niḥśreyasa). The usefulness of these texts (Vedic as well as medical) derives from the authoritativeness of the experts who compiled them. It is possible to interpret this sūtra, as Pakṣilasvāmin did: the expert authors of the medical texts known as Āyurveda are also the authors of the Vedas, and since the medical texts are useful in describing effective cures for diseases, the Vedic texts are useful too, especially as regards final liberation from suffering.

ya evāptā vedārthānāṁ draṣṭāraḥ pravaktāraś ca ta

evāyurvedaprabhṛtīnām ity āyurvedaprāmāṇyavad vedaprāmāṇyam anumātavyam iti,
'The same experts, (that is) those who see the objects [described] in the Vedas and who relate [them to others], are those ones [that see and communicate] the medical texts etc; thus the authority of the Vedas, [which is] like the authority of the medical texts, is inferred [from the authority of the reliable experts] (NBh 225.1-2)'.

In what does the reliability and authority of these experts consist? This question is not put forward in the NS; Pakṣilasvāmin brings it forward and proposes to answer it. According to him, authority (prāmāṇya) comprises:
sākṣātkṛtadharmatā bhūtadayā yathābhūtārthacikhyāpayiṣeti,
'The fact of having directly perceived the dharma [the true state of things], compassion for living beings, and the desire to communicate the thing as it really is (NBh 223.5)'. The reliable authoritative speaker must have perceived a particular thing for himself, he must know it through his own direct perception. Further, he must have compassion on others[23]; and thirdly, through compassion he wishes to inform others of his knowledge exactly as that knowledge is. Only such experienced experts are assumed to give good advice to people.
āptāḥ khalu sākṣātkṛtadharmāṇa idam hātavyam idam asya hānihetur idam asyādhigantavyam idam asyādhigamahetur iti bhūtāny anukampante,
'The experts, having directly perceived the dharman [the true state of things], show compassion on living beings in the following way: this is [something] to be abandoned, this is the cause of the abandonment for him [ie for the living being the expert wishes to instruct], this is [something] to be attained by him, this is the cause of the attainment for him (NBh 223.5-7)'. The instruction of the experts must have practical value for the unenlightened ordinary person who wishes to know what is harmful for him and what is beneficial. (As regards the term dharma the reader is referred to the discussion on NBh 40.1-3).

Only practical, valuable instruction given by

trustworthy experts can be regarded as reliable statement. As a means of valid cognition, such a reliable statement is verifiable for the hearer only in so far as the statement yields the desired result in daily life. This means that the object described by the reliable speaker must eventually become perceivable to the hearer. The truth of a reliable statement depends on the subsequent direct perception by the hearer of the described object. Pakṣilasvāmin expresses this view in NBh, p. 25.8-26.2: <u>sā ceyaṁ pramitiḥ pratyakṣaparā. jijñāsitam artham āptopadeśāt pratipadyamāno liṅgadarśanenāpi bubhutsate, liṅgadarśanānumitaṁ ca pratyakṣato didṛkṣate, pratyakṣata upalabdhe 'rthe jijñāsā nivartate</u>.

'Moreover, [all] this resultant cognition [acquired by inference and reliable statements] has as its ultimate [aim] the direct perception [of a thing, ie sound inference and statements are based on direct perception and must ultimately lead to an object of direct perception]. [For] a person who cognizes through the instructions of an expert a thing he wishes to know, seeks to cognize [this thing] also through seeing a property [of the described thing by which property he can infer the presence or the existence of this thing], and then he wants to see through direct perception the [thing] he has inferred through seeing a property [of it]. When the [previously described and subsequently inferred] object has been cognized through direct perception, [only then] the seeking to know stops'. According to Pakṣilasvāmin, the process of cognizing a thing is only completed with the direct perception of it if this thing has been first announced to the perceiver by way of a reliable statement about it. Cognition acquired through reliable statements and inferences remains indecisive as long as it is not corroborated by direct perception. Assertions made by a certain speaker about things that are not manifest to the senses (<u>adṛṣṭārtha</u>) can only be relied upon in so far as the speaker has made correct assertions on visible things.

<u>dṛṣṭārthenāptopadeśenāyurvedenādṛṣṭārtho vedabhāgo 'numātavyaḥ pramāṇam iti</u>.

'Of the portion of the Veda of which [portion] the object is not manifest [to the senses], it must be inferred that it is a means of valid cognition by [analogy with] the medical texts which are [the same] experts' instructions of which the object <u>is</u> manifest [to the senses] (NBh 224.5-6)'. Still, whether the assertions of a reliable speaker are about visible or invisible things, the main criterion of trustworthiness remains the speaker's expertise and moral superiority manifesting itself as sympathizing with suffering fellow-beings. The sort of inference on reliability that Pakṣilasvāmin alludes to, can be constructed as follows: (all) expert, compassionate persons speak the truth, their assertions on visible things are manifestly true; therefore their assertions on invisible divine matters (recorded in the Vedas) are also true.

NOTES

1. Since most of the assertions -- including those on metaphycial problems such as final emancipation and the eternity of the soul -- in this school are supported by reasoned discussion, nyāya, the whole system came to be called Nyāya, cf Oberhammer 1964a, p. 308 f. The foremost characteristic of the system was philosophical debate, epistemology and logic, and it was precisely its epistemology and logic that provided a basis for further developments in that province of learning; cf also Ruben's remarks in NS (R) p. XIV, '... das war die geschichtliche Tat des Begründers des Nyāya-Systems, Akṣapāda Gautama, dass er die Behandlung der Erkenntnismittel vor den Gegenständen der Erkenntnis als neues Kapitel der Philosophie festlegte'. And further, NS (R), p. XV: 'Akṣapāda stellt...die Reihe von 12 Erkenntnisgegenständen auf, die die Seele als Subjekt der Erkenntnis, die Sinne usw. als Werkzeuge zur Erkenntnis und den Erlösungsweg als Frucht der Erkenntnis behandeln. Akṣapāda wurde damit der Begründer einer neuen Philosophie, indem er die Erkenntnismittel, diese Erkenntnisgegenstände und dialektische Begriffe der Debattierkunst in den Kategorien des Nyāya als Inhalt seines Systems feststellte'.

2. It is very difficult to fix an exact time of compositon for the NS; Tucci sums up various possibilities ranging from 200 AD to 450 AD, Tucci 1929, p. XXIII-XXIV. The same dates are repeated in B.K Matilal, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, A History of Indian Literature, Vol VI Fasc. 2, Wiesbaden 1977, p. 78.

3. One only has to compare the Mīmāṁsā Sūtra, the Brahma Sūtra and especially the different versions of the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra with the NS to see how much more systematic the latter is. By the time the final redaction of the NS took place, these other texts already existed in some form. It seems that the Vaiśeṣika system of natural philosophy especially had considerable influence on chap-

ters 2-4 of the NS, cf Frauwallner Gesch. II, p. 7, 73 and Tucci 1929, p. XXVIIf, as well as Oberhammer 1963, p. 70. And yet chapters 2-4 should be regarded as the rational inquiry into the validity of the definitions given in chapter 1. This inquiry sometimes entails lengthy digressions, so much so that they almost seem to be interpolations. Ruben called NS 2-4 the polemical chapters and thought some of these chapters might well represent the contents of the (oral) commentary given by Akṣapāda on the definitions of NS 1, NS (R), p. XVI.

4. Frauwallner maintains that Vasubandhu's little manual on epistemology, logic and dialectics, the Vādavidhi, follows the traditional arrangement of any such handbook, an arrangement of which NS 1 and 5 are a classical example, cf Frauwallner 1957, p. 107, 129 as well as Frauwallner 1959, p. 93.

5. Frauwallner thinks Pakṣilasvāmin wrote his commentary in the first half of the 5th century AD, Frauwallner Gesch. II, p. 22; Potter too gives nearly the same time, 425 to 500 AD, Potter 1977, p. 239.

6. The Buddhist Dharmakīrti, who wrote centuries later and whose epistemology and logic goes far beyond the achievements of the NS and the NBh, has never lost sight of this practical value of true knowledge; for he opens his NB with an assumption that is very similar to NS 1.1.1, samyagjñānapūrvikā sarvapuruṣārthasiddhir iti tad vyutpādyate (NB I.1),
'The [succesful] accomplishment of every human goal is preceded by correct [true] knowledge [as a necessary condition for succesful accomplishment], therefore this [correct knowledge] is [further] explained [in NB]'.

7. It is noteworthy that final emancipation (apavarga) is considered an object of valid cognition, or rather an object deserving to be cognized through the means of valid cognition, as it is the last of the 12 prameyas (objects

of valid cognition) enumerated in NS 1.1.9. This list also contains such metaphysical objects and notions as the eternal soul (ātman) and the hereafter.
ātmaśarīrendriyārthabuddhimanaḥpravṛttidoṣapretyabhāvaphaladuḥkhāpavargās tu prameyam (NS 1.1.9),
'That which deserves to be cognized [through means of valid cognition, ie that which is the object of valid cognition] is [the following:] the soul, the body, the senses, the objects [of the senses], cognition, the mind, activity, moral flaws, existence in the hereafter, results [of good and bad acts], suffering and emancipation [from suffering]'. Thus, these matters are all capable of being cognized and rationally inquired into through the means of valid cognition, the pramāṇas.

8. Cf Ganganatha Jha's remark in NS (G) vol I, p. 83 (number at the bottom of the page) 'The Sūtra does not mean that the knowledge of all the categories enumerated is the direct cause of the attainment of Highest Good; what it means is that the knowledge of these is conducive to that end', hence he translates NS 1.1.1 'It is the knowledge of the real essence (or true character) of the following sixteen categories that leads to the attainment of the Highest Good...' op cit p. 37.

9. Freedom from suffering as the highest goal of Nyāya reminds us of Buddhism, in which the cessation of suffering is also an important aim. It is the subject matter of the third noble truth, duḥkhanirodha, 'the cessation of suffering'.

10. It may seem strange, even contradictory, that NS 1.1.1 says 'true knowledge of or concerning the pramāṇas 'when true knowledge is itself the result of pramāṇas. But this could be explained thus: although the pramāṇas produce all our real knowledge, it is still possible and necessary to specify our sources of knowledge by determining their number and defining the functions proper to them. We might go so far as to say that the pramāṇas as sources of true

knowledge gradually define _themselves_ with increasing precision. This actually happened in the course of time, when more precise definitions of the _pramāṇas_ and their number were offered by subsequent thinkers as Vasubandhu, Dignāga, Uddyotakara, Dharmakīrti etc. The epistemological as well as the logical thinking originating from the NS and the NBh, became increasingly elaborate with these authors.

11. Mr H. Krasser in Vienna has drawn my attention to an article by T. Burrow, in which it is argued that the root _mā_ from which the epistemological term _pramāṇa_ is derived, should have as its basic meaning "to ascertain" rather than "to measure" (T. Burrow, Sanskrit _Mā_- 'to ascertain', Transactions of the Philological Society, Oxford 1980, p. 134-140). Our present interpretation of _pramāṇa_ as "means of valid cognition" is based on the following paraphrase of the term in the NBh:
upalabdhisādhanāni pramāṇānīti samākhyānirvacanasāmarthyād boddhavyam (NBh, p. 24.5),
'Pramāṇas are means (_sādhana_) [by which to acquire correct] cognition (_upalabdhi_); [this meaning of the word _pramāṇa_] must be understood on the strength of the etymological explanation of the term'. The reference to this NBh-passage I owe to Prof Steinkellner in Vienna.

12. Many, from Pakṣilasvāmin to modern authors, have tried to interpret the definition in NS 1.1.5, but, it seems, in vain. The second part of the sentence remains as unintelligible as ever. One only has to compare Oberhammer's thoughts set forth in Oberhammer 1966, p. 70-71 and Wezler's reaction thereon in Wezler 1968, p. 198 and his own explanation brought forward in op cit p. 208-209, with the older discussions in NS (V), p. 4 and NS (R), p. 3; p. 159-161, note 16. Strangely enough, we find no mention of all this literature in Chakrabarti 1977, although that monograph on NS-logic devotes a whole chapter (chapt. 2 to be exact) to the threefold inference. Chakrabarti just accepts Pakṣilasvāmin's exposition as if it were per-

fectly intelligible and harps upon the third variety, sāmānyatodṛṣṭa.

13. This simple idea of connexion developed into the logical theory of positive and negative invariable concomitance, anvaya and vyatireka, found in later logic. The very validity of the inference, and hence of the syllogism, came to be based on invariable concomitance, as will be shown in the account of Dignāga's and Dharmakīrti's logic. The inference, as presented by Pakṣilasvāmin, constitutes nevertheless in barest outline the workings of deduction; the presence of fire, for instance, is deduced from the presence of smoke which must always be accompanied by fire. Using the terminology of Aristotelian logic to formulate the Nyāya-type of deduction, we might say: the major premiss is that everything that has smoke has fire; the minor premiss is that at this given place we observe smoke, so that it follows that this place has fire. Yet the invariable concomitance of the two objects, necessary for a valid inference, is not referred to by Pakṣilasvāmin. He only says
hetūdāharaṇayoḥ sāmarthyaṁ paramasūkṣmaṁ duḥkhabodham, 'The efficacy of the reason and the example is very subtle, difficult to understand (NBh 86.11)'. This means that we must find out for ourselves whether the reason is always accompanied by the probandum and whether the example actually proves that the probans and the probandum are connected.

14. "Desire etc." refers of course to NS 1.1.10:
icchādveṣaprayatnasukhaduḥkhajñānāny ātmano liṅgam, 'Desire, aversion, effort, joy, grief and knowledge are the mark of the soul'. It is interesting to note that the word liṅga can also mean logical mark; thus NS 1.1.10 seems to foreshadow Pakṣilasvāmin's inference on the soul.

15. Unfortunately, the problems of interpretation of NS 1.1.5 and the NBh on it are too numerous to be treated at length in this context, but in sum we might say that the problems

arise from the fact that NS 1.1.5 is no real definition at all; the process of inference as such does not seem to be defined, all we find is the definiendum "inference" without an intelligible definiens. The three terms pūrvavad, śeṣavad and sāmānyatodṛṣṭa have especially puzzled everyone, even an old commentator like Pakṣilasvāmin, as is evident from his divergent interpretations.

16. An elaborate treatment of the threefold division of anumāna in the NS and the NBh would certainly take up too much space and go far beyond the scope of this treatise. For the present, it suffices to summarily recount Pakṣilasvāmin's own ideas on inference which shaped later epistemological and logical thinking far more than this single dark statement of NS 1.1.5.

17. Later, we will get acquainted with the criteria of trustworthiness as developed by Pakṣilasvāmin in his commentary on NS 1.1.69. That passage in the commentary is quite important as it bears upon Dharmakīrti's conception of the trustworthy speaker, and hence his conception of the Buddha as the ideal reliable preacher of religious doctrines.

18. In Chakrabarti 1977, p. 35, we find this translation of NS 1.1.34: 'The reason (hetu) is [that from which we get] what proves the probandum by virtue of the [universal] concomitance (sādharmya) [stated] in the Exemplification'. But such universal concomitance, although most probably implied, is not taught here in the NS nor the NBh. As a major logical doctrine it was developed later by the Buddhist logicians Vasubandhu and Dignāga. Of course it is true that probans and probandum must be so connected as to yield a valid inference and a valid syllogism, but an elaborate theory of concomitance is not found in the old Nyāya. Chakrabarti's book -- though containing many useful observations -- is written on the basis of the unfounded assumption that invariable concomitance is an integral part of the logical theories in the NS, cf for example op cit p. 7.

Vidyābhūṣaṇa, on the other hand, translates NS 1.1.34: 'The reason is the means for establishing what is to be established through the homogeneous or affirmative character of the example' NS (V) p. 14; the term sādharmya carries more weight than homogeneity, for it can be interpreted as 'the fact of possessing the same property', which means possessing the same property as the subject (sādhya). This 'same' property acts as the hetu in the syllogism. The translation of sādharmya with homogeneity leads to the idea that the example in the syllogism is simply an analogous instance to make the reason more plausible, thus creating in the mind of the reader the impression that the NS is propounding a (primitive) proof by analogy. Ruben renders NS 1.1.34 'Das Beweisen des zu Beweisenden durch die Gleichheit seiner Attribute mit denen des Belegs ist die "Begründung", NS (R) p. 11, which is still inaccurate because of the plurality of 'Attribute' -- attributes -- where only one property, the probans must be the 'same' in the subject and the generally accepted fact, dṛṣṭānta.

Jha's translation of NS 1.1.34 seems to do full justice to the Sanskrit: 'The "Statement of the Probans" is that which demonstrates the Probandum, through its similarity (ie a property common to it and) to the example', NS (G) p. 343.

19. Frauwallner always thought that the Nyāya-syllogism constituted a primitive proof by analogy (Frauwallner 1957, p. 106). Frauwallner 1959, p. 93 says the following: 'In der älteren indischen Dialektik war die Beweisführung auf einen blossen Analogieschluss gegründet. Man verwies auf ein Beispiel [ie dṛṣṭānta], bei dem der Grund mit der Folge verbunden erscheint, und folgerte dementsprechend auch im gegebenen Fall aus dem Vorhandensein des Grundes das Vorhandensein der Folge [ie sādhya]. Das Gleiche konnte auch mit Hilfe eines Gegenbeispiels geschehen. Man zeigte an einem solchen Beispiel, dass im Zusammenhang mit dem Fehlen des Grundes auch die Folge fehlte, und schloss daraus, dass im Gegensatz dazu beim Vorhandensein des

Grundes die Folge vorhanden sein müsse. Die Mangelhaftigkeit dieses Verfahrens scheint uns auf der Hand zu liegen. Trotzdem war z.B. die Schule des Nyāya bis zur Zeit Dignāga's nicht über diesen Stand hinausgekommen'. In this passage "Grund" means hetu and "Folge" sādhya, probandum. Even though Frauwallner does not specify the texts of the "old Nyāya", he must be referring to both the NS and the NBh since he says that Nyāya acknowledged only a primitive proof by analogy up to the time of Dignāga, that is, in the time that the NBh already existed. Thus he believes that the NBh too teaches only proof by analogy. His opinion about Nyāya-logic was probably influenced by Ruben's observation in NS (R), p. 11-12; 179 to the effect that the syllogism taught in the NS is a simple "Analogieschluss". This interpretation of the syllogism in NS seems to be based on how one understands the dṛṣṭānta which in syllogistic reasoning is the example, udāharaṇa (dṛṣṭānta is a thing or fact, udāharaṇa the formulation of it in the syllogism). If a dṛṣṭānta is merely interpreted as one single analogous case of which ordinary people and learned investigators have the same cognition (NS 1.1.25), there is justification for saying that the NS (but not the NBh anymore) teaches a proof by analogy. On the other hand, if dṛṣṭānta is interpreted as a fact which is seen by all to be always the case -- and such an interpretation of NS 1.1.25 is not impossible --, then we have a real deduction even in the NS. In the positive dṛṣṭānta, the probans is seen together with the probandum; if this is seen to be the case only once, it is an analogous case; but if everyone until now has seen the probans to be always accompanied by the probandum, it is no more one analogous case but an established, perceived fact. The root cause of the problem is whether the word "artha" in NS 1.1.25 refers to one single case or to a fact consisting in an indefinite number of observed cases. It is my personal opinion that in NS 1.1.25 the latter is the case (especially when dṛṣṭānta is used in reasoning), so that NS 1.1.33-39 can be understood as an (in fact far too) implicit description of a deductive syllogism, ie a form of

reasoning in which a particular fact is deduced from an indefinitely large number of observed similar instances. However, what seems to be implied in the NS is made explicit by Pakṣilasvāmin who clearly interprets the positive dṛṣṭānta as an indefinite number of cases in which the probans is seen with the probandum. What is said here about the positive dṛṣṭānta equally applies to the contrary dṛṣṭānta. Ruben already has said (contrary to Frauwallner) that the NBh teaches more than a proof by analogy. According to him, it teaches the rudiments of deductive reasoning, since the positive dṛṣṭānta is 'das die Allgemeingültigkeit dieses Verhältnisses [ie of probans and probandum] belegende Beispiel', NS (R), p. 179, note 80. The NS offered the basic framework of syllogistic reasoning in a very implicit manner, while the NBh turned it into a more elaborate and explicit description of deductive reasoning, thus laying the groundwork for Vasubandhu's and Dignāga's logic.

20. If they would not be, the inference and the syllogism in which a dṛṣṭānta showing the connexion of these two properties is used, would become rather futile. It was left to Vasubandhu in his description of inference and the syllogism to state that the probans must be invariably concomitant with the probandum. Since Vasubandhu, concomitance has become an essential part of logical theory, since it explains why the probans proves the presence of the probandum.

21. In later logic, we find the socalled threefold (trirūpa) reason (hetu), which teaches that the probans must be present in the subject (pakṣa), must be present in the positive examples (sapakṣa) and must be absent from the contrary examples (vipakṣa). These three canons of the correct reason in inference and the syllogism are frequently attributed to Dignāga or a close predecessor of his, but they are already present in the NS and clearly set forth in the NBh. According to the NS and the NBh the probans must occur in the positive dṛṣṭānta, never in the

contrary <u>dṛṣṭānta</u>, while the probans is a known property of the subject, ie occurs in it. The credit for indicating that the threefold reason is actually found in the NS goes to Randle who, incidentally, mentions this in Randle Frag, p. 66, but cf also Randle 1930, p. 366-367. In all fairness, we should add here that Ruben -- whose book was published in 1928 -- says the threefold <u>hetu</u> is an early Buddhist 'Weiterbildung der Lehre des Nyāya, dass der Grund und das Beispiel positiv und negativ sein <u>können</u>', NS (R), p. 179-180.

22. It is possible to convert this into an Aristotelian syllogism; major premiss (example): all produced substances are non-eternal, minor premiss (reason): all sounds are produced, conclusion: all sounds are non-eternal. The difference, apart from the order of the members, is that in the Indian syllogism it is simply said 'sound' without any quantifier; nevertheless, the idiom of Sanskrit allows us to interpret 'sound' as referring to all sounds, sound in general, as we can say 'man' meaning all men, not some or many men. Similarly 'sound' in the Indian syllogism means every possible sound, not many or some sounds. Chakrabarti 1977, p. 37-38 mentions the fact that in this form of Indian logic quantifiers are absent, because the propositions in the syllogism are intended to be only general propositions.

23. Pakṣilasvāmin does not explain why compassion is part of the authority (<u>prāmāṇya</u>) of experts. He may, however, have intended something like the idea that compassion could be a guarantee for the hearer that the expert -- being compassionate and therefore unselfish -- correctly communicates his knowledge only in the best interests of his fellow beings.

II. Buddhist Epistemology and Logic before Dharmakīrti

2.1 Vasubandhu

In order to grasp the importance of Dignāga's contribution to epistemology and logic in PS and to recognize the rudimentary ground on which the edifice of Dignāga's thinking is built, it is necessary to outline the theories of his Buddhist predecessor, Vasubandhu. Fragments in Sanskrit and Tibetan of two of Vasubandhu's works on dialectics, logic and epistemology have come down to us and were collected by Frauwallner (in two articles, Frauwallner 1933 and Frauwallner 1957). These two works are called Vādavidhāna and Vādavidhi, the former seems to have been a dialectical work dealing with logical proof (sādhana) and refutation (dūṣaṇa), while the latter also sets forth a theory on perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna), and thus contains some epistemological thought. Vādavidhāna and Vādavidhi treat much of the same topics as the NS and the NBh. According to Vasubandhu there are only two means of valid cognition -- although the term pramāṇa is not found in the extant fragments -- namely, perception and inference. They are the sole means by which we acquire knowledge for ourselves (cf Frauwallner 1957, p. 120). Knowledge is communicated in the form of logical proof (sādhana) consisting of syllogisms. Vasubandhu regards the syllogism as an explicit inference since he calls the probandum, ie what is to be proved by the syllogism, rjes su dpag par bya ba, in Sanskrit anumeya, the thing to be inferred. This we could render as 'inferendum' (cf Frauwallner 1957, p. 135, fragm 3).

2.2 Perception

In the Vādavidhi, perception is defined, tato 'rthād vijñānaṁ pratyakṣam, 'Knowledge [that springs] from the thing [alone] is perception (Frauwallner 1957, p. 138, fragm 9)'. This definition is further explained, yul gaṅ gis rnam par śes pa tha sñad bya ba de kho na las

gal te de skye źiṅ gźan las ma yin la / de las gźan las kyaṅ ma yin pa'i śes pa de mṅon sum ste / dper na gzugs la sogs pa'i śes pa daṅ bde ba la sogs pa'i śes pa bźin źes pa'o //

'When knowledge comes from [ie is caused by] only that [real] object [in accordance] with which [this knowledge] can be designated, and not from another [object], then this knowledge [which is] not also [caused] by [something] different from this [first real object] is direct perception, as the knowledge of [outer objects such as] forms etc., and the knowledge of [internal objects such as] happiness etc (Frauwallner 1957, p. 137[1], fragm 9, lines 2-5)'. It is important to note that perception is not considered to be only knowledge received by the senses -- as in NS 1.1.4 -- but perception must also include the introspective awareness of feelings and emotions. Vasubandhu seems to maintain that it is only after objects have been directly cognized that we are able to give names to them, when he says 'When knowledge comes from [ie is caused by] only that [real] object [in accordance] with which [this knowledge] can be designated'. This can be related with NS 1.1.4, where perception is defined as avyapadeśya, 'not [yet] expressible in language'. Both Vasubandhu and the NS 1.1.4 seem to assert that a thing can be given a name only after it has been perceived by pure sensation. The NS-definition emphasizes the purely sensational character of perception before it is put in words. Vasubandhu, on the other hand, seems to emphasize that only after having perceived an object is one capable of giving it a name. Yet both say that perception is a form of cognition that may not be constituted by language.

Vasubandhu further says that his definition is intended to exclude from genuine perception, erroneous knowledge, 'khrul pa'i śes pa, knowledge of what is conventional or conceptual, kun rdzob pa'i śes pa, and knowledge derived from inference, rjes su dpag pa'i śes pa. He says,

'di ni 'khrul pa'i śes pa bsal te / dper na ña phyis la dṅul gyi śes pa lta bu'o // de ni dṅul gyis śes pa'o źes

tha sñad byed pa la de dṅul las skye be yaṅ ma yin gyi / ña phyis kho nas de bskyed par bya ba'o //

'With this [definition of perception as knowledge solely caused by the object], erroneous knowledge is rejected [as belonging to perception as pramāṇa], as the [erroneous] knowledge of silver with regard to mother of pearl. While [in accordance] with silver this [erroneous knowledge] is designated [by the perceiver as:] 'knowledge of silver', it does not also come from [ie is not caused by real] silver, but it is caused solely by mother of pearl'. This example is similar to NBh, p. 30.1-3 (translated and discussed in the previous chapter) where the notion 'water' attributed to a mirage is rejected as right perception. Vasubandhu continues,

kun rdzob pa'i śes pa yaṅ 'dis gsal te / de ltar ni bum pa'i śes pa źes pa 'di ltar de bum pa la sogs pa rnams kyis tha sñad bya źiṅ / de de rnams las 'byuṅ ba ni ma yin te / de rnams ni kun rdzob tu yod pa ñid kyis rgyu ma yin pa ñid kyi phyir ro // gzugs la sogs pa de ltar yaṅ dag par źen pa rnams kho na las de 'byuṅ ṅo //

'With this [definition] knowledge of what is conventional [ie conceptual] is rejected too. Such [conceptual knowledge] can thus be designated [as:] "knowledge of a pot" [in accordance] with [conventional, conceptual objects such as] pots etc, [but] this [knowledge] does not come from those [conventional objects] because by their only existing conventionally [ie as concepts] they are not the cause [of this conventional, conceptual knowledge]. This [knowledge] comes only from forms etc that are correctly ascertained thus [ie as pots etc]'. Knowledge of objects (such as pots) that exist only conventionally, that is, as a concept projected on to a certain form or collection of parts, is rejected here as true direct perception. Kun rdzob tu yod pa, saṁvṛtisat, 'what exists conventionally or conceptually' is explained by Vasubandhu in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya as follows,

yasminn avayavaśo bhinne na tadbuddhir bhavati tat saṁvṛtisat. tadyathā ghaṭaḥ. tatra hi kapālaśo bhinne ghaṭabuddhir na bhavati

(AKBh, p. 334.3-4), [When,] after [a thing] has been divided into [its component] parts, there is no cognition of the [thing any more], [then] that [thing] exists [only] conventionally [ie as a concept]. As a pot [exists only conventionally], for when the [pot] is divided into potsherds [ie its component parts], there is no cognition of the pot [any more]'. Lastly, Vasubandhu differentiates perceptual knowledge from inferential knowledge.

rjes su dpag pa´i śes pa yañ ´di kho nas bsal te / du ba´i śes pa dañ ´brel pa dran pa dag las kyañ de byuñ gi me kho na las ma yin pas so //

'With the same [pratyakṣa definition] inferential knowledge is rejected, because, [for example,] this [inferential knowledge of fire] comes from the knowledge of smoke [through perception] as well as the recollections of the [inseparable] connexion [of smoke with fire], but [the inferential knowledge] does not [at all] come only from fire' (all three passages from Frauwallner 1957, p. 137, fragm 9 lines 5-15). Although the last two negations are a significant improvement on the old NS-definition of perception, the idea from NS 1.1.4 that perception should be non-erroneous, is retained. The Tibetan ´khrul pa most probably translates Sanskrit bhrānta, 'erroneous'. Now, whether we say that perception should be avyabhicāri (NS 1.1.4) or not bhrānta really amounts to the same statement, for vyabhicāri and bhrānta are synonymous. With some degree of certainty we may say that Vasubandhu used the NS 1.1.4 and the NBh as one of the starting-points for developing his own perception theory, which can be summarized thus: perception is pure awareness of any object whatsoever, outer object or internal mental object; this awareness, in order to have the status of means of valid cognition, must be non-erroneous, must be free from conceptualizations and, lastly, must not be the product of inference.

2.3 Inference

Vasubandhu maintains, in accordance with NS 1.1.5, that

inference (anumāna) as a means of valid cognition is preceded by perception, because the act of directly perceiving is mentioned in his definition of inference as the basis of the inferential thought process.
nāntarīyakārthadarśanaṁ tadvido ´numānaṁ,
'The observation of an object that is invariably concomitant [with another object] for him who knows the [invariable concomitance of the one object with the other] constitutes inference (Frauwallner 1957, p. 138, fragm 10)'. If we have seen before through perception and hence know that two things are always connected, ie are invariably concomitant (nāntarīyaka), we can validly infer the presence of one object from seeing only the object that always accompanies it. Vasubandhu gives an example of invariable concomitance in the commentary on this definition, dper na me´i du ba lta bu´o, 'for example as smoke [is invariably concomitant] with fire (Frauwallner 1957, p. 138, fragm 10, line 3)'. We know, because we have observed it, that whenever there is smoke, there invariably is fire. Only someone who knows that smoke is invariably concomitant with fire, ie has seen that smoke is always produced by fire, can validly infer fire from seeing smoke alone. This is an improvement of Pakṣilasvāmin who maintained that inference is 'seeing the connexion between a property and the property-bearer and seeing the property [connected with the property-bearer] (NBh 33.3)', for Vasubandhu explicitly states that the inferendum must be invariably concomitant with the inferens to generate a correct inference[2]. Pakṣilasvāmin simply demands that they be connected. Yet, I think it is evident that Vasubandhu built his theory of inference on Pakṣilasvāmin's idea of inference found in the NBh passage quoted above. Both thinkers define inference in general as indirectly seeing or knowing an object to be present somewhere from actually seeing an object that is connected with the object that is to be inferred. But to this general principle, Vasubandhu adds the principle of invariable concomitance. Vasubandhu describes inference proper rather briefly, but he unfolds his theories on

deductive reasoning (which is inference after all) fully in his description of the syllogism. In this he follows the pattern of the NS and the NBh, where deduction is only fully set forth in the exposition of the syllogism.

2.4 The Syllogism

Vasubandhu regards the syllogism as the sole means of soundly proving a fact to others, and hence he seems to imply that the only way of communicating true knowledge is through the syllogism. For he does not mention anywhere in the extant fragments comparison (upamāna) and reliable statement (śabda) as means of valid cognition, nor does tradition ascribe to him the acceptance of these two pramāṇas. His successor Dignāga, for example, nowhere says that Vasubandhu accepted more than two pramāṇas, nor does Uddyotakara in his Nyāyavārttika. From their silence on this, we must assume that the recognition of pratyakṣa and anumāna as the only pramāṇas originated with Vasubandhu. In Buddhist epistemological thinking after him, the scheme of two pramāṇas became authoritative.

Vasubandhu prescribes that logical proof (sādhana) consists of three members instead of the five of the old Nyāya (cf Frauwallner 1957, p. 118). The three steps in Vasu-bandhu's syllogism are, pratijñā, thesis, hetu, reason or probans and dṛṣṭānta, generally-accepted fact. We recognize the Nyāya-terminology here, although the third step is not called udāharaṇa, 'example' any more but dṛṣṭānta, in accordance with the datum that acts as the real basis of the logical example. Thus the term udāharaṇa is abolished as inessential.

Since Vādavidhi is Vasubandhu's most important work on logic (cf Frauwallner 1957, p. 105), and since it is from that work that the largest fragments have survived (collected in Frauwallner 1957), I will now give the logic from Vādavidhi except in the few cases where Vādavidhāna is more explicit.

Vasubandhu first defines the subject in the syllogism, pakṣo vicāraṇāyām iṣṭo 'rthaḥ, 'The subject is the

thing that is intended for examination (Frauwallner 1957, p. 135, fragm 1)'. This examination takes place in the syllogism, the steps of which are now discussed. In the thesis one announces that a property, the inferendum, must occur in the subject. sādhyābhidhānaṁ pratijñā, 'The thesis consists in mentioning what is to be proved [ie the presence of an inferendum in the subject] (Frauwallner 1957, p. 135, fragm 3)'. Except for the term abhidhāna, this definition is identical in its wording with the NS 1.1.33, sādhyanirdeśaḥ pratijñā. Vasubandhu elucidates his definition by saying,

me daṅ sa bon daṅ mi rtag pa ñid rnams rjes su dpag par bya ba ñid du dper brjod pa'i phyir chos tsam rjes su dpag par bya ba ñid du mṅon par 'dod do źes rtogs par bya'o, 'It must be uderstood that only [one] property [of the subject] is intended to be the inferendum (rjes su dpag par bya ba, anumeya) [in the thesis] because, for example, fire, a seed and non-eternity are mentioned as inferendum (Frauwallner 1957, p. 135 fragm 3)'. In the thesis, one thing is mentioned of which it is to be proved that it occurs in the subject. What was called sādhya, probandum, in the NS 1.1.34 is now called anumeya, the thing that is to be inferred; the latter term could be rendered 'inferendum'. The term sādhya Vasubandhu seems to reserve here for the relation that is to be proved between the inferendum and the subject. In the NBh, sādhya could mean both the relation of the probandum with the subject and the probandum as such.[3] In the examples of inferenda, we find (a) fire which must be inferred from the presence of smoke, (b) a seed which must be inferred to be the origin of a plant and (c) non-eternity (of sound) which must be inferred from the fact that the subject was produced.

The second step of the syllogism is the reason, ie that which proves that the inferendum occurs in the subject. tādṛgavinābhāvidharmopadarśanaṁ hetuḥ, 'The reason consists in pointing to the property which is invariably concomitant with such [an inferendum like fire, seed, non-eternity etc.] (Frauwallner 1957, p. 136, fragm 4)'. The Sankrit term used here for invariable concomitant is

avinābhāvin, which literally means 'never occurring or being without' and hence 'always occurring together'.[4] We know that smoke always occurs with fire, so that when we wish to prove the presence of fire at a particular spot, we give as a reason the occurrence of smoke at that spot. Such a reason is valid because smoke always does occur with fire. After this definition, Vasubandhu says, don gaṅ sgra mi rtag pa ñid la sogs pa bsgrub par bya ba de ´dra ba ste / de´i rigs can med na don gaṅ źig ´gar yaṅ ´byuṅ ba ma yin pa ste / rtsol ba las byuṅ ba ñid ni mi rtag pa ñid lta bu daṅ du ba ni me lta bu´o źes pa de ni de ´dra ba med na mi ´byuṅ ba´i chos can te, 'Such [means:] that thing that is to be proved, [like] the non-eternity of sound etc. Whatever thing [functioning as the probans] does not occur when such [a thing, the inferendum] is not present, that [thing] is the property [probans] which is invariably concomitant with such [a thing, the inferendum], like the fact that production by effort [is invariably concomitant with] non-eternity, and like [the fact that] smoke [is invariably concomitant with] fire (Frauwallner 1975, p. 135, fragm 4)'. Vasubandhu gives here a definition of invariable concomitance: the probans is invariably concomitant with the probandum when the probans occurs with the probandum, and does not occur when the probandum is not present.

What seems to be missing in this account of the reason is the mentioning of the three criteria of a correct hetu. It was implicitly present in NS 1.1.34-37 and NBh[5] but Vasubandhu mentions it explicitly in the Vādavidhāna. The hetu-definition in that work runs, hetur vipakṣād viśeṣaḥ, 'The reason is a thing [ie a property] that is different from [the properties occurring in] the [class of objects that are] dissimilar to the subject (Frauwallner 1933, p. 480, fragm 7)'. In this rather short definition, it is said that the reason -- being a known property of the subject (pakṣa) and occurring in all instances similar to the subject (sapakṣa) -- does not occur in any instances that are contrary to the subject (vipakṣa). In NS 1.1.36-37 and in the NBh, positive in-

stances were called positive example, ie the *dṛṣṭānta* in which the probans and the probandum were seen together, the contrary example being the *dṛṣṭānta* in which the probans never occurs. In the Vādavidhāna-definition of the *hetu*, the presence of the *hetu* in the subject and in positive instances is apparently implied; all that is said is that the *hetu* does not occur in the contrary instances. Fortunately, an important sentence from Vasubandhu's commentary on this definition has survived;

vṛttāv āha, yo dharmaḥ pakṣasya sapakṣe siddho vipakṣe nāsti,

'In the commentary [Vasubandhu] said, [the *hetu* is that] property of the subject which is known [to occur] in the positive instances and [which] does not occur in the contrary instances (Frauwallner 1933, p. 480, fragm 7a)'. Here it is clearly said that the probans is a property of the subject (*pakṣa*) and it is known to occur in those instances that are similar to the subject, collectively called *sapakṣa*, while the probans does not occur in the instances that are dissimilar to the subject, collectively called *vipakṣa*.

The last step in the syllogism is the generally-accepted fact, *dṛṣṭānta*, from which the validity of the probans is derived. In the Vādavidhi, the *dṛṣṭānta* is defined as follows: *tayoḥ sambandhanidarśanaṃ dṛṣṭāntaḥ*, 'The generally-accepted fact [serving as example] consists in showing the connexion of the two [ie the invariable concomitance of the probans with the inferendum] (Frauwallner 1957, p. 136, fragm 5)'. The commentary paraphrases this definition,

de dag gi ste de 'dra ba daṅ de med na mi 'byuṅ ba'i bsgrub par bya ba daṅ sgrub par byed pa dag gi'brel pa ste med na mi 'byuṅ ba ñid gaṅ gis ṅes par ston pa de dpe'o //

(Frauwallner 1957, p. 136, fragm 5), '"Of the two" [means:] of the probandum [ie inferendum] and the probans that are invariably concomitant, "connexion" [means:] the invariable concomitance [ie the never occurring of the probans without the inferendum], that by which [this connexion] is shown, is called "generally-accepted fact"'.

Through the _dṛṣṭānta_ we have to show the invariable concomitance of the probans with the inferendum. This kind of _dṛṣṭānta_ corresponds to the notion of _sapakṣa_ in the Vādavidhāna-definition of the triple _hetu_, because the _sapakṣa_ actually evidences that the probans always occurs with the inferendum. What seems to be missing in Vādavidhi is the _dṛṣṭānta_ which shows that the probans never occurs when the inferendum is absent, ie a _dṛṣṭānta_ corresponding to the _vipakṣa_. Only in Vādavidhāna is there a definition of _dṛṣṭānta_ as directly referring to the triple _hetu_: _tathā siddho dṛṣṭāntaḥ_, 'The generally-accepted fact is established in this way [ie as _sapakṣa_ and _vipakṣa_] (Frauwallner 1933, p. 301, fragm 8)'. So here we have the generally-accepted fact showing the positive invariable concomitance of the probans with the inferendum, and one that shows their negative invariable concomitance. Vasubandhu's notion of positive and contrary _dṛṣṭāntas_ can be compared with Pakṣilasvāmin's remark on the positive example, 'By this [ie by this positive _dṛṣṭānta_] is exemplified that the two properties function as probandum and probans (NBh 85.1-2)'; but why the two properties are probandum and probans he leaves unsaid. About the contrary example he says, 'This [negative] generally-accepted fact ... does not posses the property [ie the probandum] of the [subject] because in it [ie in the negative _dṛṣṭānta_] does not occur the property [ie the probans] of the subject (NBh 86.2)'. Vasubandhu is much more precise because he says _why_ two properties are probans and probandum, namely through positive and negative invariable concomitance, which comes into view through the two _dṛṣṭāntas_. Pakṣilasvāmin's imprecision arises from his failure to clearly recognize invariable concomitance as a fundamental logical principle.[6]

2.5 _Dignāga_

The most accomplished Buddhist thinker on epistemology and logic before Dharmakīrti was Dignāga who lived 480-540 AD (Frauwallner 1961, p. 134-137). Dignāga was a very pro-

lific author, as can be seen from the list of works he wrote (cf Hattori 1968, p. 6-10). In his last work, the Pramāṇasamuccaya, "Comprehensive account of the means of valid cognition", Dignāga sums up his theories on logic which he had unfolded in various other works and summarizes his epistemological thinking.

By its contents and its systematic treatment of epistemological and logical problems, the PS exercised great influence on all subsequent epistemology and logic, Buddhist and non-Buddhist alike[7]. The PS was, moreover, the only work of a predecessor that Dharmakīrti deemed worthy of an extensive discussion in his Pramāṇavārttika, that eventually superseded the PS.

2.6 The two Objects of Knowledge

The means of valid cognition, pramāṇas, are the basis of all valid knowledge of reality. Dignāga states this principle thus, pramāṇādhīno hi prameyādhigamaḥ, 'The [intellectual] acquisition of the object of valid cognition is dependent on the means of valid cognition (PS 1.1 commentary line 14)'.[8] This was also Pakṣilasvāmin's starting-point: pramāṇam antareṇa nārthapratipattiḥ, 'Without a means of valid cognition there is no cognition of an object (NBh 2.1)'.[9] Now, in the first chapter of the PS the means of valid cognition are enumerated and their respective objects defined.

pratyakṣam anumānaṁ ca pramāṇe, de gñis kho na ste,
yasmād lakṣaṇadvayaṁ prameyam,

'The two means of valid cognition are perception and inference, only those two because the object of valid cognition possesses two characteristics (PS I.2a-c)'. All cognizable objects have two appearances and these two appearances can be known by only two pramāṇas. In this way Dignāga derives the number of true pramāṇas from the two aspects of reality.[10] In the commentary on this verse[11], Dignāga explains the two aspects,

na hi svasāmānyalakṣaṇābhyām anyat prameyam asti,
svalakṣaṇaviṣayaṁ hi pratyakṣaṁ sāmānyalakṣaṇaviṣayam

anumānam,
'For there is no other object of valid cognition than the characteristic of the [thing] proper and the characteristic of the generality [of a thing]. Perception has as its object the characteristic of the [thing] proper [ie the particular], inference has as its object the characteristic of the generality [ie the universal] (PS I.2 commentary lines 20-21)'.

The uniqueness (svalakṣaṇa) of objects is known through direct perception (pratyakṣa); the general characteristic (sāmānyalakṣaṇa), ie that which several objects seem to have in common, is that with which inferences operate. It is possible to translate svalakṣaṇa by 'particular' and sāmānyalakṣaṇa by 'universal' as is done in Hattori 1968, p. 24. We must keep in mind, however, that they are two aspects of one and the same object, the real visible aspect which is revealed by perception and the conceptualized aspect of the thing, which is the field of inference. The two terms sva- and sāmānyalakṣaṇa were not invented by Dignāga, but stem from the tradition of Abhidharma- analysis. A passage from Vasubandhu's[12] Abhidharmakośabhāṣya will give us a better idea of the terms svalakṣaṇa and sāmānyalakṣaṇa.
kāyaṁ svasāmānyalakṣaṇābhyāṁ parīkṣate, vedanāṁ cittaṁ dharmāṁś ca. svabhāva evaiṣāṁ svalakṣaṇam,
'One examines the body in its proper and general characteristics, as well as sensation, mind and dharmas. [Their] own being is their proper characteristic (AKBh, p. 349.11-12)'. Their own being, svabhāva, evidently refers to the unique character of every single thing at a given moment in time. What all things have in common is explained in the next sentence,
sāmānyalakṣaṇaṁ tv anityatā saṁskṛtānāṁ duḥkhatā sāsravāṇāṁ śūnyatānātmate sarvadharmāṇāṁ,
'But the general characteristic is the non-eternity of produced [things], the fact that [everything that is] connected with the [four] evil influences is [full of] suffering, and the fact that all things are empty and not the self (AKBh 349.12-13)'. If this is taken in a purely onto-

logical sense, we could say that everything is ephemeral, impermanent; that is to say that everything has its own unique being which lasts only for a moment. This constitutes the *svalakṣaṇa*. The general characteristics of all things are their impermanence, painfulness, emptiness and unsubstantiality; these marks all things have in common and hence these marks are called *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*.

The real thing lasts only for one moment, *kṣaṇa*; therefore everything is said to be momentary. The doctrine of momentariness is described in Abhidharmakośa IV, verse 2cd and the commentary thereon. *na gatir yasmāt saṁskṛtaṁ kṣaṇikam*, '[Bodily activity] is not a [flowing] movement because [whatever is] produced is momentary [ie lasts for one moment]'. The commentary explains the notion of 'moment'.

ko 'yaṁ kṣaṇo nāma, ātmalābho 'nantaravināśī, so 'syāstīti kṣaṇikam. daṇḍikavat. sarvaṁ hi saṁskṛtam ātmalābhād ūrdhvaṁ na bhavatīti yatraiva jātaṁ tatraiva dhvasyate, 'What is this moment ? [It is] the coming into being which ends immediately; momentary [means:] for this [particular thing] there is this [one moment of existence only;] therefore [the particular thing is called] momentary, as [we can say] 'having a stick' [in like manner we can say having a moment, existing for one moment, in brief 'momentary']. For everything that is produced does not exist anymore after its coming into being, [that is to say] where [something] is born, there it decays (AKBh, p. 163.1-2)'.

As all real things (which are the object of perception in Dignāga's opinion) are momentary, they do not remain the same at every instant. From this it follows that the general characteristics, which have to remain unvarying in order to be "perceptible" of many individual things, are not really present in the things themselves, but are conceptualized by the perceiver. Therefore, Dignāga says, that the general characteristics, the universals, are the domain of inference, for the drawing of an inference is a purely mental activity involving the rearrangement of concepts. Such, at least, would be the

drift of Dignāga's argument in PS 1.2 and commentary.

2.7 Perception

Dignāga defines perception in general as that form of cognition which is free from conceptualizing. pratyakṣaṁ kalpanāpoḍham, 'Perception is [cognition] removed from conceptualizing (PS I.3c)'. This is paraphrased, śes pa gañ la rtog pa med pa de ni mñon sum mo, 'Perception is that knowledge in which there is no conceptualizing (PS I.3c commentary line 6)'. In PS I.3d conceptualizing itself is defined as follows, nāmajātyādiyojanā,'[It is] the application of a proper name, a common noun etc [to a perceived object]'. Dignāga regards conceptualizing as the mental process of giving names to the impressions of reality received by perception. In the commentary on this verse, Dignāga distinguishes five kinds of name-giving or verbal designation. The first is yadṛcchāśabda, a proper name denoting only one object, as the proper name 'Ḍittha', which designates only one person. The second is jātiśabda, a word denoting a class or genus, like the word 'cow'. The third is guṇaśabda, a word denoting a quality, like the word 'white'. The fourth is kriyāśabda, action noun or verb, like 'cooking' and the last is dravyaśabda, a word denoting a substance like daṇḍin, 'staff-bearer' or viṣāṇin, 'horn-bearer', 'horned' (all examples from Hattori 1968, p. 25, 83-85).

According to Dignāga, direct perception as a means of valid cognition should be free from all name-giving, it should not be influenced by our linguistic consciousness. This reminds us of NS 1.1.4 where pratyakṣa has been defined as avyapadeśya, 'not [yet] expressible in language', which means that the direct perception of a thing should not be influenced by language. And furthermore, Dignāga's definition is reminiscent of Vasubandhu's perception-definition in Vādavidhi fragment 9. Dignāga's general definition of perception in PS I.3c seems to summarize and improve on the ones offered by the NS, the NBh and Vasubandhu.

As for perception, it includes all forms of inner awareness, feelings etc, so that in this respect also, Dignāga follows his predecessor Vasubandhu. Dignāga distinguishes four kinds of perception: sensory awareness, mental awareness of the sensory impressions, mental awareness of emotions and lastly, the higher perceptions of the yogins. The object of sensory perception is described thus:

dharmiṇo 'nekarūpasya nendriyāt sarvathā gatiḥ /
svasaṃvedyam anirdeśyaṃ rūpam indriyagocaraḥ //

(PS I.5)

'The sensory cognition of a property-bearer [ie a real, outer object] whose forms [ie appearance] are many is not [possible] in a complete manner, [but] [that outer] form [of the particular] which is to be cognized by the self [-awareness of cognition] and [which form] is not expressible in language, [that form] is the object of the [five] senses.'

The object of pure sensory perception cannot be described in language, which means that it cannot be conceptualized, but must simply be perceived as it appears to the senses. In so far as the perceiver does not conceptualize the outer phenomenon, he is perceiving an object of sensory perception. The basis of perception is the fact that cognition is aware of its own content and does not need another internal witness for becoming aware of the knowledge received through the senses. 'The word "svasaṃvitti" (self-cognition: sva-saṃvid, -saṃvedana, ātma-) is expressive of the thought that cognition is cognized by itself and does not need another cognition to cognize itself (Hattori 1968, p. 101)'. Dignāga himself says,

śes pa ni gñis su snaṅ bar skyes te, raṅ gi snaṅ ba daṅ yul gyi snaṅ ba´o. snaṅ ba de gñis la gaṅ raṅ rig pa de ni ´bras bur ´gyur ro

(Hattori 1968, p. 183.18-19), '[All] knowledge has come about with a double appearance, [namely] the appearance of itself [ie as awareness of itself] and the appearance of the object [to be cognized]. The awareness of itself [of knowledge] in this double appearance becomes [in the

process of cognizing an object] the effect [ie the resultant cognition through a pramāṇa of an object]'.

Three other types of pratyakṣa are described in the PS I.6,

mānasaṁ cārtharāgādisvasaṁvittir akalpikā /
yoginām gurunirdeśāvyatibhinnārthamātradṛk //

'And mental [direct perception] is [, on the one hand,] the [mental] awareness of itself of an [outer] object [appearing in the mind, after the object has been perceived with the senses], and [on the other hand, the awareness of itself of emotions like] passion etc. [Both forms of mental perception are] without conceptualization. [The perception] of the yogins is [their] seeing an object simply as it is, completely dissociated from any description [made of it] by the spiritual preceptor[13]'.

As we have seen, Vasubandhu opposed erroneous perception, conceptual knowledge and inferential knowledge to genuine perception as a means of valid cognition. In this rejection, Dignāga follows him (as is noticed by Hattori, cf his book p. 95-96).

bhrāntisaṁvṛtisajjñānam anumānānumānikam /
smārtābhilāṣikaṁ ceti pratyakṣābhaṁ sataimiram //

(PS I.7cd-8ab)

'Cognition (a) [consisting] in error and (b) of that which exists [only] conventionally, (c) [cognition consisting in] inference and (d) [the resultant cognition] derived from inference, (e) [cognition] relating to memory and (f) to desire, together with (g) [cognition blurred by] an eye-disease, [all these cognitions] have the [false] appearance of perception'.

In the prose passage following on this verse, Dignāga explains only why cognitions a-d are not instances of true direct perception.

tatra bhrāntijñānaṁ mṛgatṛṣṇikādiṣu toyādikalpanāpravṛttatvāt pratyakṣābhāsam. saṁvṛtisajjñānaṁ saṁvṛtisatsv arthāntarādhyāropāt tadrūpakalpanāpravṛttatvāt pratyakṣābhāsam

(PS I.8ab, comm line 10-11). 'Concerning this [list of seeming perceptions], erroneous cognition [bears] upon

[real objects that are liable to deceive the perceiver, such as] mirages etc [and] has the [false] appearance of [true] perception because [erroneous cognition] has become active through the conceptualization [of mirages etc] as water etc. Cognition of what exists [only] conventionally [bears] upon [things] that exist [only] conventionally [and it] has the [false] appearance of [true] perception because [this cognition comes into existence through] [mental or conceptual] superimposition [on a real thing] of a thing that is different [from the real thing], [that is to say:] because [this sort of cognition] has become active through the conceptualization of the form of the [conventionally existing thing out of the perception of things that exist in the ultimate sense]'.[13a]

In this rather intricate passage Dignāga makes clear that bhrāntijñāna, erroneous cognition, cognition consisting in error, and saṁvṛtisajjñāna, cognition of what exists [only] conventionally [ie as a concept, not as a real thing], cannot be considered to be true perception since these two forms of cognition are not free from conceptualizations, which true perception should be free from (according to the definition in PS I.3c). Erroneous cognition occurs when, for instance, someone perceives a mirage and wrongly forms in his mind the notion of water about this mirage. Consequently, his "perception" of water is false. The same example of false perception is given in NBh 30.1-3 in relation to the postulation that pratyakṣa should be avyabhicārin, non-erroneous.

The second type of false perception corresponds to Vasubandhu's kun rdzob pa'i śes pa, saṁvṛtijñāna, which is rejected as true perception in Vādavidhi fragm 9. According to Dignāga, saṁṛtisajjñāna operates through the conceptualization of the form of the real thing into a thing that exists only conventionally, ie by convention or as a concept. For instance, the form of a certain number of atoms (which exist in the ultimate sense) is conceptualized as a pot which exists only conventionally (according to AKBh, p. 334.3-4 and Vādavidhi fragm 9, both quoted previously on p. 51-52).

The conceptualization of a heap of atoms as a pot consists in conceptually superimposing the notion "pot" on this heap. Since conceptualization comes into play in the "perception" of a pot, this perception is denied the status of real perception. The difference between the two forms of false perception lies in the fact that bhrānti-jñāna is the result of mentally mixing up really existing things, eg water and a mirage, while the second type consists in superimposing a conventionally existing thing on real things.

anumānatatphalādijñānaṁ pūrvānubhūtakalpanayeti na pratyakṣam,

'Knowledge [as the process] of inference and [knowledge as] the result of that [ie inference] etc is not perception, for [all those forms of knowledge are produced] by the conceptualization of what was experienced before [during actual direct perception] (PS I.8a-b), comm line 12)'. Here it is said that inference follows upon experiences received from perception, and as inferential cognition deals with concepts (which are, after all, abstractions of real objects), it is excluded from perception. We will remember that Vasubandhu too, excluded inferential knowledge from perception. Dignāga rejects the same three forms of seeming perception as Vasubandhu in Vādavidhi.

2.8 Pramāṇa and its Result are not Different

In the first chapter of the PS, Dignāga discusses an important theory of his, namely the theory that a means of cognition and its resultant cognition are in reality not different. He states, savyāpārapratītatvāt pramāṇaṁ phalam eva sat '[We say that] a means of valid cognition is identical with the resultant [cognition and not different from it] because [the resultant cognition] is cognized together with the activity [of cognizing a thing through a means of valid cognition] (PS I.8cd)'. Dignāga does not distinguish between the act of correctly cognizing an object and the state of having correctly cognized, the state of possess-

ing valid cognition of an object. He evidently regards pramāṇa as the process of knowing a thing and finds it unnecessary to regard means and result as separate facts. Such a distinction between the means and the result of valid cognition was indeed made by Pakṣilasvāmin who said, sa yenārthaṁ pramiṇoti tat pramāṇam, 'A means of valid cognition is that by which he [who wishes to cognize a thing,] validly cognizes the thing (NBh 3.5)'. And he continues, yad arthavijñānaṁ sā pramitiḥ, 'The valid cognition is the [true] understanding of the thing (NBh 3.6)'. It seems that Dignāga had this passage in mind when he wrote in his commentary on PS I.8c-d the following, ´di la phyi rol pa rnams kyi bźin du tshad ma las ´bras bu don gźan du gyur pa ni med, 'As regards this [statement in PS I.8c-d we add that we do] not [think] that the result [ie the resultant cognition coming from a pramāṇa] is a thing that is different from the means of valid cognition [itself] as the outsiders [ie the non-Buddhist philosophers maintain] (Commentary line 15, p. 182.8-9; p. 183.9-10)'. Hattori thinks that word 'outsiders' possibly refers to the Mīmāṁsakas, although primarily it seems to refer to Pakṣilasvāmin (Hattori 1968, p. 99). Dignāga continues, kyi / ´bras bur gyur pa´i śes pa de ñid yul gyi rnam pa can du skyes pa daṅ / bya ba daṅ bcas par rtog pa de ñe bar blaṅs nas tshad ma ñid du ´dogs pa ste / bya ba med par yaṅ yin no //

'But only that knowledge that is the resulting [cognition], has originated while possessing the form of the [outer] object, and when this [resulting] cognition has been appropriated to oneself as including the activity [ie the process of cognizing], then it [ie the activity together with the result] is named "means of valid cognition", although [in fact pramāṇa] is without activity (comm line 15-17; p. 182.9-12; p. 183.10-13)'. A passage from Hattori's commentatorial notes may be quoted here to throw more light on the ideas contained in these words of Dignāga. 'In asserting the identity of pramāṇaphala and pramāṇa in this verse, Dignāga is basing his thought upon sākārajñānavāda, the theory that the cognition as pramāṇa-

phala is the apprehension of an object (viṣayādhigati). If, ... the cognition were formless (nirākāra) while the object had form (ākāra), then the cognition itself ..., as distinguished from the object, would remain the same whether it cognized something blue or something yellow or any other object. Accordingly, the cognition as the apprehension of an object must be admitted to be sākāra. ... The sākāra cognition is thus understood to possess the function (vyāpāra) of assuming the form of an object (Hattori 1968, p. 98) . Translating vyāpāra by 'act' or 'activity' seems to me to render the term in a better way, since vyāpāra refers to the process, the act of cognition, rather than to the function of assuming.

2.9 Inference for Oneself

The second means of valid cognition is inference (anumāna) which, according to Dignāga, manifests itself in two ways. The first is svārthānumāna, inference for oneself, the inference that is drawn in the mind but not expressed in words; the second is parārthānumāna, inference for the sake of others, inference verbalized in the form of a correct syllogism. The first verse of PS II says:

anumānaṁ dvidhā svārthaṁ trirūpāl liṅgato 'rthadṛk[14]

(Kitagawa 1968, p. 74)

'Inference is twofold. [Inference] for oneself is seeing an object through a property (liṅga) which has three aspects'. The commentary says about the two forms of inference, raṅ gi don daṅ gźan gyi don daṅ (Kitagawa 1965, p. 447.2). 'For one's own sake, and for the sake of others'. The three aspects of the property refer, of course, to the trirūpahetu which was formulated by Vasubandhu in Vādavidhāna (Frauwallner 1933, p. 480 fragm 7a). But Dignāga took the definition of the threefold hetu to also define the property that we use to infer the presence of another property, the inferendum. The inferring property could be called 'inferens', which renders the term liṅga used by Dignāga, a term which, incidentally, is used by Pakṣilasvāmin to denote the proving property in his exposition of

inference in NBh 33.3-5. The triplicity of the liṅga is defined,

anumeye 'tha tattulye sadbhāvo nāstitāsati

(PS II.5c-d, Randle, Frag p. 22)

'The [liṅga, property,] is really present in the inferendum and in [the set of instances that is] resembling the [inferendum], and [the liṅga] is not present when [the inferendum is] not present'. The inferens-property can only validly prove the presence of the inferendum if (a) the inferens occurs in the inferendum (b) occurs in the instances that are like the inferendum, instances where the inferendum and the inferens are seen together, and (c) if the inferens never occurs in instances where the inferendum does not occur. The inferendum itself is defined in the commentary,

rjes su dpag par bya ba ni chos kyi khyad par du byas pa'i chos can no

(Kitagawa 1965, p. 455.11-12), 'The inferendum is a property-bearer (chos can, dharmin) which is distinguished by a [special] property'. PS II.5c-d itself seems merely to epitomize what was said in NS 1.1.34-35 and the NBh thereon, as well as the Vādavidhāna-passage mentioned on page 53. If these three criteria are not met, the inference will not be valid, says Dignāga.

ekaikadvidvirūpād vā liṅgān nārthaḥ kṛto 'rthataḥ

(unpublished fragm found by Steinkellner in Tarkasopāna p. 286.5) 'Through a property that has [in] each [case] one, or [in] each [case] two characteristics, a thing [the inferendum] is not established [inferred] from the [other] thing [from the property that proves, the inferens] (PS II.6c-d)'. There are three cases in which only one criterion is met, and they are: (a) when the property is not present in the inferendum, not present in similar instances and not present in contrary instances; (b) when the property is not present in the inferendum, is present in similar instances as well as in contrary instances; (c) when the property is present in the inferendum, absent from similar instances, but present in contrary instances. As for the three cases in which two criteria are met, they

are as follows; (d) when the property is present in the inferendum, in similar instances and in contrary instances; (e) when the property is present in the inferendum, absent from similar instances and absent from contrary instances; (f) when the property is absent from the inferendum, present in similar instances and not present in contrary instances (cf Kitagawa 1965, p. 456-457 and Hayes 1980, p. 253-254). There is a last possibility that the property is absent from the inferendum, absent from similar instances, but present in contrary instances; in this case no criterion is met. From the Vādavidhi we have learned that another important condition for an inference to be valid is the invariable concomitance of the inferens with the inferendum. This notion reappears in PS II.

liṅgasyāvyabhicāras tu dharmeṇānyatra darśyate /
tatra prasiddhaṁ tadyuktaṁ dharmiṇaṁ gamayiṣyati //

(PS II.11, source PVSV (Gn) p. 95.8-9)

'The invariable concomitance (*avyabhicāra*) of the [proving] property with the property [ie the inferendum] is pointed out with reference to another [place where the invariable concomitance was really observed]. [If the invariable concomitance is remembered, then the proving property] that is known [to be present] there [in the subject] will indicate [the presence of] the property-bearer [the inferendum] which is [invariably] connected with the [proving property, the inferens]'. In the commentary on this verse, Dignāga adduces the well-known proof of fire from smoke.

gaṅ me daṅ dud pa med na mi 'byuṅ ba'i 'brel ba de gźan du bstan par byas nas yul gźan du dud pa de 'ba' źig tsam mthoṅ yaṅ gaṅ na dud pa yod pa de na me yod do źes me daṅ ldan par grub pa ston par byed do

(Kitagawa 1965, p. 461.5-9). 'When the connexion, that is, the invariable concomitance of smoke with fire has been pointed out with reference to another [place where the connexion was really observed], then also by seeing smoke alone at another place [different from the instance where the connexion was seen] is pointed out the proof that [this second place] possesses fire, since [we remember the

fact observed earlier that] wherever there is smoke there is fire'.

The power of invariable concomitance in a deduction is, according to Dignāga, quite limited. It will reveal the presence of a thing in a certain locus, but not its specific qualities. The invariable concomitant inferens can reveal the inferendum in general, not the particular properties of the inferendum.

rtags can gan rjes ´brel pa yi / rtags can de ´dir rtogs bya yin / bye brag rtogs bya ma yin te / de dag ñid las ´khrul phyir ro // tasyaiva vyabhicāritvāt //

(PS II.18, Kitagawa p. 465. 9-12; DvNC II, p. 675.11)

'Those property-bearers [inferenda] that are connected [with a property, the inferens,] can be made known by way of the property [the inferens], but the specific qualities [of the property-bearers] cannot be made known [through the inferens, because] they are not [always] invariably concomitant with that [ie with the inferens] alone'. In the inferendum may occur a wealth of properties, but since those are not all invariably connected with the inferens, the latter cannot make them known. The inferens only discloses a general notion of the inferendum, nothing more. For the particular characteristics of the inferendum are exclusively known through direct perception.

Dignāga discovered that inseparable connexion is not sufficient to make a deduction valid. In the case of fire and smoke, it is true that smoke can reveal the presence of fire in general on the grounds that smoke is always connected with fire. But the converse is not always true. Fire does not necessarily indicate the presence of smoke, for there are instances of fire without smoke, but no instances of smoke without fire. So it is said that the extension of fire is greater than that of smoke. All the instances of fire or instances of smoke or of anything else can collectively be called a set or a class as in Oberhammer 1964, p. 136. Thus we can speak of fire as the class of fiery objects and we can call smoke the class of all instances of smoke. Now the class of fire has a greater extension than that of smoke and so it is said that fire

pervades (vyāpin) smoke and that smoke is pervaded (vyāpta) by fire. The class with the smaller extension -- being pervaded by a class with a greater extension -- can serve as inferens for the latter, provided the two classes are inseparably connected. The class which acts as inferendum must have an equal or greater extension than the class which serves as inferens. It seems that Dignāga was the first to work out the logical theory of pervasion (vyāpti) (cf Oberhammer 1964, p. 136) a theory still unknown to Vasubandhu.

The inseparable connexion of two classes acting as inferens and inferendum is explained as the relation of the content to its receptacle.

sambandho yady api dviṣṭhaḥ sahabhāvyaṅgaliṅginoḥ /
ādhārādheyavad vṛttis tasya saṁyogivan na tu //

(PS II.20, Katsura 1975, p. 67)

'Although the connexion of the concomitant (sahabhāvin) part [the inferens] with the property-bearer [the inferendum] is relying on the two [ie on inferens and inferendum], the occurrence of this [connexion] is like that of a receptacle and a deposit but not like that of a thing possessing full conjunction [between the two]'. The situation of receptacle and what is to be deposited in it is intended by Dignāga to be such that wherever what is to be deposited is placed, it necessarily is always placed in a receptacle, but the receptacle itself can occur without any content. The receptacle must be as large as, or larger than, what is to be placed in it. Likewise, the extension of the inferendum is as great or greater than that of the inferens. The inferendum can occur without the inferens, but the inferens, on the other hand, must always invariably occur with the inferendum. Yet inferens and inferendum are not inseparably connected in such a way that they are similar or equal. Therefore Dignāga compares the relation between inferens and inferendum to the relation of the content with its container. In the commentary he stresses that inferens and inferendum are qualitatively different from each other in spite of their invariable concomitance.

na kadācid ādhāra ādheyadharmā bhavati nāpy ādheya ādhāradharmā tathā na kadācil liṅgaṃ liṅgi bhavati liṅgi vā liṅgam (PS II.20 comm, source DvNC II, p. 679.14-15). 'The receptacle never possesses the properties of what is to be deposited, and also, what is to be deposited never possesses the properties of the receptacle; likewise, the property [inferens] is never [the same as] the property-bearer [the inferendum] or the property-bearer [the same as] the property'. On the remark in the last quarter-verse (PS II.20d), the commentary says,

saṃyogī tu yathaikas tathā dvitīya iti na tadvad iha, 'But a thing possessing full conjunction [with the other thing] means "as the first thing is, so is the second thing". Thus it is not here [in this doctrine of receptacle and content symbolizing the invariable concomitance of inferens with inferendum] (PS II.20 comm, source DvNC II, p. 679.15)'. This means that inferens and inferendum may not be so connected as to be virtually the same, because in that case the inference would be an instance of direct perception. For example, fire is not smoke and smoke not fire; smoke has got properties that fire does not have and vice versa. We infer fire from smoke, but if the two were the same, seeing smoke would amount to seeing fire.

The theory of pervasion and extension is summarized in PS II.25.

rva can ñid kyis ba laṅ khyab /
rva can min pa ldog par byed /
ba laṅ rva can ñid kyis khyab /
ba laṅ min don ldog byed min //

(Kitagawa, p. 469.7-10).

'[The fact of being a] cow is pervaded by the fact of having horns, [and this fact of being horned] is contrary to [the fact of] not having horns. [But the fact that] a cow is pervaded by the fact of having horns is not contrary to [the class of] things [ie animals] that are not-cows'. The extension of the class of horned animals is much greater than the extension of the class of cows. The

property of having horns is, therefore, capable of removing the notion of the class of unhorned animals, but it cannot prove an animal to be a cow. Eg when I see a horned animal, I do not necessarily see a cow, for I may be seeing some other horned animal; on the other hand, I can be quite sure that I am not seeing a dog or a rabbit -- animals that have no horns. Conversely, if I see a cow, I will also see the horns. Thus, having horns negates everything without horns, but does not imply belonging to the class of cows, whereas belonging to the class of cows necessarily implies being horned. In an earlier statement in prose, Dignāga maintains the same, <u>viṣāṇitvena govyāpitve 'pi na goprakāśanaṁ vyāpitvāt tu tad eva gotvena prakāśyaṁ bhavati</u> (PS II.22 comm, source DvNC II, p. 679.22). 'The fact of having horns does not reveal [the fact of being a] cow, although [having horns] pervades [the fact of being a] cow; on the contrary, only this [fact of having horns], since it pervades [cows], can be revealed through the fact of [being a] cow'. It is not possible to infer cowhood from being horned, although the latter pervades the former, which means that the two are in part invariably concomitant; but it is indeed possible to infer hornedness from the fact of being a cow. If two classes of objects are invariably concomitant, it is the class with the smaller extension alone that can be used as a valid reason to infer the presence of the class with the greater extension, but the converse will not always yield a valid inference. With this theory of pervasion, Dignāga was able to refine the possibilities of valid inference far beyond the old Nyāya and Vasubandhu.

2.10 <u>The Syllogism</u>

In PS II we are already confronted with an important part of Dignāga's logic, albeit not in the formalized appearance of the syllogism.[15] In PS III.1a-b the syllogism is defined in general, and later in detail. Verbalized deductive reasoning is now called <u>parārthānumāna</u>, in-

ference for the sake of others. In so far as the syllogism embodies a valid inference, it is to be regarded as a means of valid cognition. PS III.1a-b runs,

parārtham anumānaṁ tu svadṛṣṭārthaprakāśanam

'Now, inference for the sake of others is [an instance of] communicating a thing that one has seen [ie has inferred] for oneself (source Frauwallner 1957a, p. 60)'. A little further in the text of the commentary on this verse, we find this definition, trirūpaliṅgākhyānaṁ parārthānumānam, 'Inference for the sake of others consists in communicating the property that has three characteristics (source PVBh, p. 468.1; NB III.1 unpublished fragm found by Steinkellner)'. The threefold property refers to the inferens in the internal inference. When that property is communicated to others, it becomes the reason (hetu) in the syllogism.

That step in syllogistic reasoning which the NS, the NBh and Vasubandhu call pratijñā, thesis, is described by Dignāga in the following way:

tatrānumeyanirdeśo hetvarthaviṣayo mataḥ

(PS III.1c-d, source Frauwallner 1957a, p. 60) 'With regard to this [inference for the sake of others, we] regard the [verbal] indication of the inferendum [, the property of which we wish to prove that it occurs in the property-bearer,] [not as a necessary part of the syllogistic proof itself, but] as [a proposition] referring (viṣaya) to the purpose (artha) of the probans [, namely to prove the presence of the inferendum in the property-bearer in which the probans occurs]'.

The indication of the inferendum, ie the "thesis" has, up to Dignāga's time, been regarded as a necessary part of the logical proof (sādhana). Dignāga seems to say here that the proof of the presence of an inferendum is solely done by the probans (a particular proposition) and the dṛṣṭānta (a general proposition). The thesis is not an integral part of the proof, but simply meant to make clear the purpose of the probans. The inferendum is proved to be present in a property-bearer. The latter is described in the prose on PS III.2b-d,

... sgrub par 'dod pa'i chos kyi khyad par du byas pa'i chos can
(Kitagawa 1965, p. 472, text V.4), '...the property-bearer [is] characterized by a [visible] property [ie the probans that resides in it], which is intended for proving [that another property occurs in it]'. A few lines below, the formulation of the property-bearer characterized by a property is called a *bsgrub bya bstan pa, sādhyanirdeśa* (op cit, text K, p. 472.7), 'The indication of what is to be proved (*sādhya*)'. This same term is also used in NS 1.1.33, the NBh on it and Vādavidhi frag 3. According to PS III.10, *sādhya* can refer to the property whose presence is to be inferred, the property-bearer in which it is to occur and the fact that the inferendum occurs in the property-bearer.

samudāyasya sādhyatvād dharmamātre 'tha dharmiṇi /
amukhye 'py ekadeśatvāt sādhyatvam upacaryate //

(source PVBh, p. 580.27; Steinkellner 1967 II, p. 83 where it is quoted as PS III.9).
'Since what is to be proved (*sādhya*) is [really] the aggregate [of the property that is to be proved to occur in the property-bearer together with the property-bearer itself], the [term:] "being what is to be proved" is metaphorically used [to designate] the property [ie the inferendum] alone and then the property-bearer [in which the inferendum should occur] as well, although [they are] not directly [designated], because [both, ie inferendum and property-bearer] are [each] an [integral] part of [of the aggregate]'.

A correct *sādhya*, ie a property-bearer of which some property must be proved to occur in it, is described in PS III.2,

svarūpeṇaiva nirdeśyaḥ svayam iṣṭo 'nirākṛtaḥ /
pratyakṣārthānumānāptaprasiddhena svadharmiṇi //

(source Frauwallner 1957a, p. 60)
['What is to be proved, *sādhya*] must be specified through its own appearance alone; it [should be] accepted [to exist] by [the speaker] himself and [the *sādhya* should] not [be] contradicted by [another property that is] estab-

lished [to occur] in his own [ie accepted by the speaker] property-bearer through an object of perception, through inference or through [the words of] an expert'. The commentary says,

<u>raṅ gi ṅo bo kho na źes bya ba ni bsgrub par bya ba'i ṅo bos yin</u>

(Kitagawa 1965, p. 471 text V.11), 'Through its own appearance alone means: through its appearance as <u>sādhya</u>'. And further, the prose text on PS III.2b-d says,

<u>gaṅ sgrub par 'dod pa'i chos kyi khyad par du byas pa'i chos can [gal te] de la bsgrub par bya ba'i chos daṅ 'gal ba'i mṅon sum daṅ / rjes su dpag pa daṅ / luṅ daṅ / grags pa rnams te / chos gźan gyis ma bsal ba'o // de ltar na bsgrub par bya ba kha na ma tho ba med par bstan pa yin no //</u>

(Kitagawa 1965, text V, p. 472.4-8), '[when] a property-bearer which is intended for proving as being characterized by a property, is not removed by another property that is (a) contrary to the property that is to be proved [to occur in the property-bearer], [and] (b) is established [to occur] in the [property-bearer] through perception, inference and tradition, [then] in this way the indication of what is to be proved is irreproachable'.

The speaker of the syllogism must personally accept the existence of the property-bearer. That the speaker really saw the property-bearer for himself was expressed in the initial phrase of PS III, 'Inference for the sake of others is communicating a thing that one has seen for oneself'. It should not be possible to deny the existence of the property-bearer on the grounds that it really and observably possesses properties contrary to the properties it is proposed to have, eg when a speaker made the proposition that fire is cold, for it is established by sense experience that fire is not cold but possesses the property heat. Dignāga mentions the <u>pramāṇas</u> by which one could deny the existence of a subject. They are perception, inference and (remarkably enough) reliable statement, the statement of an <u>āpta</u>, an expert, by which Dignāga is probably referring to the syllogism, although

in the commentary he calls it luṅ, āgama, tradition. In the commentary, he also gives a few examples of false propositions, ie propositions invalidated by pramāṇas. aśrāvaṇaḥ śabdo nityo ghaṭa iti (PVBh, p. 454.8), '[every] sound is inaudible, [every] pot is eternal'. The first example is contradicted by direct experience since we do hear sounds if they are loud enough; it is not the case that no sound can be heard at all. The second example is contradicted by sense experience as well as inference. We may see a pot being made or being destroyed or both and hence deduce its perishableness.

As with internal inference, we need a proving property by the presence of which we can establish the presence of another invariably concomitant property that is as yet not immediately visible in a given property-bearer. The triplicity of the liṅga described in PS II.5c-d reappears here as the triplicity of the hetu in the syllogism. Thus, the hetu is the property known to occur in the subject (pakṣa), known to occur in the instances similar to the subject (sapakṣa) and known to be absent from the instances dissimilar to the subject (asapakṣa). It is important to realize that Dignāga introduced in his logic the possibility of quantification. The hetu can occur in the whole of the sapakṣa or in a part of the sapakṣa, and similarly, can be absent from the whole of the asapakṣa or from part of the asapakṣa. The relevant verse is PS III.9

sapakṣe sann asan dvedhā pakṣadharmaḥ punas tridhā /
pratyekam asapakṣe ca sadasaddvividhatvataḥ //

(source Randle Frag, p. 29)

[The reason as] a property of the subject is -- regarding the sapakṣa [, class of instances similar to the subject,] -- present [in it], not present, [or] in two ways [ie present in a part of the sapakṣa, not present in another part] and in so far as [the property of the subject] is present in, absent from, [or] in two ways [present] in [a part of the class of] instances dissimilar from the subject [, the asapakṣa]; in each one [of the possibilities, as regards the sapakṣa, we can generate] in three ways

[three combinations]'.

The extreme brevity of the original necessitates this rather lengthy paraphrasing translation in order to lay bare the intentions of this verse. First of all, it must be borne in mind that sapakṣa refers to the class of objects[16] in which it is seen that the probans is invariably concomitant with the inferendum, and that the asapakṣa is the class of objects in which it is observed that the probans never occurs with the inferendum. The term sapakṣa also occurred in Vādavidhāna (fragm 7, 7a), but the term asapakṣa occurred there as vipakṣa. There are, according to Dignāga, three possible relations of the probans with the sapakṣa or the asapakṣa. The probans is present with the inferendum in the whole of the sapakṣa, is fully absent from it, or is present in some part of the sapakṣa, which is saying as much as being absent from some part of the sapakṣa. The same three possibilities obtain for the asapakṣa; the probans accompanied by the inferendum fully occurs in all of the asapakṣa, does not at all occur in the asapakṣa or occurs in some part of the asapakṣa. The probans occurring in the subject and the three types of occurrence of the probans in the sapakṣa and asapakṣa respectively make in all nine different combinations. These nine consitute the famous wheel of nine reasons.[17] The first condition is, without exception, that the probans is a property of the subject, while it is with the second and third condition that the nine combinations can be made. As regards the sapakṣa the three possibilities are:

a. present in the whole of the sapakṣa
b. absent from the whole of the sapakṣa
c. present in some part of the sapakṣa

With the asapakṣa we have the same three possibilities:

d. present in the whole of the asapakṣa
e. absent from the whole of the asapakṣa
f. present in some part of the asapakṣa

The nine pairs we can make are as follows:

1. a and d	4. b and d	7. c and d
2. a and e	5. b and e	8. c and e

3. a and f 6. b and f 9. c and f

Only combinations 2 and 8 yield a valid inference, that is, when the probans together with the inferendum is present in the whole of the sapakṣa and fully absent from the asapakṣa, or when the probans is present in some part of the sapakṣa and fully absent from the asapakṣa. In Frauwallner 1959, appendix we find in the Tibetan translation of Dignāga's Hetucakra a worked out set of 9 syllogisms with these nine hetus in Tibetan. Combination 2 reads;

> sgra ni mi rtag ste /
> byas pa'i phyir /
> bum pa bźin daṅ /
> nam mkha' bźin no /
> mthun pa'i phyogs thams cad la yod /
> mi mthun pa'i phyogs la med /
> rtags yaṅ dag go /

'Sound is non-eternal (thesis)
because it is produced (reason, probans)
like a pot (sapakṣa)
[sound is not unproduced] like space (asapakṣa)
[the probans] is present in the whole of the sapakṣa
not present in the asapakṣa
the reason (rtags, hetu) is correct'.[18]

The fact of being produced occurs in the whole of the sapakṣa, for pots and the like are all seen to be produced and non-eternal. The fact of being produced does not occur at all in the asapakṣa, for space and the like are well-known to be unproduced as well as eternal. In the sapakṣa we observe the invariable concomitance of the probans with the inferendum and the extension of the inferendum and the probans. In this syllogism, the inferendum has the same extension as the probans, for everything that is non-eternal is produced and everything that is produced is non-eternal. When the sapakṣa would show that the extension of the inferendum is greater than the probans, the syllogism is also valid, because wherever the probans occurs there the inferendum occurs too. This can be exemplified by the smoke-fire syllogism, where we see in the

<u>sapakṣa</u> that the probans always occurs with the inferendum fire, and yet the inferendum itself can occur without the probans, smoke. The example of combination 8 is as follows:

<u>sgra ni mi rtag ste</u> /
<u>rtsol ba las byuṅ ba'i phyir</u> /
<u>bum pa daṅ glog bźin daṅ</u> /
<u>nam mkha' bźin no</u> /
<u>mthun pa'i phyogs la gñis ka</u> /
<u>mi mthun pa'i phyogs la med</u> /
<u>rtags yaṅ dag go</u> /

'Sound is non-eternal
because it is caused by [some intentional]
effort like a pot and a flash of lightning
[sound is not] like space [which is not caused by intentional effort]
[the probans] is in two ways [present] in the <u>sapakṣa</u>
not present in the <u>asapakṣa</u>
the reason is correct.'

Although the fact of being caused by some intentional effort (<u>prayatnotthita</u>) is invariably concomitant with non-eternity, it does not occur in the whole of the <u>sapakṣa</u>. For the <u>sapakṣa</u> actually contains the class of objects that are produced (<u>kṛtaka</u>), but are not all necessarily produced by intentional effort. Pots are made with intentional effort, but lightning is not, though it is produced by some cause. The fact of being caused by intentional effort has a smaller extension than being-produced. The latter fully contains the former, so that we could say that intentional effort is invariably concomitant with production. And since production is invariably concomitant with non-eternity, intentional effort is also invariably concomitant with non-eternity. The third condition is completely met, the probans does not occur at all in the <u>asapakṣa</u>. Space -- being not non-eternal -- is not produced and not caused by intentional effort. Thus, the probans being present in the subject, in a part of the <u>sapakṣa</u> and absent from the whole of the <u>asapakṣa</u>, yields a valid syllogism.

In all the remaining 7 cases, the reason generates incorrect syllogisms. The reason is present in the subject, but the other two criteria are either not, or only partly, met. There is one case, namely 5, where the probans does not occur in the sapakṣa nor in the asapakṣa. Such a reason is called asādhāraṇa, uncommon reason, a reason peculiar to the subject alone, a reason not supported by any example. In the cases 4 and 6, the probans is not present in the sapakṣa but present in the whole or in a part of the asapakṣa. The reason is then called viruddha, contradictory, proving the contrary of what one wished to prove. In cases 1, 3, 7 and 9, where the probans is present in the whole or in a part of the sapakṣa as well as in the whole or in a part of the asapakṣa, the reason is called anaikāntika, inconclusive, because the reason does not conclusively establish the presence of the inferendum in the subject. In all these cases, the logical error arises from the circumstance that the probans is not seen to be invariably concomitant with the inferendum in the sapakṣa and not seen to never to occur with the inferendum in the asapakṣa.

When in the course of the syllogism the sapakṣa and the asapakṣa are mentioned, they are regarded as dṛṣṭāntas, generally-accepted facts. The function of the dṛṣṭānta is explained in PS IV. Dignāga opens that chapter with the following statement.

trirūpo hetur ity uktaṁ pakṣadharme ca saṁsthitaḥ /
rūḍhe rūpadvayaṁ śeṣaṁ dṛṣṭāntena pradarśyate //

(PS IV.1 occurs in Vip, p. 88.27-28)

'It is explained [what] the triple reason is [in PS II-III] and [that the reason] is established as regards [its presence in the subject as] a known (rūḍha) property of the subject [the first criterion]. [As for] the other two criteria, they are pointed out by means of a dṛṣṭānta'. The other two critera are, of course, the condition that the probans must always be found with the inferendum in the sapakṣa and that wherever the inferendum is absent the probans is also absent, a fact that is seen in the asapakṣa. We disclose the positive invariable concomitance

of the probans with the inferendum by means of the *sādharmya-dṛṣṭānta* which reálly is the *sapakṣa*. We disclose the negative invariable concomitance with the help of the *vaidharmya-dṛṣṭānta* which is the *asapakṣa*. Dignāga continues:

sādhyānugamo hetuḥ sādhyābhāve ca nāstitā /
chos mthun cig śos daṅ bcas gñis //
dpe la rab tu bstan par bya //

(PS IV.2a-b source Tucci 1930, p. 21; 2cd Kitagawa 1965, text V p. 518.3-4) 'The reason [is the property that always] follows what is to be proved (*sādhya*) and [the reason] is not present when what is to be proved is absent. The fact of possessing the same property (*chos mthun*, *sādharmya*), which [fact] is related to the other two [criteria of a valid reason], must be shown in a *dṛṣṭānta* (*dpe*)'. The fact of possessing the same property, *sādharmya*, relates to the *sapakṣa* in which we see that the inferendum is connected with the probans, and thus the *sapakṣa* possesses the same proving property as the subject, which is here called *sādhya* in order to emphasize that what is to be proved by the *hetu* is the residence of the inferendum in the subject (cf PS III.10 quoted above). In the commentary on this verse Dignāga says,

chos mthun pa ni re źig sgra mi rtag ste byas pa´i phyir źes bya ba lta bu´o,

'In the first place, *sādharmya* (*chos mthun pa*), the fact of possessing the same property [as the subject functions] thus: sound is non-eternal because it is produced (Kitagawa 1965, text V p. 518, 6-7)'. This phrase exemplifies the reason in a syllogism (again the famous syllogism on the non-eternity of sound). The next step is the enunciation of the *dṛṣṭānta*,

gal te gaṅ rtsol ba las byuṅ ba de mi rtag par bum pa la sogs pa la mthoṅ ba de bźin du chos mi mthun pa la yaṅ rtag pa rtsol ba las ma byuṅ bar nam mkha´ la mthoṅ ba´i phyir ´dir yaṅ sgrub byed kyi sgo nas bsgrub bya sgrub par brjod par bya´o.

'[And further] if it is seen in [the *sapakṣa*, the similar instances like] pots etc [used as *dṛṣṭānta*]

what is caused by [intentional] effort is non-eternal, [then] in like manner regarding the fact of not possessing the same property (chos mi mthun pa, vaidharmya) it is seen in [the asapakṣa, the dissimilar instances like] space that what is eternal is not caused by [intentional] effort. Therefore, in the [vaidharmya-dṛṣṭānta] too one has to state that the proof of the sādhya is [being done] by the probans (sādhana, sgrub byed) (Kitagawa 1965, text V p. 513.7-11)'. As we will remember, the use of a positive example and a contrary example in the syllogism was taught in NS 1.1.36-37 and the NBh thereon. According to those texts, the reason is established by a sādharmya-udāharaṇa and a vaidharmya-udāharaṇa. Dignāga has retained this practice also in the PS, for here the reason is based on a sādharmya-dṛṣṭānta, showing the positive invariable concomitance of the probans with the inferendum as well as a vaidharmya-dṛṣṭānta, showing the negative invariable concomitance which evidences the absence of the probans at the absence of the probandum.

2.11 Reliable Statement

The only two means of valid cognition, according to Dignāga (and probably Vasubandhu), are perception and inference. Thus, Dignāga denies all the other pramāṇas the status of real means of valid cognition. The number of two valid pramāṇas was -- as we have seen -- based on the idea that there exist only two sorts of objects, viz the particular (svalakṣaṇa) and the universal (sāmānya-lakṣaṇa). The particular is cognized by perception, the universal by inference (cf PS I.2). This seems to leave no room for reliable statement, apart from being considered a kind of inference, as a source of knowledge about reality. The most perfect form of reliable statement would be the syllogism, the inference put in words. But even if a reliable statement does not assume the form of a correct syllogism, Dignāga wishes to include it in inference. For in PS II.5a-b he mentions reliable state-

ment which he calls āptavāda, 'discourse, statement' of an 'expert'.

āptavādāvisaṁvādasāmānyād anumānatā

(source PVSV Gn p. 108.1, 109.5)

'The statement by an expert is [to be regarded as] inference in so far as there is similarity in trustworthiness [between real inference and reliable statement]'. The cognition which results from both reliable statement and inference seizes upon the universal, and in so far as the cognition derived from reliable statement is valid, it is qualitatively similar to inferential cognition -- at least this seems to be the drift of Dignāga's argument in PS II.5a-b. The commentary does not say much more, although we discern a tendency to base the validity of āptavāda on direct perception.

yid ches pa'i tshig ñid bzuṅ nas kyaṅ mi bslu bar mtshuṅs pa'i phyir de yaṅ rjes su dpag pa ñid du brjod do / de skad du yaṅ / miṅ gi las rnams kyi don du mṅon sum soṅ ba'i phyir ro źes'byuṅ ṅo,

'And further, after we perceived [ie heard] only a statement of an expert, we call also this [kind of statement] inference [ie of inferential nature] on account of the similarity in trustworthiness [between inference and reliable statement]. And thus [by way of trustworthiness, a reliable statement] is produced because the activities of giving names [to things] is [inevitably] preceded by direct perception (mṅon sum, pratyakṣa) (Kitagawa 1965, text V, p. 455.1-4)'. Dignāga is actually saying here that the trustworthiness of statements is based on the fact that the objects they refer to were really perceived by the speaker. Thus, direct perception (pratyakṣa) is the source of valid inferences as well as correct statements that do not assume the form of an inference. And since the validity of inferences (and thus of reliable statements) can be verified by the very fact that correct inferences are drawn in accordance with the rules of logic, Dignāga does not have to further discuss the reliability of the speaker, as Pakṣilasvāmin did in NBh 223.5-7. The correct inference depends for its validity

on the impersonal laws of valid deduction, not on the moral qualities of its speaker.

NOTES

1. This article is reprinted in Frauwallner, Kleine Schriften, Wiesbaden 1982, p. 716-758. The article itself is numbered there p. 2-44, whereas in the journal in which it was originally published it occupies p. 104-146.

2. In fact, the notion of invariable concomitance (avinābhāva, nāntarīyakatva) as the basis of valid inference does occur in the NBh, although not in the description of the inference and the syllogism, where we would expect it. In NS 2.2.2 various other pramāṇas are subsumed under reliable statement or inference. The pramāṇa called saṁbhava, 'the fact [that two things] are together' is subsumed under inference. Pakṣilasvāmin comments on this with the following remark,
avinābhāvavṛttyā ca saṁbaddhayoḥ samudāyasamudāyinoḥ samudāyenetarasya grahaṇaṁ saṁbhavaḥ, tad apy anumānam eva (NBh, p. 229.5-6), 'The fact [that two things] are together [, as a separate pramāṇa] consists in grasping the second [object, ie the part] by [grasping] the whole by [way of] the presence of the never occurring without (avinābhāva) [ie always occurring together, hence invariable concomitance] in a whole and its part that are both connected [with each other]; also this [kind of grasping] is only inference [and not a separate pramāṇa]'. Pakṣilasvāmin says here that if a part and the whole of which it is a part are so connected that the whole never occurs without its part, that is to say that the two are invariably concomitant, it is possible to infer the presence of the part through the presence and observation of the whole. In his commentary on NS 2.2.1 Pakṣilasvāmin explains saṁbhava thus,
saṁbhavo nāmāvinābhāvino 'rthasya sattāgrahaṇād anyasya sattāgrahaṇam. yathā droṇasya sattāgrahaṇād āḍhakasya sattāgrahaṇam āḍhakasya sattāgrahaṇāt prasthasyeti (NBh, p. 228.2-4), 'What is called saṁbhava is grasping [ie perceiving] the presence (sattā) of another [ie a second] [thing] through grasping the presence of a thing

that is never occurring without [the second thing, ie that is invariably concomitant with the second thing], as grasping the presence of [the weight of] an ādhaka [1/4 of a droṇa] through grasping the presence of [the weight of] a droṇa [4 ādhakas with which 1 ādhaka is invariably concomitant, and grasping the presence] of [the weight of] a prastha [1/64 ādhaka] through grasping the presence of an ādhaka [64 prasthas, with which 1 prastha is invariably concomitant]'. Pakṣilasvāmin says here that a smaller weight is always concomitant with, always included in, a greater weight. For instance, 100 grams of sugar is invariably concomitant with, and included in, 500 grams of sugar. Vasubandhu, in all probability, used this doctrine of avinābhāva between two things to describe in Vādavidhi the basis of valid inference in general, not only of saṁbhava as a special type of inference as Pakṣilasvāmin does.

3. NBh, p. 84.1-2, sādhyaṁ ca dvividhaṁ dharmiviśiṣṭo vā dharmaḥ śabdasyānityatvaṁ dharmaviśiṣṭo vā dharmī anityaḥ śabda iti,
'That which is to be proved (sādhya) is twofold: either it is a property characterized by a property-bearer, [as the property] non-eternity of [a property-bearer] sound, or it is a property-bearer characterized by a property, [as the property-bearer] sound is non-eternal [ie characterized by the property non-eternity]'. In the first example, the property that is to be proved to occur in the property-bearer is called sādhya; in the second, the property-bearer of which it must be proved that a certain property occurs in it is called sādhya.

4. Cf note 2 about this term.

5. Cf the description of NS- and NBh-logic in the previous chapter and note 22.

6. At least in this description of the syllogism. But he did know about invariable concomitance as the basis of some

special type of inference, sambhava, cf note 2. It is the achievement of Vasuandhu to have made avinābhāva the basis of correct inference in general and of syllogistic reasoning.

7. The Mīmāṃsā author Kumārila and the Vaiśeṣika author Praśastapāda, for instance, borrowed a great deal of their logic from Dignāga. The Nyāya author Uddyotakara heavily attacked Dignāga and yet made good use of Dignāga's logic, cf Oberhammer 1964b, p. 136-137 and Steinkellner 1961, p. 152-153.

8. In an appendix without page numbers, Hattori 1968 gives the surviving Sanskrit fragments of PS I.1-11 with the missing parts supplied from Tibetan. Thus we have a complete running text partly in Sanskrit partly in Tibetan. Whenever I quote PS I it is from this mixed text of Hattori 1968.

9. It is strange to find in Hattori 1968, p. 76 that the first statement of the NBh (NBh 1.5) should have an affinity with this assertion of Dignāga. NBh 1.5 says, pramāṇato 'rthapratipattau pravṛttisāmarthyād arthavat pramāṇam,
'A means of valid cognition possesses the object, because of the appropriateness of [human] activity [with regard to the object] when the object is cognized through a means of valid cognition'. This passage is not similar to Dignāga's statement, for NBh 1.5 tries to explain the practical utility of the pramāṇas; but my quotation (NBh 2.1) and Dignāga's statement are indeed affirming the same principle, namely, that true knowledge of an object depends on and is produced by pramāṇas.

0. In the Nyāyamukha, Dignāga says, '... there are only two pramāṇas, I mean: inference and direct perception ... since [the other pramāṇas admitted by different schools] such as tradition (śabda), analogy (upamāna) etc. are included in these two. Thus there are only two pramāṇas, by

which we can apprehend the thing in itself (svalakṣaṇa) and its generality (sāmānyalakṣaṇa)', Tucci 1930, p. 50.

11. Whenever I am referring to the commentary on the PS, I am referring to Dignāga's own commentary on the verses.

12. According to Frauwallner 1961, p. 131-132 this is the same Vasubandhu who wrote the Vādavidhāna, Vādavidhi, Viṁśatikā and Triṁśikā. That Dignāga was well-acquainted with the Abhidharmakośa is an established fact, because he wrote an abridgment of that work called Abhidharmakośa-Marmapradīpa which exists in a Tibetan translation in TTP vol. 118, Thu 144a.8-286b.1 (cf Hattori 1968, p. 3, 8).

13. In PS, Dignāga does not say more on yoga and the experience of yogins, yogipratyakṣa than PS I.6b-c. For further details on his conception of yoga we could turn to his Yogāvatāra (published in Frauwallner 1959, p. 144-145). In this little tract Dignāga says that the yogin, after having heard the elevated doctrine (v. 1), having shaken off all kinds of concepts (v. 2), having regarded everything as illusory and having torn to pieces that which binds him to the body (v. 4), sees his own mind or pure consciousness (citta) and the highest reality:

svākāramātraśeṣaṁ paśyati cittaṁ svam ādyanutpannam /
yenāpi paśyatīdaṁ tad api tathaivāvalokayati // 5 //
so 'nupalambho 'cintyā tathatoktā bhūtakoṭiś ca // 6ab //

'[The yogin] sees that his own consciousness [or mind, citta], having as its remainder (śeṣa) [after all concepts etc are shaken off] nothing but (mātra) the form (ākāra) of itself (sva), has never originated from a beginning [ie the pure consciousness is beginningless]. This [consciousness] too, through which [the yogin] sees the [beginningless consciousness], he beholds in the same way [namely, as beginningless] 5.
This non-perception [ie beginningless consciousness only beholding itself as such] is called [in Prajñā Pāramitā Sūtras] the inconceivable [or unthinkable, acintya] reality (tathatā) and the highest limit of being

(bhūtakoṭi) 6ab'. This should give us some idea of what Dignāga has in mind when he speaks of perception / experience of yogins, yogipratyakṣa.

13a I have interpreted the locative mṛgatṛṣṇikādiṣu in the first sentence as referring to bhrāntijñāna. However, the locative could also refer to kalpanā. Then the sentence would state, 'As regards this [list], erroneous cognition has the [false] appearance of perception because [erroneous cognition] has become active through the conceptualization of water etc with regard to [things that are not water etc but in fact] mirages etc'. If this second interpretation of the locative is applied to the parallel phrase saṁvṛtisatsu in the next sentence, ie if we regard it as referring to adhyāropa and/or kalpanā instead of referring to saṁvṛtisajjñāna, then we get the rather surprising and indeed improbable notion that conceptualization -- which in fact produces saṁvṛtisat out of things that exist in the ultimate sense, paramārthasat -- acts on its own product (saṁvṛtisat) in order to produce precisely that, namely saṁvṛtisat. The sentence would absurdly maintain that 'cognition of what exists [only] conventionally has the [false] appearance of perception because [this cognition comes into existence through] [mental] superimposition [on a real thing] of a thing that is different [from the real thing]; [ie saṁvṛtisajjñāna] has become active through the conceptualization of the form of the [conventionally existing things] with regard to the [things] that exist [only] conventionally'. The interpretation I have adopted -- ie saṁvṛtisatsu as referring to the immediately preceding saṁvṛtisajjñāna -- does not yield a very elegant statement either, but it is still preferable to the one just mentioned. It could be said that the Sanskrit original, saṁvṛtisajjñānam saṁvṛtisatsv, is clumsily formulated (it must be the correct reading as it is supported by the Tibetan translations, cf Hattori 1968, p. 180.36-37, p. 181.35-36).

I have interpreted the ablative tadrūpakalpanāpravṛttatvāt (a) as the reason for regarding saṁvṛtisajjñāna

as false perception and (b) as an explanatory paraphrase in the same case of arthāntarādhyāropāt. It seems perfectly evident that adhyāropa has the same function as kalpanā, namely to mentally superimpose or conceptualize a thing that exists only conventionally on a thing that exists in the ultimate sense, eg to superimpose "pot" on a heap of atoms or to form the concept "pot" about a heap of atoms. Dignāga may have used the term adhyāropa to indicate wherein saṃvṛtisajjñāna originates, and may have paraphrased adhyāropa by kalpanā in order to make quite clear that saṃvṛtisajjñāna is no true perception because it is not free from conceptualization (kalpanā). The only other interpretation of the two ablatives would be that arthāntarādhyāropāt expresses the cause of kalpanā. The conceptualization of the form of saṃvṛtisat would then be brought forth by a mental or conceptual superimposition of a different thing on the real thing. This would amount to the conceptualization of a mental superimposition (ie again a conceptualization) of a real thing as something that exists only conventionally. As a double conceptualization of a thing seems very unlikely in this context, we could safely stick to the first interpretation.

14. Most of the Sanskrit fragments of PS II and III I owe to the kindness of Prof. Steinkellner in Vienna who gave me a copy of his unpublished collection of fragments of the PS. Some of these fragments are quite well-known and occur in Kitagawa 1965 or Randle Frag. After the Sanskrit fragment I will cite the source, while the Tibetan text is taken from the edition in Kitagawa 1965.

15. In Tillemans 1984 it is argued that the parārthānumāna as taught in the PS and PV should not be called syllogism. On p. 94 Tillemans states, 'Une inférence - pour - autrui PS-PV n'est pas un "syllogisme" bouddhique, puisque ses critères de validité ne ressemblent pas à ceux d'un syllogisme dans une loqigue formelle", and on p. 87 he says '... les différences fondamentals qui séparent une inférence - pour - autrui et un syllogisme aristotélicien

... la validité d'un syllogisme ne dépend que de sa forme logique, tandis que la cognition ... joue un role majeur dans la validité selon la logique bouddhique. ... un syllogisme ... doit avoir une conclusion, alors que c'est un point logicophilosophique fondamental de la version PS - PV que l'expression de la thèse (pakṣavacana) ne figure pas dans l'énoncé d'une inférence - pour - autrui.' Now his first objection to calling parārthānumāna a syllogism seems to be that a parārthānumāna, an inference for the sake of others, does not constitute a system of formal logic in the modern sense of the word, which is, of course, true. It would be misleading and incorrect to call Dignāga and Dharmakīrti's logic a formal logic, for its main purpose is to arrive at correct knowledge of reality. Thus their logic is a pramāṇa, a means of valid cognition. However, I am not so sure that Aristotelian logic, ie the Aristotelian syllogism could simply be regarded as part of a system of formal logic in which the correctness, the validity of the syllogism merely depends on its logical form, as Tillemans maintains. Moreover, Tillemans does not make clear whether he means the syllogism as taught by Aristotle himself or the medieval developments based on Aristotle. In any case, it seems that Aristotle meant his logic to be an instrument to gain correct knowledge, cf the following remark in Kneale p. 67, 'Aristotle's account of general propositions prepares the way for his doctrine of the syllogism. At the beginning of the Prior Analytics he defined a syllogism as a discourse in which from certain propositions that are laid down something other than what is stated follows of necessity. This formula is wide enough to cover almost any argument in which a conclusion is inferred from two or more premisses'. What is important here is that from general true propositions another proposition necessarily follows. If this general notion is kept in mind, we are able to see the correspondence of this with the parārthānumāna, for in the latter the dṛṣṭānta functions as a proposition enunciating a general fact while the hetu enunciates a particular fact. The thing that was announced for proof follows from both proposi-

tions. Tillemans is right when, with regard to Buddhist logic, he says that cognition (ie direct perception) plays a major role in the validity of the statements. But I think he is not quite right in saying that the absence of a thesis (on which his interpretation of the parārthānumāna as not being a syllogism seems to rest) is a fundamental logical and philosophical characteristic of the parārthānumāna. As we will see in my description of the parārthānumāna, Dignāga discusses some sort of enunciation of what is to be proved (sādhyanirdeśa) in PS III.1cd-2, although he makes it clear that this is not a separate step in syllogistic reasoning as his predecessors thought. I would say that, for convenience's sake, we could still use the word syllogism for parārthānumāna, provided we keep in mind that the parārthānumāna does not have the actual form of the Aristotelian syllogistic, nor is it a kind of formal logic in the modern sense.

16. A class can be regarded as an indefinite number of individual occurrences or, in other words, a collection of objects, itself considered as a single abstract object, a set. In our case, this set or class consists of all the occurrences of the invariable concomitance of the probans with the inferendum and the negative invariable concomitance of the probans with objects dissimilar to the subject. If the notion of sapakṣa is taken to denote a class (as in Frauwallner 1959, p. 85 and more explicitly in Oberhammer 1964, p. 136-138) we can refer to sapakṣa in the singular. If the sapakṣa is taken to denote a number of similar instances (as in Randle Frag, p. 30), we can refer to it in the plural. Thus, saying that the probans is present in all the sapakṣas or in the whole of the sapakṣa, really amounts to the same proposition and, similarly, to saying that the probans occurs in some sapakṣas or in a part of the sapakṣa. But one should be careful in using terms like 'all' and 'some' because they suggest real logical quantifiers in the original, whereas Dignāga never used any quantifiers in the Aristotelian sense of the word. Dignāga himself, at all events, refers

to <u>sapakṣa</u> and <u>asapakṣa</u> in the singular.

17. Cf Vidyabhushana, A History of Indian Logic, reprint Delhi 1971, p. 283-285; Randle Frag, p. 31-33; Tucci 1930, p. 26-30; Frauwallner 1959, p. 85-87; Hayes 1980, p. 230-237. According to Frauwallner 1959, the Hetucakraḍamaru which expounds the nine reasons is one of Dignāga's earliest writings on logic, cf op cit p. 89.

18. It is interesting to compare Dignāga's syllogistic with the illustrative syllogism on the non-eternity of sound offered by Pakṣilasvāmin in his commentary on NS 1.1.33-39. In spite of the absence of the <u>upanaya</u> and <u>nigamana</u>, Dignāga's syllogism has the same structure as Pakṣilasvāmin's. One could say that Dignāga submits a highly improved version of Pakṣilasvāmin's syllogism.

III Dharmakīrti's Logic

In spite of his widespread renown, Dignāga is greatly overshadowed by his philosophical successor Dharmakīrti, who lived later, ca 600-660 AD according to Frauwallner 1961, p. 137-139, but according to Lindtner 1980, p. 29, ca 530-600 AD. Dharmakīrti was the one who gave definite shape to Buddhist epistemology and logic by his various works, of which PV I with PVSV and PV II-IV are the earliest. PV II-IV were intended to be an exhaustive commentary on the PS, a commentary in which Dharmakīrti also allowed himself to elaborate his own epistemological and logical theories. PV II comments on the first verse of PS; PV III refers to PS I, while PV IV refers to PS III. PV I with PVSV are shown by Frauwallner to be the oldest part of PV, coming before PV II-IV. PV I together with PVSV is an independent treatise on topics related to PS -- particularly logic and semantics -- without being a direct commentary (Frauwallner 1954, p. 146, 148, 152). Not only is PV I a separate work, it is, moreover, Dharmakīrti's first treatise (Frauwallner 1954, p. 152-153), and PV II-IV can only be fully understood in the light of PV I and, of course, of Dignāga's philosophy.

3.1 The utility of inference

Before finally examining PV II itself, it is necessary to show how Dharmakīrti in PV I with PVSV fundamentally revised and improved Dignāga's theory of inference. The first prose sentence of the PVSV specifies the utility of drawing valid inferences (anumāna).

arthānarthavivecanasyānumānāśrayatvāt tadvipratipattes tadvyavasthāpanāyāha

(PVSV, p. 1.8-9). 'In so far as the distinguishing between what is meaningful (artha) and what is not meaningful (anartha) [in epistemology and logic][1] has [correct] inference as [its] basis, [and] because there is perplexity [ie a variety of conflicting opinions] about it [ie about correct inference], [therefore] he [ie Dharmakīrti] says

[the following verse, PV I.1] in order to [clearly] determine it [ie inference]'. One of the pramāṇas that is used to acquire valid knowledge about reality is inference, which primarily means internal inference, svārthānumāna, but also refers to the syllogism, parārthānumāna, as the latter is, in Dharmakīrti's opinion, nothing but an explicitly formulated inference.[2] The importance of inference as the only second pramāṇa along with pratyakṣa compels Dharmakīrti to dissipate the conflicting and contradictory opinions on inference by clearly describing a correct process of drawing inferences and the circumstances in which an inference can be valid. What is important to Dharmakīrti is that an inference be valid as a pramāṇa, that it may give true knowledge about reality; for it is correct knowledge that enables one to make the right choices between what is useful and what is not.

3.2 A compendious definition of the probans

In the verse that now follows, Dharmakīrti defines what was called by Dignāga the inferens, liṅga in the internal inference and reason, hetu, in the syllogism.

> pakṣadharmas tadaṁśena vyāpto hetus tridhaiva saḥ /
> avinābhāvaniyamād dhetvābhāsās tato 'pare //

(PV I.1)[3]

'The reason is a property of the subject pervaded by a part [ie another property] of the [subject]. The [reason as valid probans] is only of three kinds owing to the restriction of the positive invariable concomitance [of the reason with the probandum]. [Reasons] other than this [one] are fallacious reasons'. This programmatic verse contains various propositions:in the words of Śākyamati's[4] Ṭīkā on PV I and PVSV,

tshigs su bcad pa 'di las [la] ni rtags kyi mtshan ñid daṅ / graṅs ṅes pa daṅ /ṅes pa'i rgyu daṅ mi mthun pa'i phyogs las ldog pa bśad de /

(PVT, Je, p. 7.6-7, cf PVSVT, p. 8.24-25), 'In this verse are expressed; a definition of a [correct] reason, a restriction of the number [of correct reasons, ie only

three], the cause of this restriction [ie the positive invariable concomitance of the probans with the probandum], and the absence [of the correct probans] from [all instances that are] contrary [to the definition of the correct probans]'. If the reason (hetu) conforms to this definition, it is a correct reason; if it does not, it is a false reason (hetvābhāsa). Śākyamati explains his last remark as follows,

gtan tshigs ltar snaṅ de las gźan źes bya ba ni mi mthun pa'i phyogs las ldog pa ste / gtan tshigs gsum po de las gźan pa ni gtan tshigs ltar snaṅ ba dag yin no (PVT, Je, p. 7b.1, cf PVSVT, p. 8.28-29),' "Other [kinds of reasons] than this [one] are fallacious reasons" [this means:] the absence [of the correct reason] from [all instances that are] contrary [to the definitions]; [ie reasons] other than these three [valid] reasons are fallacious reasons'. In the above verse, the reason is defined as a property of the subject, which means that it is a known property of the subject; this is the first of the three criteria of a valid inferens (liṅga) and reason (hetu) as defined by Dignāga in PS II.5c-d and PS III.9. Not only must the probans be a known property of the subject, it must also be invariably concomitant with, and be pervaded by, the probandum, another hitherto unknown property of the subject. This other property 'pervades' the reason, which is a different way of saying that its extension is greater than, or as great as, that of the invariably concomitant reason. What is to be established by the valid reason is, of course, the presence of the pervading property in the subject. The probans, in this verse, is implied to be the threefold probans. The first criterion is already mentioned; it is a property of the subject. The second criterion demands that the probans must be known to always occur with the probandum in the sapakṣa (PS II.5c-d, PS III.9), and the third criterion that the probans in the asapakṣa must be known never to occur when the probandum is not present (PS II.5d, PS IV.2b). All this has already been discussed in the chapter on Dignāga. According to Dharmakīrti, the second and third criteria are met

through the principle of positive invariable concomitance. If it is known that the reason is fully pervaded by the probandum, then it is always true that wherever the reason is found, there the probandum must be found too. And it is always true that wherever the probandum is not found, the reason is not there either, precisely on the grounds that the probans, having the smaller extension, is invariably concomitant with the probandum. Dignāga already has said as much in PS IV.2a-b,

sādhyānugamo hetuḥ sādhyābhāve ca nāstitā

(Tucci 1930, p. 21), 'The reason [is the property that always] follows what is to be proved (sādhya) and [the reason] is not present when what is to be proved is absent'. But Dignāga does not draw from this the conclusion that Dharmakīrti draws. In the commentary on PV I.1, Dharmakīrti interprets the second and third criterion as follows,

sajātīya eva sattvam iti siddhe'pi vijātīya-vyatireke sādhyābhāve'sattvavacanavat,

[The statement of the second criterion that the reason -- being a known property of the subject --] is present only in the [class of objects] similar [to the subject] is comparable to the statement [of the third criterion, ie] of the absence [of the reason] at the absence of the probandum [when this statement is made] with regard to the negative invariable concomitance [of the probans with the probandum] in [all classes of objects] dissimilar [to the subject], although [this third criterion] is [already] established [with the second criterion, namely, with the statement that the probans occurs only in the class of objects similar to the subject] (PVSV, p. 2.5-6)'.

Dharmakīrti is saying here that the establishment of the positive invariable concomitance of the probans with the probandum and the presence of the probans in the subject suffice for validly inferring the presence of the probandum in the subject. He implies that the explicit mentioning of the third criterion of a valid reason is superfluous, for the second criterion, ie the positive invariable concomitance of the probans with the probandum in the

sapakṣa, logically entails the negative invariable concomitance of the probans with what is not the probandum in the asapakṣa. This aspect of Dharmakīrti's logic will be further elaborated in the sequel.

About the pervasion (vyāpti) of the probans by the probandum, Dharmakīrti says,

vyāptir vyāpakasya tatra bhāva eva, vyāpyasya vā tatraiva bhāvaḥ,

(PVSV, p. 2.12-13), 'Pervasion [of the probans by the probandum means]: the pervading [property, the probandum] is only present there [ie with the probans] or [pervasion of the probandum by the probans means:] the [property that is] to be pervaded [ie is pervaded, the probans,] is present only there [ie with the probandum]'.[5] In this passage, the two aspects of pervasion are described. From the point of view of the probans, pervasion means that the probandum as pervading (vyāpaka) property only occurs with the probans. From the point of view of the probandum, pervasion means that the probans as pervaded (vyāpya) property is found only with the probandum.

The 'only three kinds' of reasons according to PV I.1 does not refer to the three criteria of a valid reason, but to a new theory of Dharmakīrti's own make. PV I.2-3 define the three kinds of valid reason. A short explanation of this new threefoldness already appears in the prose following on PV I.1.

ta ete kāryasvabhāvānupalabdhilakṣaṇās trayo hetavaḥ, yathā'gnir atra dhūmāt. vṛkṣo 'yaṁ śiṁśapātvāt. pradeśaviśeṣe kvacin na ghaṭa upalabdhilakṣaṇa-prāptasyānupalabdheḥ,

'These three reasons [referring to the term tridhā in PV I.1] are defined as effect, essential property[6] and non-perception; [they function as valid reasons] as [in the propositions:] there is fire here because there is smoke [effect as probans], this is a tree [in general] because it is a śiṁśapā [a particular kind of tree, ie a smaller essential property as probans], at some particular spot there is not a pitcher because there is no perception of [the pitcher which is a thing] that has got characteris-

tics for cognition [ie can be cognized] (PVSV, p. 2.14-17)'. Effect as logical reason is illustrated by the well-known example of fire and smoke. Smoke being an invariably concomitant effect of fire, with a smaller extension than fire (because some fire occurs without smoke), can be used as a valid reason to infer the presence of fire. The fact of being-a-śiṁśapā, that is, the class of śiṁśapā-trees, is invariably concomitant with the greater class of trees in general. The svabhāva of śiṁśapā-ness, the essential property of being a śiṁśapā- tree is logically contained in, and pervaded by the essential property of being a tree in general, and hence śiṁśapā-ness can be used as the probans to validly infer the presence at a given spot of tree-ness in general. Non-perception, at a given spot, of a perceivable thing like a pitcher can be used to validly infer the absence of it at that spot.

As for the logical necessity that in the sapakṣa the probans is observed to be invariably concomitant with the probandum, Dharmakīrti maintains there are only two possible cases in which the positive invariable concomitance (anvaya) of the probans with the probandum can be established beyond any doubt. Either the probans shares its essence with the probandum or the probans is an invariably concomitant effect of the probandum. Therefore Dharmakīrti teaches in the first verse of PV I that '[the reason as valid probans] is only of three kinds, owing to the restriction of positive invariable concomitance'. That is, the three above-mentioned kinds of valid reason are all generated by invariable concomitance, which can only exist when the probans possesses the same essence as the probandum, or when the probans is brought into being by the probandum. In both cases, there is a connexion of probans with probandum through an essence, svabhāva. In the words of Dharamakīrti,

svabhāvapratibandhe hi saty artho 'rthaṁ na vyabhicarati, sa ca tadātmatvāt,

'When there exists an [inseparable] connexion through an essence (svabhāva), [one] thing [possessing that essence] never deviates from [ie is invariably concomitant with the

other] thing [possessing the same essence]. And that [connexion] exists on the grounds that [the object acting as probans] is [in reality] the essence of the [object acting as probandum] (PVSV, p. 2.19-21)'. As is explained in the example of śiṁśapās and trees in general, both classes of objects possess the same essential property of treeness, and they are connected with the same svabhāva; therefore śiṁśapās are invariably concomitant with trees in general. About the connexion of an effect (acting as probans) with an essential property, Dharmakīrti says,
kāryasyāpi svabhāvapratibandhaḥ, tatsvabhāvasya tadutpatter iti,
'Also for an effect there exists an [inseparable] connexion through an essence, because the essence of the [effect] is produced by the [cause] (PVSV, p. 3.3-4)'. We might say that Dharmakīrti derives the invariable concomitance, which is the basic principle in his conception of valid reasoning, from the actual connexion of the probans with the probandum through an essence. This essence through which probans and probandum are connected is either their factual essence or else, the essence of the probans is produced by a specific complex of causes which complex constitutes the probandum. In the first case, by probans and probandum the same essence is meant; in the second case, the essence of the probans can only spring from the essence of the probandum.

3.3 Effect as probans

The effect (kārya) used as probans is explained in PV I.2a-c.

kāryaṁ svabhāvair yāvadbhir avinābhāvi kāraṇe /
teṣāṁ (PVSV, p. 3.14)
hetuḥ,

'With as many essential properties the effect is invariably concomitant [and present] in the cause, for those [essential properties, the effect] is the logical reason'. Only an effect that is invariably concomitant with certain properties of the cause, can be used to validly infer the

presence of those properties, as in the example of smoke and fire. Since smoke is produced by fire alone and is, therefore, invariably concomitant with fire, it can be used as logical reason to infer the presence of fire. But how can a thing be established as the effect of something? Dharmakīrti answers:

yeṣāṁ upalambhe tallakṣaṇam anupalabdhaṁ yad upalabhyate, tatraikābhāve'pi nopalabhyate, tat tasya kāryam,

'A [thing] which, unperceived [elsewhere and] possessing characteristics for it [ie for perception], is perceived when other [things] are perceived [and] which is not perceived in the absence of even one [of those other things], that [thing] is the effect of that [assemblage of things acting as cause] (PSVS, p. 22.2-3)'.[7] The idea is that an object is the effect of an assemblage (sāmagrī) of other objects if the said object is not perceived elsewhere but together with the assemblage, and if the effect is not perceived when at least one element in the assemblage is missing. Therefore, it could be said that the object is brought forth only when the assemblage of causes (kāraṇa-sāmagrī), ie all required causes, are present and cooperate in producing the effect. In another prose passage, Dharmakīrti elucidates his thought on the assemblage of causes a bit more.

kathaṁ tarhīdānīṁ bhinnāt sahakāriṇaḥ kāryotpattir yathā cakṣūrūpāder vijñānasya. na vai kiṁcid ekaṁ janakaṁ tatsvabhāvam. kiṁ tu sāmagrī janikā tatsvabhāvā. saivānumīyate. saiva ca sāmagrī svabhāvasthityāśrayaḥ kāryasya.

'Now, how then is there the arising of an effect from a particular cooperating [cause] as [for instance the arising] of cognition from [particular causes like] the eye, forms etc? Surely there is not some one single productive cause that possesses the essence of [bringing forth the effect], but [, on the contrary ,] it is a productive assemblage [of causes] that possesses the essence of [bringing forth the effect]. And that [assemblage] alone [is what] is inferred. And that same assemblage is the substratum on which rests the essence of the effect

(PSVS, p. 23.18-21)'.[8] One particular effect is always produced by an assemblage of causes, and thus, the extension of the effect is always equal to, or smaller than the extension of the cause, ie the assemblage of causes. This is truly so because the effect arises only when all constituent causes are present. And thus the effect is also always invariably concomitant (avinābhāvin) with the assemblage of causes, for the assemblage is necessarily present when the effect has arisen.[9]

Dharmakīrti sums up his thought on effect as logical reason (kāryahetu) by referring to the causal relation between smoke and fire.

agnisvabhāvaḥ śakrasya mūrddhā yady agnir eva saḥ /
athānagnisvabhāvo'sau dhūmas tatra kathaṃ bhavet //
dhūmahetusvabhāvo hi vahnis tacchaktibhedavān /
adhūmahetor dhūmasya bhāve sa syād ahetukaḥ //

(PV I.36-37)

'If an anthill possesses the essence of fire [namely to produce smoke], then it is fire. But if it does not possess the essence of fire, how could there be smoke near it [ie arising from it]? For fire [alone] possesses the essence of [being] the cause of smoke, [since fire alone] is distinguished by the power to [produce] it [ie smoke]. If the occurrence of smoke from [a thing that is] not the cause of smoke [were possible], it [ie smoke] would be without cause [, which is absurd][10] (36-37)'.

3.4 Essential property as probans

Essential property (svabhāva) as logical reason is described in PV I.2c-d.

svabhāve bhāvo'pi bhāvamātrānurodhini //

'Also something (bhāva) [is a logical reason] with regard to an essential property that conforms to the mere [actual] existence [of the first thing]'.

What is said here is, that the essential property with a smaller extension serves as the logical reason for inferring the presence of a property with a wider extension and in possession of that same essence. In the commentary,

Dharmakīrti adds,
tādātmyaṁ hy arthasya tanmātrānurodhiny eva nānyāyatte,
'For the fact that an object possesses the essence of the [other object belonging to the same class] is [possible] only in [an object] conforming to being solely [ie in the fullest measure] the [class of similar objects], not in [an object that is] dependent upon another [object or class of objects for its being] (PVSV, p. 4.2-3)'.[11] The example of a svabhāva with a small extension as probans of a probandum with a wider extension has already been given before in PVSV, p. 2.16, vṛkṣo'yaṁ śiṁśapātvāt, 'This is a tree [in general] because it is a śiṁśapā-tree'. Since the essence tree-ness is present in both classes, the probans with the smaller extension is invariably concomitant with the probandum. It is always the case that wherever there is a śiṁśapā-tree, there is also tree-ness in general, for śiṁśapā-ness is materially, and therefore logically, contained in general tree-ness. The invariable concomitance of the probans with the probandum is the fact that the essential property of general tree-ness pervades all individual classes of trees.

3.5 Non-perception as probans

The third kind of valid probans consists in negating the presence of a thing at a particular given place (pradeśaviśeṣe kvacid) on the grounds that the thing is not perceived there. First, non-perception in general is described.

apravṛttiḥ pramāṇānām
anupalabdhiḥ (PVSV, p. 4.6)
apravṛttiphalā'sati / PV I.3ab

'The inactivity of the means of valid cognition is non-perception which results in the absence of activity [on the part of the perceiver] with regard to [a thing] that is not present [at a particular place]'.

Dharmakīrti regards non-perception of a thing at a particular place as the logical sign of the absence of that thing. Something that is not perceived through any

means of valid cognition is not present. To exist (somewhere) according to Dharmakīrti, is the same as being perceived. This epistemological doctrine is quite clearly expressed in the following passage from the commentary on this verse;

sajjñānaśabdavyavahārapratiṣedhaphalā, upalabdhi-
pūrvakatvāt teṣām iti. idaṁ sadasatpratiṣedhavidhihetvos
tulyaṁ rūpam. tathā hi sattvam upalabdhir eva
vastuyogyatālakṣaṇā tadāśrayā vā jñānapravṛttiḥ

(PVSV, p. 4.8-11), [The inactivity of the means of valid cognition, ie non-perception] results in the negation of cognizing, naming and treating a [thing as] present [at a certain place], because these [ie cognizing, naming and treating a thing as present] are preceded by the cognition [of a thing at a certain place]. This [result] is the same (tulyaṁ rūpam) in both [kinds of] reasons [whether they] negate [something as] present [or] affirm [something as] not present. In this way the presence [or existence of a thing] is [its] perception[12], being defined (-lakṣaṇā) as the capability [on the part] of the thing [to be perceived]; or [the presence of the thing is] the activity of knowing [this thing, which activity of knowing] is based on the [capability of the thing to be perceived]'.

Non-perception is not meant to refer to total absence of any cognition, but to refer to the absence of a specific cognition with regard to a particular place. Only absence of a particular piece of cognition can be used to infer the absence of certain objects.

asajjñānaphalā kācid dhetubhedavyapekṣayā //

'A specific [inactivity of the means of valid cognition] results in knowing that [a thing] is not present [somewhere] [only] in dependance on a particular character of the cause (PV I.3c-d)'. In the commentary Dharmakīrti says,

hetur anupalabdhiḥ, bhedo'syā viśeṣaṇam
upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasattvam,

'The cause is the non-perception [of a thing]. "Particular character" is a distinguishing property of this [non-perception], [namely] the existence that has got marks for

perception [ie is capable of being perceived] (PVSV, p. 4.14-15)'. Only the non-perception of a perceivable particular object is a logical reason to infer the absence of the thing. And thus, only the non-existence or absence of particular perceivable things can be proved. Dharmakīrti maintains that a meaningful negation can only be made of particular things which are perceivable, for a meaningful negation consists in communicating the non-perception of something;

yāvān kaścit pratiṣedhaḥ sa sarvo'nupalabdheḥ,

'Any [meaningful] negation whatsoever is [derived] from non-perception [of something] (PVSV, p. 5.9)'. Dharmakīrti says further,

tathā sa dvidhā kriyeta kasyacid vidhinā niṣedhena vā,

'and that [meaningful negation] can be made in two ways, either by affirming some [particular] thing or by denying [some particular thing] (PVSV, p. 5.9-10)'.

3.6 Four kinds of non-perception

PV I.4 enumerates four ways in which non-perception by way of affirmation or denial gives knowledge of the absence of a thing.

> viruddhakāryayoḥ siddhir asiddhir hetubhāvayoḥ /
> dṛśyātmanor abhāvārthānupalabdhiś caturvidhā //

'The establishment [amounting to an affirmation] of a contrary [thing] or an effect of a contrary [thing] and the non-establishment [amounting to a denial] of a cause or an essence, the essences of [which two pairs, ie a contrary thing and the effect of a contrary thing as well as a cause and an essence] are [normally] perceivable, constitutes the fourfold non-perception whose purpose it is [to prove] the absence [of a particular thing somewhere]'. Dharmakīrti enumerates the only four cases of non-perception. The first two consist in perceiving something contrary to what was expected or an effect of something that is contrary to an expected cause. The second two consist in not perceiving a cause or not perceiving an essence. This general principle of fourfold non-perception

as a valid probans seems to be based on the two kinds of essential relations accepted by Dharmakīrti, ie tādātmya, the fact that two things have the same essence and kārya-kāraṇabhāva, the fact that two things are connected as effect and cause. The absence of something is either established directly through its non-perception or the non-perception of its cause. The absence may also be established indirectly through the perception of something contrary, or the effect of something contrary. By applying the positive invariable concomitance of an effect with its cause, or of a greater essence with a smaller one to these four non-perceptions, a certain number of specific non-perceptions as probans can be made. In PVSV, p. 6.1-6 Dharmakīrti gives eight possibilities. Later, in PVin ten examples, and in NB II eleven examples are given (cf Steinkellner 1979, p. 60 note 178).

viruddhasiddhyā yathā na śītasparśo'trāgneḥ etena vyāpakaviruddhasiddhir uktā veditavyā yathā na tuṣārasparśo'trāgneḥ,

'[A negation based on non-perception is expressed] by establishing a contrary [thing], as: there is no sensation of coldness here, because there is fire. By this [sort of negation] the establishing of a pervading contrary [thing] must be understood to have been expressed, as: there is no sensation of frost here, because there is fire (PVSV, p. 6.1-3)'. In the first example, fire is the contrary of the sensation of coldness. If there is fire, there cannot be at the same time the sensation of coldness at the spot where the fire is. The presence of coldness is negated by referring to the contrary of coldness, ie fire. According to Dharmakīrti, it is also legitimate to prove the absence of an invariably concomitant essence with a smaller extension than the sensation of coldness by referring to the presence of the contrary of coldness, fire. The sensation of frost is an invariably concomitant essence of the sensation of coldness with a smaller extension than coldness. Thus, if fire by its heat drives away coldness, it can also drive away an invariably concomitant essence, namely the sensation of frost. If coldness goes, frost inevitably

also goes. Fire is the contrary, viruddha, of the pervading object (vyāpaka), the sensation of frost. The text continues,

viruddhakāryasiddhyā yathā na śītasparśo'tra dhūmāt (PVSV, p. 6.3-4), '[A negation is expressed] by establishing the effect of a contrary [thing], as: there is no sensation of coldness here, because there is smoke'. Here the presence of coldness is negated by the presence of an invariably concomitant effect of the contrary object, fire. Since smoke invariably points to the presence of fire, it also points to the absence of the contrary of fire, coldness.

So far, the non-perception and absence of a thing are established by the perception of the contrary thing. Subsequently, Dharmakīrti describes the actual non-perception of a thing, which proves its absence.

hetvasiddhyā yathā nātra dhūmo'nagneḥ, '[A negation is expressed] by the non-establishment of the cause, as: there is no smoke here, because there is no fire (PVSV, p. 6.4)'. When we see no fire at a particular spot, we will certainly see no invariably concomitant smoke. If the thing with the greater extension is absent, then the invariably concomitant thing with the smaller extension is necessarily also absent, ie its presence is negated. The commentary continues,

svabhāvāsiddhyā yathā nātra dhūmo'nupalabdheḥ, '[A negation is expressed] by the non-establishment of the essence, as: there is no smoke here, because there is no perception [of smoke at this spot] (PVSV, p. 6.5)'. Dharmakīrti continues,

etena vyāpakasvabhāvāsiddhir uktā yathā nātra śiṁśapā vṛkṣābhāvāt, 'With this [kind of negation] is expressed the non-establishment of the pervading essence [ie the essence of the class with the wider extension], as: there is no śiṁśapā here, because there is no tree at all [here] (PVSV, p. 6.5-6)'. The presence of a class of objects is negated by referring to the total absence of the class of objects with the wider extension. When, at a certain spot,

there are no trees at all, the spot is also necessarily devoid of śiṁśapās that possess general tree-ness as their essence.

Dharmakīrti concludes this explanatory passage by saying,
sarvatra cāsyām abhāvasādhanyām anupalabdhau dṛśyātmanām eva teṣāṁ tadviruddhānāṁ ca siddhir asiddhiś ca veditavyā, 'And it must be understood that in all [these cases of] non-perception proving the absence [of something], there is the establishment and the non-establishment of only those [objects] that possess a perceivable nature and of [those objects that are] contrary to the [objects that are to be negated] (PVSV, p. 6.6-7)'. A meaningful negation can only be made of things whose nature it is to be perceivable. Non-existence or absence can be predicated only of perceivable things.

3.7 The dṛṣṭānta

In the classical syllogism before Dharmakīrti, mention had to be made of two generally-accepted facts, dṛṣṭāntas showing the positive invariable concomitance (anvaya) of the probans with the probandum and the negative invariable concomitance (vyatireka) of the probans with what is not the probandum. The second dṛṣṭānta, showing the vyatireka, must prove that the probans never occurs with things that are not the probandum. With Dharmakīrti's new theory of positive invariable concomitance, these two dṛṣṭāntas, but especially the second, have become superfluous. The valid probans as defined by Dharmakīrti suffices for making the syllogism valid, for the invariable concomitance of the probans with the probandum is necessarily present when the probans is the actual product (kārya) of the probandum, or when the probans shares its essence (svabhāva) with the probandum. With this simplification Dharmakīrti deviates from, and improves upon, the received logic of Dignāga in PS II-IV, set forth in the previous chapter. Dharmakīrti provides a solid and unerroneous material basis for the positive invariable concomitance, which Dignāga did not

provide.

About the necessity of a drṣṭānta in the syllogism, Dharmakīrti says in PV I.27,

tadbhāvahetubhāvau hi drṣṭānte tadavedinaḥ /

khyāpyete, viduṣāṁ vācyo hetur eva hi kevalaḥ //

'For in the generally-accepted fact (drṣṭānta), the [reason's being] the essence of the [probandum] or [the reason's] having the [probandum] as [its] cause, are communicated to him who does not know that [ie the invariable concomitance]. To those who know [the invariable concomitance], only the bare reason needs to be told'. Dharmakīrti reduces the syllogism to a proposition which contains a thesis and a well-founded reason, the sound basis of the reason being the known invariable concomitance of the reason with the object acting as the probandum. If the hearer of the syllogism is not completely familiar with the invariable concomitance, the speaker could refer to the positive drṣṭānta, in all instances of which it is known that the reason invariably occurs with the probandum. Dharmakīrti demands, however, that this drṣṭānta also shows why the probans and the probandum are invariably concomitant, namely in so far as the probans is the effect of the probandum or has the same essential property as the probandum. But if the connexion between the probans and the probandum is known, it is enough to mention only the reason, because the valid reason will immediately evoke the probandum that is connected with the reason.

About the positive and contrary drṣṭāntas, Dharmakīrti says in PV I.28 that either one of them implies the other when it is established that the probans is the effect or the essence of the probandum. Thus only one of the two drṣṭāntas would have to be mentioned in a syllogistic proof.

tenaiva jñātasambandhe dvayor anyataroktitaḥ /

arthāpattyā dvitīye'pi smṛtiḥ samupajāyate //

'Therefore when [the probans] has a known connexion [with the probandum, either by being the effect of the probandum or by being the essence of the probandum] -- recollection

arises by implication[13] [in the hearer of the logical proof] also as regards the second [dṛṣṭānta] by the mentioning of either one of the two [dṛṣṭāntas, ie the positive and the contrary dṛṣṭānta]'.

In the prose after this verse, Dharmakīrti explains the function of the negative invariable concomitance (vyatireka) and its relation with the positive invariable concomitance. He uses the well-known inference of fire from smoke as example.

tasmāt kāryaṁ dhūma ity anvayena viditatatkāryatvasya dahanābhāve dhūmo na bhavatīty arthād vyatirekapratipattir bhavati.

'By implication the cognition of the negative invariable concomitance [of smoke with what is not fire], ie that in the absence of fire there is no smoke, arises for him who knows that [smoke] is the effect of that [ie of fire] by means of the positive invariable concomitance [of smoke with fire alone] (PVSV, p. 19.8-9)'. The cognition that smoke can only be produced by fire, and that on these grounds smoke is invariably concomitant with fire alone, implies also the cognition that smoke is negatively invariable concomitant with what is not fire. When there is no fire at a certain spot, there is no smoke, from which fact conclusively follows that smoke is only produced by, and only occurs with, fire.

tathā'saty agnau dhūmo nāstīty ukte'gnir dhūme bhavaty avaśyam ity arthād anvayapratipattiḥ,

'Thus, when it is said that in the absence of fire there is no smoke [which statement constitutes the negative dṛṣṭānta], there is by implication the cognition of the positive invariable concomitance that there is necessarily fire in [case there is] smoke (PVSV, p. 19.10-12)'.

There is a verse which neatly epitomizes Dharmakīrti's theory on the real basis of positive invariable concomitance and the use of the two dṛṣṭāntas.

kāryakāraṇabhāvād vā svabhāvād vā niyāmakāt /
avinābhāvaniyamo 'darśanān na na darśanāt //

(PV I.31)

'The restriction of the positive invariable concomitance

[of the probans with the probandum is possible] either on account of a restrictive occurrence of effect and cause [, restrictive in the sense that the effect is invariably concomitant with the cause,] or on account of a restrictive essence [, restrictive in the sense that the probans is the essence of the probandum]. [But the restriction of the positive invariable concomitance is] not [established beyond doubt merely] on the grounds [that two things] are seen [together in the sapakṣa] and not seen [together in the aspakaṣa]'.

Here, it is explicitly stated that the restriction of the positive invariable concomitance is protected when two things are related as effect and its cause, or when two things have the same essence -- which makes them belong to the same class of objects. And from this it follows that all instances in which two things are seen together and all instances in which two things are not seen together cannot prove the invariable concomitance of the two things. For Dharmakīrti's logic demands that positive invariable concomitance, being the basic principle that makes all reasoning valid, is a real connexion such as exists between products and their causes and things sharing the same essence.

NOTES

1. This interpretation (one among several possibilities) is based on an important passage in the PVT, a passage to which Prof. Steinkellner in Vienna has drawn my attention. don ni slob dpon phyogs kyi glaṅ pos mdzad pa'i tshad ma yi mtshan ñid la sogs pa yin te rigs pa daṅ ldan pa'i phyir ro // don ma yin pa ni mu stegs kyis byas pa yin te / rigs pa daṅ mi ldan pa'i phyir ro //
(PVT, p. 6b.6-7) (cf Sanskrit fragm),
ācāryadignāgapraṇītaṁ pramāṇalakṣaṇādikam artho yuktatvāt. tīrthikapraṇītaṁ na yuktatvād anarthas
(PVSVT, p. 6.2-3), 'What is meaningful is [ie refers to] [the epistemological science] starting with the definitions of the means of valid cognition as promulgated by the teacher Dignāga, because [his epistemological thinking] is correct. What is not meaningful is [ie refers to] [the epistemological science] as promulgated by the adherents of other doctrines [ie the non-Buddhist philosophers] because [their epistemological, thinking] is not correct.'

2. As will become clear in the sequel of the PVSV, Dharmakīrti describes inference without differentiating between internal inference, svārthānumāna, and the syllogism, parārthānumāna, since both are based on the same logical theory, cf also Steinkellner 1967 II, p. 82, 'Die von Dignāga übernommene Unterscheidung von svārthānumāna und parārthānumāna wird bei Dharmakīrti beibehalten, doch fällt für ihn, für den die Verknüpfung allein das wesentliche Thema der Logik ist, der Unterschied weitgehend weg'.

3. According to Frauwallner 1954, p. 145 the beginning of this verse must come from a lost work of Dignāga's, as it is quoted by Uddyotakara in the Nyāyavārttika, NV, p. 131.17, in a slightly different wording:
grāhyadharmas tadaṁśena vyāpto hetuḥ.

4. According to Frauwallner, Śākyamati could have lived ca 660-720 AD and was a pupil of Devendrabuddhi, a direct pupil of Dharmakīrti, Frauwallner 1961, p. 145.

5. The same passage is repeated in Hetubindu and is commented upon in Steinkellner 1967 II, p. 90, "Eine Umfassung liegt seitens dessen, was umfasst ... vor, wenn die umfassende Beschaffenheit da, das heisst an dem Beschaffenheitsträger, an welchem auch die umfasste Beschaffenheit vorhanden ist, ausschliesslich vorhanden ist, das ist nicht nicht vorhanden ist... Seitens dessen, was umfasst wird ... liegt eine Umfassung vor, wenn die umfasste Beschaffenheit ausschliesslich da, das ist an dem Beschaffenheitsträger, an welchem auch die umfassende Beschaffenheit vorhanden ist, vorhanden ist'.

6. The meaning of the term svabhāva in Dharmakīrti's work is discussed in Steinkellner 1971 and 1974. As it is not easy to find suitable English equivalents, I translate 'own being', svabhāva, as 'essence' and 'essential property' thus following Steinkellner. The notion of svabhāva plays an important role in Dharmakīrti's logic and epistemology. The following remarks by Steinkellner may throw some light on the import of svabhāva, 'Aus diesen Stellen [ie from PVSV] entnehme ich dass Dharmakīrti den Svabhāva als eine Beschaffenheit (bhāvaḥ, dharmaḥ) bestimmt, die nicht von einer anderen Sache bedingt ist, d.h. mit der Sache selbst (sva-) gegeben ist (Steinkellner 1971, p. 206)'. And further, 'In the ontological context the svabhāvaḥ of something is the totality of causal possibilities, usually determined only with regard to one major aspect, whereas in a logical context the various aspects of the causal possibilities have been separated by abstraction. If we ... translate "essential property, wesentliche Beschaffenheit" in logical contexts, the translation "essence, Wesen" would be quite appropriate in ontological contexts...', Steinkellner 1974. p. 124.

7. Cf the translation in Steinkellner 1971, p. 204, note 93,

'Welches [zunächst] nichtwahrgenommene [Ding], das an sich wahrnehmbar ist (tallakṣaṇam), bei der Wahrnehmung bestimmter [anderer Dinge] (yeṣāṁ) [selbst] wahrgenommen wird und nicht wahrgenommen wird, wenn unter diesen [anderen Dingen] (tatra) ein einziges fehlt, das ist dieses [Ursachenkomplexes] Wirkung'. Cf also Y. Kajiyama, Trikapañcakacintā, Miscellanea Indologica Kiotiensia, Nos. 4-5, 1963, Kyoto University, Kyoto, p. 2-3.

8. Cf Steinkellner 1971, p. 185, note 26 which contains the following remark on this passage, 'Damit ist die ... Frage ... beantwortet, wie man ... aus dem Rauch auf Feuer schliessen kann. Feuer als Mitursache im Ursachenkomplex, der allein den Rauch hervorbringt, wird für sich allein gar nicht erschlossen, sondern ist als logische Folge (sādhyam) immer im Sinne eines Symbols für den Ursachenkomplex zu verstehen, in dem die Mitursachen Feuer, Holz, Feuchtigkeit, Wind, etc. vereinigt sind'.

9. Cf Steinkellner 1971, p. 202, 'Dharmakīrti's Verdienst ist es, die Frage nach dem Grund für den logischen Nexus beantwortet zu haben. Und das Wesentliche seiner Antwort ist, dass er zeigt, dass und wie der logische Nexus auf einer realen Verbindung beruht und bei welchen Begriffen diese Verbindung in der Wirklichkeit gegeben ist'.

10. These two verses are also translated in Steinkellner 1979, p. 105 representing Pramāṇaviniścaya II.60-61, 'Wenn der Termitenhügel das Wesen des Feuers (nämlich Rauch hervorzubringen) hat, dann ist er eben Feuer. Und hat er nicht das Wesen des Feuers, wie könnte Rauch aus ihm entstehen? (v.60) Das Feuer hat nämlich das Wesen der Ursache für Rauch und unterscheidet sich durch diese (Rauch hervorbringende) Fähigkeit (von anderen Ursachen). Entstünde der Rauch aus etwas, das nicht Ursache für Rauch ist, dann wäre er ursachelos (v.61)'.

11. A simpler translation than mine is found in Steinkellner 1971, p. 205, 'Die reale Identität (tādātmyam) dieser

Sache besteht nämlich nur mit dem, was sich bloss an sie anschliesst, nicht [aber] mit dem, was von einem anderen abhängt'.

12. Pakṣilasvāmin seems to foreshadow Dharmakīrti's epistemological principle that the existence of a thing is the perception of that thing.
...pramāṇena sati gṛhyamāṇe tad iva yan na gṛhyate tan nāsti, yady abhaviṣyad idam iva vyajñāsyata vijñānābhāvān nāstīti tad evaṁ sataḥ prakāśakaṁ pramāṇam asad api prakāśayatīti,
'When an existent [thing] is being perceived through a means of valid cognition, than that which is in no way (iva) perceived is not [present or not existent]. If this [unperceived thing] would have been [present], it would somehow (iva) have been cognized, [but] because there is no cognition [of it], it is not present. Thus, a means of valid cognition, while revealing what is present, reveals also that which is not present (NBh, p. 4.2-4)'. Pakṣilasvāmin's last remark, that a means of valid cognition reveals present as well as absent things, formulates a principle that seems to be implied in Dharmakīrti's theory on non-perception, anupalabdhi, as a valid probans.

13. In this verse Dharmakīrti alludes to a passage from Dignāga's Nyāyamukha. He quotes this passage in the prose following on this verse (cf PVSV p. 18.17 and the critical apparatus).

IV The Pramāṇa-definitions of the Pramāṇasiddhi-chapter of PV, v 1-7 (PV II.1-7)

In PV II Dharmakīrti exhaustively discusses the topics that relate to the first half of PS I., a half-verse in which Dignāga expresses his respect for the Buddha.[1] PSV I.1a-b runs:

pramāṇabhūtāya jagaddhitaiṣiṇe
praṇamya śāstre sugatāya tāyine /

'After paying obeisance to Him who is[1a] a means of valid cognition, who strives for the welfare of the world, who is the Teacher, the Well-gone, the Saviour'.

This verse praises the Buddha by simply enumerating five of his outstanding virtues. The verse does not tell us that the Buddha is a pramāṇa on the grounds that he possesses the four other virtues. However, in the commentary on this verse, Dignāga briefly explains why he thinks the Buddha is a pramāṇa, an authoritative speaker on religious subjects[2].

atra bhagavato hetuphalasaṃpattyā pramāṇabhūtatvena stotrābhidhānaṃ śāstrādau gus pa bskyed par bya ba'i don du'o

(PS I.1 comm line 1-2), 'As regards this [verse], there is at the beginning of this treatise a sentence praising the Lord [Buddha] as one who is a means of valid cognition [or religious authority] through [his] perfection in cause and effect, in order to produce reverence [for the Buddha in the hearers of this book]'. The perfection in cause (hetu) and effect (phala) makes the Buddha the religious authority that he is, makes him a pramāṇa. In the rest of the commentary, it is taught that cause refers to the Buddha's striving for the welfare of the world (jagaddhitaiṣin) and his being the Teacher (śāstṛ), while effect refers to the Buddha's being the Well-gone (sugata) and Saviour (tāyin). Thus, according to Dignāga, the last four qualities are meant to describe the nature of the Buddha's religious authority[3].

tatra hetur āśayaprayogasampat. āśayo jagaddhitaiṣitā.

prayogo jagacchāsanāc chāstṛtvam
(PS I.1, comm line 2-3),
'With regard to this [foregoing statement, it is so that] the cause is the [Buddha's] perfection in disposition of mind and [his perfection in] practice. Disposition of mind is [the Buddha's] being one who strives for the welfare of the world. Practice is the fact that [the Buddha] is the Teacher [by excellence] on the grounds that [he] teaches the world'. In this way, the second and third virtue mentioned in PS I.1a-b are said to produce the cause of the Buddha's authority.[4] The effect is explained as follows:
phalaṁ svaparārthasampat. svārthasampat
sugatatvena trividham artham upādāya
(PS I.1 comm line 3-4), 'The effect is the [Buddha's] perfection [in the virtues] for himself as well as for the sake of others. The perfection [in the virtues] for himself [is clear] from [his] being the Well-gone [which] comprises three meanings'. These three meanings are the following,
praśastatvaṁ surūpavat. apunarāvṛttyarthaṁ
sunaṣṭajvaravat. niḥśeṣārthaṁ supūrṇaghaṭavat
(PS I.1 comm line 4-5), '[namely] [the meaning of] (a) being extolled like one who has got a beautiful form [ie body][5]; (b) the meaning of not returning [anymore to the world of birth and death the Buddha is called Well-gone] like one whose fever has fully gone; (c) the meaning of [his being] complete [ie perfect] like a jar that is completely full'. In the next sentence, Dignāga emphasizes that the term sugata is an epithet of the Buddha alone.
don gsum po de yaṅ phyi rol pa'i'dod chags daṅ bral ba daṅ, slob pa daṅ, mi slob pa rnams las raṅ don phun sum tshogs pa khyad par du bya ba'i phyir ro
(PS I.1, comm line 5-6), 'And these three meanings [of the term well-gone] are also [mentioned here] because [the Buddha's] perfection [in the virtues] for himself should be distinguished from [the achievements of] those non-Buddhist [saints] who are freed from passion, [as well as the achievements of] those [Buddhist saints] who are [still] undergoing religious training, and those who no

[longer] need religious training [ie who are arhats]'. This passage completes Dignāga's explanation of <u>sugata</u>. The fifth epithet of the Buddha is his being the Saviour. Dignāga says about this,

<u>parārthasampaj jagattāraṇāt tāyitvam</u>

(PS I.1, comm line 6-7), 'The [Buddha's] perfection for the sake of others is the fact that [he] is the Saviour because he enables the world to cross [the waters of birth and death]'. This continuous prose passage (PS I.1, comm line 1-7) gives a brief synopsis of the religious importance of the Buddha's personality. The Buddha has perfected and saved himself, but also saves others by teaching them a road to ultimate salvation, a road which he has travelled himself. This constitutes, according to Dignāga, the Buddha's being a pramāṇa.

Since Dignāga, in the Pramāṇa-samuccaya, does not elaborate on the relation of the concept of pramāṇa with the Buddha and his doctrines, it was left to Dharmakīrti to write and comment extensively in PV II on this verse and its short commentary.

Even though we may say with Steinkellner that PS I.1 'was conceived with a stroke of genius around 530 A.D., and can be considered the cornerstone that marks the historical border between the dialectical and the truly epistemological period of our [ie Buddhist] tradition' (Steinkellner 1982, p. 7), the verse still does not say much more than that the Buddha is a pramāṇa and possesses four other qualities. The rest of the PS deals with the two pramāṇas, perception and inference, as well as with syllogistic reasoning, dialectics and semantics, but these things are not related to the religious message of the Buddha.[6]

Dignāga simply asserted that the Buddha is a means of valid cognition and Dharmakīrti considered it his task as a commentator to explain this assertion. It presented to him the following epistemological problem: Dignāga accepted only two means of valid cognition in PS I.2a-c; if the Buddha is also a means of valid cognition, that is, if his teachings are pramāṇa, then his teachings must either

be regarded as inference or constitute a third kind of pramāṇa, namely reliable tradition (āgama), in addition to the accepted two pramāṇas. On the one hand, Dharmakīrti does not simply posit tradition (āgama) or reliable statement (śabda, āptavāda) as a separate pramāṇa; on the other hand, he does not regard the words of the Buddha as mere inference[7], since they refer sometimes to things that are not accessible to the perception and inference of the hearers. But if the words of the Buddha give valuable non-inferential information about the highest goals of religious aspiration, it should be rationally established to what extent these words are pramāṇa.[8] That it is necessary to logically prove the trustworthiness (avisaṃvāda) of reliable statements on things that are beyond ordinary perception (parokṣa) is maintained by Dharmakīrti already in PV I in discussing PS II.5a-b (see note 7).

tasya cāsyaivaṃbhūtasyāptavādasyāvisaṃvādasāmānyād adṛṣṭavyabhicārasya pratyakṣānumānāgamye'py arthe pratipattes tadāśrayatvāt tadanyapratipattivad avisaṃvādo'numīyate

(PVSV, p. 109.7-9),

'And in so far as the statement by an expert [as taught by Dignāga in PS II.5a-b] is of such a nature [as we have investigated in PV I.214], is in general (-sāmānyād) trustworthy, (analysis of the compound āptavādāvisaṃvādasāmānyād of PV I.216a-b, then follows a loose paraphrase:) it is inferred (anumīyate) that this [expert statement] of which no error (vyabhicāra) [in cases that can be verified] has been observed is trustworthy also in [the specific case of] an object that is [at present] not accessible to perception and inference, on the grounds that [also in the latter case] cognition [referring to the invisible object and not only to the intention of the speaker, cf PVSV, p. 109.10] has the [expert statement] as its basis, [just] like cognition [referring] to [objects that are] different from the [invisible objects, ie cognition referring to directly verifiable objects]'. Here Dharmakīrti in fact acknowledges that information about invisible things can only come from expert statements

(āptavāda), but he demands that the truth of such information should be inferred from the trustworthiness of the information about visible things. In another passage from the same work he says that, in the absence of other pramāṇas, man needs reliable traditions (āgama) in the form of statements made by experts[9] in order to know the at-that-time invisible results of good and bad acts.

nāyaṁ puruṣo'nāśrityāgamaprāmāṇyam āsituṁ samarthaḥ. atyakṣaphālānāṁ keṣāṁcit pravṛttinivṛttyor mahānuśaṁsāpāpaśravaṇāt tadbhāve virodhādarśanāc ca (PVSV, p. 108.2-5),

'Man cannot [safely] exist without resorting to the [reliable] authority of tradition [consisting of reliable statements], because [from reliable tradition, āgama alone] he hears the great advantage and the [great] disadvantage of engaging in or abstaining from certain [acts] whose results are not [at present] perceivable, and [also he cannot safely exist without reliable tradition] in so far as he does not observe any contradiction [with the reliable tradition] when the [results predicted by the tradition] are [actually] there'. In PV II Dharmakīrti says that the Buddha too made proper use of certain information which he had got from reliable tradition, āgama, for example, information about the cause of suffering. This is said in PV II.132cd-133ab, trsl Vetter, p. 40:

yuktyāgamābhyāṁ vimṛśan duḥkhahetuṃ parīkṣate // 132 cd
tasyānityādirūpaṁ ca duḥkhasyaiva viśeṣaṇaiḥ / 133 ab

'[Der Anwendung der Mittel geht voraus:] Forschend mit Hilfe von Argumenten und Überlieferung stellt er eine Ursache des Leids fest und ausserdem, dass diese [Ursache] eine nichtewige usw. Natur hat, [und zwar stellt er dies fest] an Hand von Bestimmungen, die dem Leid selbst [anhaften]'.

In PV II.1-7 Dharmakīrti proposes to define and explain the first word of PS I.1, pramāṇabhūta, in connexion with the Buddha. In PV II.1-6 the term pramāṇa is defined and discussed, in PV II.7 the results of this discussion are applied to the doctrines of the Buddha. What follows now is a translation of PV II.1-7 with elaborate discus-

sion of its contents. In explaining the verses, I will make use of the oldest and therefore most authoritative commentary on PV II, Devendrabuddhi's Pramāṇa-vārttika-pañjikā (PVP), preserved only in Tibetan.[10] Devendrabuddhi usually explains quite satisfactorily, but when certain theories of Dharmakīrti are only hinted at in PVP, I explain them in greater detail by quoting relevant passages from PV I which was written before PV II (cf Frauwallner 1954, p. 148, 152-153).[11] The text of PV II I utilize is PV I (Mi), so that PV II.1-7 corresponds to PV I (Mi) 1-7. Below every part of the Sanskrit of PV II.1-7 I give references to various other standard editions in which the text of PV II occurs.

Devendrabuddhi introduces Dharmakīrti's general definition of a means of valid cognition with the following words:

tshad mar gyur pa źes bya ba ni tshad mar ´khruṅs pa´o // tshad ma daṅ ´dra bas na tshad ma ste bcom ldan ´das so // tshad ma´i ṅo bo de ci źig yin na gaṅ gis de daṅ ´dra bar dam bca´ bar byed ce na

(PVP (P), p. 2a 1-3), '[In Dignāga's introductory verse it is said that the Buddha] "has become a means of valid cognition" which means 'he came into existence as a means of valid cognition'. By being similar [in validity] to a means of valid cognition, he is a means of valid cognition, namely the Lord [Buddha]. [Question:] "What is this nature of a means of valid cognition, that it is asserted that [the Lord Buddha] is similar to [a means of valid cognition] ?".

The answer to this is given, according to Devendrabuddhi, in Dharmakīrti's definitions and their examinations offered in PV II.1-7.

1 a-b

pramāṇam avisaṃvādi jñānam

(PVBh p. 3.21; PVV, p. 3.14; PVV (S), p. 3.5)

'A means of valid cognition [in general] is knowledge possessing trustworthiness.[12]

The commentary of Devendrabuddhi says:

bslu ba yod pa ma yin pa can ni bslu ba med pa can te /

gaṅ la bslu ba med pa ẑes bya ba'i don to //
(PVP (P), p. 2a.4-5), 'That in which untrustworthiness does not occur is trustworthy; in which trustworthiness occurs, [that is possessing trustworthiness], this is the meaning [of Dharmakīrti's expression "possessing trustworthiness, avisaṁvādin"]'. According to PVP (P), p. 2a.5-2b.1 it is possible to interpret Dharmakīrti's expression in two ways: (a) a means of valid cognition is knowledge of a trustworthy thing, and thus knowledge possessing, grasping, revealing the trustworthiness of the object; (b) a means of valid cognition is knowledge which itself possesses trustworthiness, hence trustworthy knowledge. In the first interpretation, trustworthiness is predicated of the object of knowledge, in the second interpretation, of knowledge itself. Although the second interpretation of avisaṁvādin seems more natural and obvious, the first cannot be wholly rejected as fanciful, for it occurs also with Dharmakīrti himself in PV I.215-217 and PVSV, p. 108.17-109.20 as we will soon see. It is conceiveable that these passages have led Devendrabuddhi into thinking that in PV II.1a trust-worthiness is said to exist of the object and the knowledge of it. He writes thus:
mi bslu ba de yaṅ don yoṅs su bcad nas 'jug pa na don gyi raṅ gi nus pa grub pas ji ltar 'dod pa'i don de lta bu'i ṅo bo'i mi slu ba ni (D. p. 1b5; P. 'i) yul gyi chos daṅ / de'i de lta bur gyur pa rtogs pa na ŝes pa'i mi bslu ba ni yul can gyi chos yin no // de gaṅ la yod pa de ni bslu ba med pa can gyi ŝes pa'o //
(PVP (P), p. 2a.5-2b.1),
'And further, this trustworthiness -- when [on the part of the perceiver] there is activity [directed towards a thing] after the thing has been fully ascertained [by him through means of valid cognition] -- being the trustworthiness of [this thing] whose form conforms to [the thing's] desired purpose [ie desired and expected by the perceiver] through the establishing [ie ascertainement] of the thing's own power [to serve the desired purpose], is a property of the object (yul, viṣaya) [of cognition]. And when there is the cognition that has become [of] such [a

form, ie of the form] of the [thing], then the trustworthiness of this knowledge is a property of [the valid cognition] related to the object (yul can, viṣayin). This [knowledge] in which the [trustworthiness of the object and the trustworthiness of the cognition] is present, is "knowledge possessing trustworthiness".

It seems that Devendrabuddhi interprets the double trustworthiness in this manner; the power of a real thing to serve an intended purpose for the perceiver constitutes its trustworthiness, while the valid cognition of the thing's power constitutes the trustworthiness of the cognition of the thing. That is to say, we proceed from the trustworthiness, the power of the thing, to the trustworthiness of the cognition of the thing. Both forms of trustworthiness eventually unite in the knowledge which is the essence of a pramāṇa.[13]

That trustworthiness (avisaṁvāda) should be an essential quality of a pramāṇa is not an entirely new doctrine stemming from Dharmakīrti himself. For it is implied in Dignāga's definition of a reliable statement by an expert.
āptavādāvisaṁvādasāmānyād anumānatā /
(PS II.5ab)
'The statement by an expert is [to be regarded as] inference in so far as there is similarity in trustworthiness [between real inference and reliable statement]'.
Note that according to this definition āptavāda and anumāna must share the essential quality of trustworthiness, avisaṁvāda (the same word as in PV II.1), in order to be pramāṇas. Dharmakīrti evidently used this term avisaṁvāda to define the essential quality of pramāṇa in general in PV II.1ab. In PV I.216-217 he interprets avisaṁvāda of Dignāga's definition in two ways, (a) as the trustworthiness of the reliable statement and (b) as the trustworthiness of the object of the statement; in this we recognize Devendrabuddhi's two interpretations of the term in PV II.1.

Before interpreting Dignāga, Dharmakīrti defines the general characteristics of the expert statement;
saṁbaddhānuguṇopāyaṁ puruṣārthābhidhāyakam /

parīkṣādhikṛtaṁ vākyam ato'nadhikṛtaṁ param //
(PV I.214)
'A sentence [an expert statement]: (a) whose [words] are coherent, (b) for [which] there are means that are suitable [for acquiring the desired ends], and (c) which expresses what is useful to man, is [alone] made the subject of an investigation [into the validity of such a sentence as a pramāṇa]. A [sentence] which is different from [such] a [sentence having these three characteristics] is not made the subject [of an investigation into its validity]'. Only the statement of an expert which has characteristics a-c could be regarded as a pramāṇa, provided the statement can be proved to be trustworthy. kaḥ punar asyāvisaṁvādaḥ (PVSV, p. 108.16), 'But what is the trustworthiness of this [useful sentence as defined in PV I.214]?'. Dharmakīrti answers:
pratyakṣenānumānena dvividhenāpy abādhanam /
dṛṣṭādṛṣṭārthayor asyāvisaṁvādas tadarthayoḥ //
(PV I.215)
'The trustworthiness of this [useful sentence] about visible and invisible things which are [ie can be] objects of the [two pramāṇas, perception and inference], consists in the fact that [the information contained in such a sentence] is neither contradicted by perception nor by twofold inference'.
'Twofold inference', according to Karṇakagomin, means:
anumānena ca dvividhena vastubalapravṛttenāgamāśritena ca (PVSVT, p. 392.14-15), 'And "by twofold inference" [means: by inference] that has operated through the power of a [perceived real] thing and [inference] that is based on tradition'. In PV I.215 Dharmakīrti asserts that for an expert statement to be trustworthy, two requirements should be fulfilled -- first, the information in the statement must have been obtained by the speaker through his own power of perception and inference; and second, the information may not be contradicted by the subsequent perception and inference of the hearer.

In the next verse Dharmakīrti uses this general conception of trustworthiness to give his first explanation

of PS II.5ab.

āptavādāvisaṁvādasāmānyād anumānatā /
buddher agatyābhihitā parokṣe'py asya gocare //
(PV I.216)

'In so far as a statement by an expert [ie by the Buddha] is in general [ie in directly verifiable cases] trustworthy [and thus reveals an object in an indirect manner as does inference, therefore Dignāga] has designated [in PS II.5ab] the cognition [derived from this statement] as inference [ie as of an inferential nature] also in [the specific case, ie a case that is not directly verifiable, of] an invisible object [to which] this [expert statement refers], since there is no [other] possibility [but to also regard the latter kind of statement as an inference, ie in so far as no contrary results are perceived there is no cause for deviating from Dignāga's rule that an expert statement is like an inference]'.

In this first interpretation trustworthiness is regarded as an essential quality which the statement as a pramāṇa and valid inference as a pramāṇa have in common. The second interpretation says that the expert statement is inference in so far as the hearer knows that the main object which the statement described is trustworthy.

heyopādeyatattvasya sopāyasya prasiddhitaḥ /
pradhānārthāvisaṁvādād anumānaṁ paratra vā //
(PV I.217)

'Or [introducing the second explanation of PS II.5ab, an expert statement] about another [object, ie one that is not visible to the hearer] is inference in so far as the main thing [which the statement describes] is trustworthy on the grounds that [this main thing, being the four noble truths taught by the expert, ie the Buddha:] [namely] the truth of what has to be avoided [ie suffering] and obtained [ie the destruction of suffering] together with the causes [ie the cause of suffering and the cause of the destruction of suffering, the eightfold path], is established [ie ascertained by the hearer to be trustworthy through his own power of perception and inference]'.

In the prose following on this verse Dharmakīrti adds,

heyopādeyatadupāyānāṁ tadupadiṣṭānām avaiparītyam avisaṁvādaḥ
(PVSV p. 109.15-16), 'The fact that what is to be avoided [ie suffering] and obtained [ie the destruction of suffering] and the causes thereof [ie the cause of suffering and the cause of the end of suffering, the eightfold path] which have [all] been taught by the [expert speaker, the Buddha] are not contrary [to the perception and inference of the hearer] constitutes the trustworthiness [of these objects that have been indicated by the Buddha]'.

These excerpts from PV I and PVSV lend support to Devendrabuddhi's interpretation of PV II.1ab that a means of valid cognition in general is trustworthy knowledge as well as knowledge of a trustworthy object, the difference being that PV I refers to reliable statement and inference, whereas PV II.1ab refers to every means of valid cognition.

Devendrabuddhi also makes clear why the general definition in PV II.1ab is valid for both perception and inference, the only two pramāṇas recognized by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti.
skyes bu ma slus pas ni mi bslu ba ni mṅon par ʼdod paʼi don daṅ phrad par byed paʼi mtshan ñid can gyi mṅon sum daṅ / rjes su dpag par khyab par byed pa yin no //
(PVP (P), p. 2b.2), '[The term] "trustworthiness" [in the general definition, meaning: trustworthy] "by not having deceived a person [with regard to the intended effect of a real thing]", comprises perception as well as inference [, in so far as both pramāṇas are] characterized by the fact that they lead to the intended [ie intended and expected by the perceiver] effect [of a real thing]'.
In PV II.1bc Dharmakīrti defines the trustworthiness announced in PV II.1ab.

1bc

arthakriyāsthitiḥ /
avisaṁvādanam
(PVBh, p. 4.1-2; PVV, p. 3.18-19; PVV (S), p. 3.7-8)
'Constancy [on the part of the thing and the cognition of it] with respect to the production of a [useful] effect

[by the real particular thing, svalakṣaṇa] is the trustworthiness [of the knowledge of the thing and of the thing itself]'.

The reliability of the cognition of an object is determined by the realness of the object. An object must produce an effect (artha-kriyā) in order to be real, and if the object is constant in doing this, it is trustworthy. The cognition of this effect-producing object must likewise be constant in order to be trustworthy cognition. If it is true that Dharmakīrti, in defining pramāṇa, predicates trustworthiness of both the object and the cognition of the object in PV II.1ab, then the same trustworthiness which is defined here in PV II.1bc must apply to the object and its cognition. Thus sthiti, "constancy" can be consistently predicated of the object -- ie the real object must be constant in its production of a (useful) effect -- as well as of the cognition of this object, meaning that the cognition must be constant in its activity of cognizing the production of an effect by the real object. These two modes of constancy define the trustworthiness, the reality of the object of cognition and the truth, the pramāṇatā, of the cognition of the object respectively.

The definition in PV II.1bc is paraphrased by Śākyamati[14] in his commentary on PVP:

don ni sreg pa la sogs pa´o // de´i byed pa ni skyed pa´o // de´i gnas ni rtogs pa ste khams kyi don sna tshogs pa ñid kyi phyir ro //

(PVT II (P), p. 88b.2), '"Effect" means [for example the effects of a real fire like] burning [and useful effects like cooking] etc. "Production" of this [effect] means bringing [it] about. "Constancy" of the [production of an effect by the real object] means the cognition [of the effect-production], because the root [sthā, to stand, from which the noun sthiti, constancy is derived] has various meanings'. The last remark seems strange, as the root sthā, "to stand" cannot mean "to cognize", but Śākyamati's paraphrase is influenced by Devendrabuddhi's commentary which says about PV II.1bc;

tshad mas yoṅs su ṅes pa'i don gyis sgrub par bya ba'i don byed par rtogs pa'o // ji ltar mṅon sum gyis śes nas me bsreg pa daṅ / 'tshed pa la sogs pa'i nus pa la 'jug pa de'i dro ba'i reg pa la sogs pa'i yul can gyi mṅon sum daṅ ji ltar 'ga' źig gi tshe me ñid la rnam pa mtshuṅs pa la sogs pa 'ga' źig gis 'khrul pa du ba las me ṅes par byas pa'i rjes su dpag pa'i 'jug pa mi bslu ba yin no // (PVP (P), p. 2b.3-5),

'The cognition of the production of an effect to be brought about by a thing that is fully ascertained [by the perceiver] through the means of valid cognition -- like [the cognition coming from] the direct perception referring to [effects] such as touching etc something hot when [an object such as a real fire] is actually present -- [this perception is trustworthy cognition] with regard to the power of fire to burn and [the consequent useful power to] cook [food] etc after [a real fire and its powers] have been [correctly] known through direct perception; and as the activity of inferring is trustworthy when at a certain time the [inference] has ascertained [the presence of real] fire on the grounds that there is smoke [an invariably concomitant effect of fire with a smaller extension than fire] even though [the inference] is erroneous with regard to the essence of [a real] fire because [inference] operates with a [kind of] similarity of forms etc [among real particulars, ie inference deals with conceptualized and therefore ultimately unreal universals, not with real particulars]'.

In this passage Devendrabuddhi maintains that it is the cognition of a useful effect of a real thing, which constitutes a pramāṇa. The definition in PV II.1bc is discussed here in connexion with both pramāṇas. First, with direct perception (*pratyakṣa*), the ultimate source of all knowledge -- when perception of fire reveals some constant effect to the perceiver, like heat, the power to burn and thus the power to cook food etc, then these perceptions are trustworthy in so far as they reveal to the perceiver a real and trustworthy object. For a real fire will invariably produce such effects as burning and heat, which

can be used to cook dinner on it. Inference, on the other hand, cannot show the real object, but it can and does convey to the perceiver a general notion of the real object, when the perceiver observes another real object that is invariably concomitant with the first one and has a smaller extension than the first one. The actual perception of smoke at a certain place conveys the general notion of fire, with which smoke is invariably concomitant. If the direct perception of the probans, smoke, is trustworthy, and if the invariable concomitance of the probans with the probandum, fire, has been observed before in a trustworthy way, then the inference of the presence of fire will also be trustworthy, as the general notion of fire which the inference conveys, can bring the perceiver to the actual, real fire. The trustworthiness of both manners of cognizing -- through perception and inference -- of fire is warranted by the constancy of the production of effects by the real fire. For fire is constant in producing actual heat as well as potential smoke. Even though fire does not always produce smoke, when smoke is produced it is only by fire, and thus smoke will invariably point to the presence of real fire.

The notion of arthakriyā, "production of an effect" plays an important role in Dharmakīrti's ontology.[15] The term did not originate with him, it occurs in older Buddhist texts in the sense of "useful, beneficial action" (Nagatomi 1967/68, p. 60) and it occurs with the same meaning in NBh, p. 117.4; 445.3 (cf Nagatomi op cit p. 63). In Dharmakīrti's ontology however, arthakriyā is the essential power of a real thing, vastu, the particular, svalakṣaṇa, viśeṣa. In PV I.166 together with PVSV, p. 84.4-11 Dharmakīrti defines the particular, real object and its contrary, the conceptualized, unreal universal in the following way.

> sa pāramārthiko bhāvo ya evārthakriyākṣamaḥ / 166ab
> idam eva hi vastvavastunor lakṣaṇaṁ yad artha-
> kriyāyogyatā 'yogyatā ceti vakṣyāmaḥ.
> sa ca
> arthakriyāyogyo'rthaḥ nānveti yo'nveti

<u>na tasmāt kāryasambhavaḥ</u> // 166cd
<u>tasmāt sarvaṁ sāmānyam anarthakriyāyogyatvād avastu.</u>
<u>vastu tu viśeṣa eva tata eva tanniṣpatteḥ</u>
(PVSV, p. 84.4-11),
'Only that which is able to produce an effect is a thing which is real in the ultimate sense (PV I.166ab);
For this is the sole characteristic of a real thing (<u>vastu</u>) and of that which is not a real thing (<u>avastu</u>), namely the capacity [in the real thing] to produce an effect and the absence of this capacity [in what is not a real thing], this we will explain.

And this object which is capable of producing an effect is not inherent [in other similar particulars as a universal]. That which is inherent [in other particulars as a seeming similarity, ie a universal] does not bring about an effect (kārya) (PV I.166cd).

Therefore, every universal is an unreal thing (<u>avastu</u>), because [the universal is] not capable of producing an effect. But only a particular (<u>viśeṣa</u>) is a real thing, because only the [particular, real thing] brings forth the [effect]'.

This passage clearly demonstrates that <u>arthakriyā</u> is the essential power of a real thing (<u>vastu</u>). Significantly enough, the term is paraphrased as <u>kāryasambhava</u>, "bringing about an effect (<u>kārya</u> instead of <u>artha</u>)" in PV I.166d. Thus, valid cognition of a real thing and its effect-production (<u>arthakriyā</u>, <u>kāryasambhava</u>) is not generated only by direct perception, but also by inference. For the real thing that is not directly perceived is inferred to be present on the grounds of perceiving an effect that is produced by, and therefore invariably concomitant with, the real thing that is its cause. This logical <u>reason</u> is called <u>kāryahetu</u>, "effect as probans". Dharmakīrti illustrates this kind of probans in PV I.37:
<u>dhūmahetusvabhāvo hi vahnis tacchaktibhedavān</u> /
<u>adhūmahetor dhūmasya bhāve sa syād ahetukaḥ</u> //
'For fire [alone] possesses the essence of [being] the cause of smoke [since fire alone is] in possession of a particular power for the [production of smoke]. If the oc-

currence of smoke from [a thing that is] not the cause of smoke [were possible], then it [ie smoke] would be without a cause [, which is absurd]'. From this example of a kāryahetu, it is clear that fire not only has the power to produce effects such as heat which is useful for cooking dinner, it can also, to quote here Devendrabuddhi's example, produce an effect (arthakriyā) such as smoke. Smoke is a useful effect of fire when it indicates the presence of a real fire.

In PV II.1cd Dharmakīrti applies his definition of trustworthiness to meaningful, coherent verbal expressions in order to make clear to what extent they can convey valid knowledge to the hearer, ie how they function as pramāṇa.

1cd

śābde´py abhiprāyanivedanāt //

(PVBh, p. 4.21; PVV, p. 4.11; PVV (S), p. 4.2)

'[This trustworthiness] also occurs with [knowledge] conveyed by words, in so far as [these words[16] forming a coherent meaningful sentence] make known [to the hearer] the intention [, ie the concepts in the mind of the speaker]'.

Devendrabuddhi briefly explains this assertion, sgra ´byuṅ yaṅ / bsam pa dag ṅi ston phyir ro (PV II.1cd) // mi bslu ba yin te źes bya ba rjes su ´jug go // skyes bu´i bsam pa ston par byed pa de ltar na de ston pa´i phyir / ´di ni tshad ma ñid yin no // (PVP (P), p. 3b.4), 'Also with [knowledge] conveyed through words, in so far as [these words forming a coherent meaningful sentence] make known the intentions [ie the concepts in the mind of the speaker] (PV II.1cd), there is trustworthiness, this [term] is [what should] follow [in the verse]. The making known [through words in a meaningful sentence] of the intention in a person ['s mind] is a means of valid cognition in so far as making known this [intention is done] in this way [ie by describing a trustworthy, real particular to the hearer]'.

A meaningful sentence can convey to the hearer knowledge of a thing, namely knowledge of the intention

present in the mind of the speaker. When the knowledge contained in the meaningful sentence leads the hearer to directly perceiving a trustworthy and real object, then the sentence itself is also trustworthy.

I understand <u>śābda</u>, "[knowledge] conveyed by words" as referring to words used in a coherent, meaningful sentence which teaches suitable means and expresses what is useful to man, as such a sentence alone is regarded by Dharmakīrti as a possible candidate for being a pramāṇa. He made this clear in PV I.214 which I have quoted earlier. Coherently formulated sentences which refer to practicable methods to gain something and which, moreover, disclose a desirable human goal (especially in the religious sense), can really communicate practical knowledge about real objects to the hearer, even though such statements do not reveal particular objects themselves as direct perception does. For denotative words in sentences are mere mental symbols of real objects. The use of informative sentences is explained in PV I.92-93.

<u>śabdāḥ saṁketitaṁ prāhur vyavahārāya sa smṛtaḥ</u> /
<u>tadā svalakṣaṇaṁ nāsti saṁketas tena tatra na</u> // 92 //
<u>api pravarteta pumān vijñāyārthakriyākṣamān</u> /
<u>tatsādhanāyety artheṣu saṁyojyante' bhidhāyakāḥ</u> // 93 //

'[Denotative] words express a [concept derived from real objects, a concept] that is agreed upon [by linguistic or philosophical convention]. This [agreement, ie linguistic convention] is regarded [to be useful] for activity [on the part of the hearer towards the real object, but] at the time [of acting,] the [real object, being a momentary] particular, is not present [to the perception of speaker and hearer anymore], therefore the agreement [with regard to the concept] is not [made with direct referece] to the [momentary real particular](92).[And yet] a person [ie the hearer] who [-- on the basis of words in a meaningful sentence --] has got [conceptual] knowledge of [real objects] that are capable of producing [useful] effects, can act for the accomplishment of these [for him useful effects]; thus [on the strength of linguistic convention] denotative [words in a coherent meaningful sentence] are [fruitfully]

used to [point out] real objects (artha) [to the hearer] (93)'.

Words do not express real things but the conceptual pictures of real things as they are present in the mind. This aspect of Dharmakīrti's philosophical semantics will be further elucidated in our comments on PV II.2. What words denote in ordinary and philosophical or scientific speech is something that is mutually agreed upon by the users of these words. Words by themselves do not express a thing; it is on the strength of a particular linguistic convention (saṁketa) that denotative words put in a meaningful sentence are made to express certain intentions (abhiprāya) or denote real objects by the speakers who use these words. The intentions of the speaker are meaningful constructions made out of concepts which are mentally derived from perceived real objects, momentary particulars (svalakṣaṇa). Therefore, these concepts are unreal; they are not as real as the particulars from which they were derived.

But these "unreal" concepts are very useful tools when they can impart information about real objects that produce useful effects.[17] Such information is correct in so far as the receiver, on the basis of it, strives for and really acquires the desired effect-producing objects .

In PV II.2 Dharmakīrti makes clear what he means by the "intention" of the speaker and defines the power of words to convey valid knowledge to the hearer.

2

vaktṛvyāpāraviṣayo yo'rtho buddhau prakāśate /

prāmāṇyaṁ tatra śabdasya nārthatattvanibandhanam //

(PVBh, p. 7.23-24; PVV, p. 4.17-18; PVV (S) p. 4.3-5.1)

'[For the hearer] a [coherent meaningful] statement (śabda) [coherently expressing suitable means to reach the desired end and good human goals] is a means of valid cognition [only] with regard to the thing which appears in the mind [of the speaker] as the object of the [mental] activity [ie the intention] of the speaker, [but the validity of such a statement] is not [in a direct manner] based on the true [absolutely individual] nature of the

[real particular] object [ie the statement cannot reveal the true nature of the particular]'.

As I have already shown, Dharmakīrti believes that words in a meaningful statement do not reveal any real object but only its mental image as it appears in the mind of the speaker. A meaningful statement does not reveal the true nature of the object, the real particular, for if it really could, it would be equal to direct perception, which it, by its very nature, is not. The trustworthiness of perceptual cognition can be tested immediately, because perception directly grasps the effect-production of the particular. But the trustworthiness of a meaningful statement is tested only afterwards, when the hearer really perceives and acquires for himself the effect of the particular that was described in the statement.

Devendrabuddhi paraphrases this verse;
´chad pa po´i byed pa ste / yaṅ dag par ´dod pa daṅ brjod par ´dod pa źes bya ba´i bar du´o // de´i yul gyi don gaṅ yin pa rab tu gsal źiṅ (2b) so sor snaṅ ba´o // gaṅ la źe na / rnam par rtog pa´i blo la´o (2b) // brjod par ´dod pa´i yul gyi don de la sgra ´di ni tshad ma ñid yin no (2c) // ´chad pa po´i don der snaṅ ba can gyi rnam par rtog pa sgra las rtogs par ´gyur te / don de śes pa na ´di ni tshad ma ñid yin no źes bya ba´i don to //
(PVP (P), p. 3b.5-7), '"The [mental] activity of the speaker" means as much as [the speaker's] real intention and [his] desire to verbally communicate [the concepts he has in his mind], the "thing which" is the object of the [intention of the speaker] "appears" [meaning] becomes manifest; in what [does the intention appear]?, [answer:] in the conceptualizing "mind". "With regard to the" thing, being the object of the intention [of the speaker], this "[coherent meaningful statement] is a means of valid cognition" (2c). Through the [meaningful] statement a concept is cognized [by the hearer] which shows (*pratibhāsin*) the thing [ie the mental semblance of the real object] [in the mind] of the speaker. [For the hearer] this [meaningful statement] is a means of valid cognition with respect to the [abstracted conceptual] knowledge the

[speaker has got] of the real thing [, the particular perceived by the speaker]'.

In this passage, Devendrabuddhi makes it clear that meaningful statements reveal only the concepts in the mind of the person who is speaking, and such statements are in a direct manner pramāṇa only with regard to the concepts, but not with regard to the actual objects which generated the concepts.

Dharmakīrti has based his philosophical semantics on the idea that words are symbols of concepts derived from the real objects. Concept-making, in his opinion, is done by the mind through its faculty of apoha, "[mentally] separating / excluding [a thing from other things]". The conceptualizing mind separates certain perceived objects from other objects that are not quite like them, as well as from those that are totally unlike them. Through this separation / exclusion, the mind arrives at certain (general) concepts. These concepts can be used to describe real objects: either a single concept refers to a number of objects or a certain number of concepts is made to refer to a single object.

I will now quote a passage from PVSV which shows that Dharmakīrti regards words as images or symbols of concepts (vikalpa):

nanu sarvato vyāvṛttasya rūpasyābhidhānaṁ na saṁbhavati / na vai tad eva rūpaṁ buddhau samarpyate / anatīndriyatvaprasaṅgāt / kevalam ayaṁ tathābhūtaṁ pratyāyayiṣyāmīti śabdena śrotary asaṁsṛṣṭatatsvabhāvaṁ vikalpapratibimbam arpayati

(PVSV, p. 37.23-27), 'Surely an [adequate] denotative expression for the form [of the momentary real particular that is completely] separated [ie different] from all [other momentary particulars] cannot exist nor indeed is this very same form communicated to the mind [of the hearer by a denotative expression], because [if it could be communicated in its real essence] then it would wrongly follow that [a word denoting a momentary particular] is not above the senses [so that a denotative word could act as if it were equal to the direct perception of the

denoted particular]. The [speaker] - while thinking "I will make known [to the hearer a particular] that is of such a [specific] nature" - through a denotative word [or meaningful sentence] merely communicates to the hearer a conceptual image with which the essence of the [momentary particular itself] is not [directly] connected'.

Next, I will quote the famous passage with which Dharmakīrti starts his apoha-doctrine in PV I. this passage defines how, through apoha, correct concepts are formed in the mind of the person who perceives a particular.

sarve bhāvāḥ svabhāvena svasvabhāvavyavasthiteḥ /
svabhāvaparabhāvābhyāṁ yasmād vyāvṛttibhāginaḥ // 40 //
tasmād yato yato'rthānāṁ vyāvṛttis tannibandhanāḥ /
jātibhedāḥ prakalpyante tadviśeṣāvagāhinaḥ // 41 //
tasmād yo yena dharmeṇa viśeṣaḥ saṁpratīyate /
na sa śakyas tato'nyena tena bhinnā vyavasthitiḥ // 42 //
(PV I.40-42)

'As all things [, real, momentary particulars,] through [their individual] essence, partake of [total] separateness from their own being[18] [ie separateness from similar things], and from another essence [ie separateness from unlike things] -- because [all particulars] abide [exclusively] by their own essence -- (40) therefore specific classes which penetrate [ie grasp] the specific properties of the [real separate particulars] are [merely] conceptually constructed [in the mind of the beholder]; [the concepts constituting these specific classes of similar objects] are based on the [conceptual] exclusion of every [unlike object] from the things [,ie from that number of not so different particulars which in the mind of the beholder produces the concepts of classes of similar objects] (41).

Therefore, through which [conceptualized general] property [and words denoting this property] a special property [of a particular] is known, [only] through this [general but correctly circumscribing property], not through another than this one, can the [specialness of the particular be known and made known; for this [reason each concept has

its] separate existence [ie its proper range of applicability, so that qualitatively different concepts referring to the same particular are not identical in content] (42).'

In verse 40 Dharmakīrti defines the uniqueness of the momentary real particular: every particular is in reality totally different from every other seemingly similar, as well as dissimilar, particular. Every particular has its own unique essence and therefore partakes of total separateness from every other particular. In verse 41 he described the mind's function of conceptual separation, vyāvṛtti, apoha.

After particulars have been perceived, the mind conceptualizes specific classes of objects and certain general properties. These are not based on the actual essence (svabhāva) of every real particular, but on some common differences among real particulars. When a given number of different particulars makes a somewhat similar impression on the mind, it is possible to say that these particulars share the same properties, and thus it is imagined that they belong to a class of objects. But the similarity among them is not based on their really sharing a real universal by which they look similar; there is a seeming similarity in them in so far as they are less different from one another than from other more dissimilar particulars. The mind envelopes the slight differences and thus conceptually creates similarity. In verse 42 it is said that the concepts which are thus created by mentally excluding the too dissimilar particulars can be used to denote (but never precisely) the special aspects of real particulars. Concepts made by conceptual exclusion are general and factually unreal, but those that correspond most to the unique features of a particular have the capacity to symbolize these unique features. Other concepts that do not correspond very much to these features cannot symbolize them. The idea that concepts and denotative words circumscribe the particular only by excluding from it all that is very dissimilar is unfolded in greater detail in the following verses.

kvacid dṛṣṭe'pi yaj jñānaṁ sāmānyārthaṁ vikalpakam /
asamāropitānyāṁśe tanmātrāpohagocaram // PV I.48 //
'Also with regard to a [real particular] that has been directly perceived somewhere and to which no parts [ie properties] of other [particulars] have been [wrongly] attributed, the conceptual knowledge [of it] has as its object the [conceptualized] similarity [of things] and operates in the sphere of merely excluding [from this particular] the [wrong attributions] (48)'.
niścayāropamanasor bādhyabādhakabhāvataḥ /
samāropaviveke'sya pravṛttir iti gamyate // PV I.49 //
'Since an ascertaining [conceptual] cognition [of a particular] prevents [wrongly attributing certain properties to this particular] and since [whatever mode of] cognition which [wrongly] attributes [these properties] is what is to be prevented [by correct conceptual ascertainment, ie correct concepts], therefore the [usefulness] is discerned [of the] operations of this [ascertaining conceptual cognition] with regard to the isolation of [wrong] attributions [from the mental image of a real particular] (49)'.

In the next two verses Dharmakīrti equates the use of denotative words with the correct conceptual ascertainments (niścaya-manas) derived from exclusion.

yāvanto'ṁśasamāropās tannirāse viniścayāḥ /
tāvanta eva śabdāś ca tena te bhinnagocarāḥ // 50 //
anyathaikena śabdena vyāpta ekatra vastuni /
buddhyā vā nānyaviṣaya iti paryāyatā bhavet // 51 //
(PV I.50-51)
'There are just as many [conceptually constructed] ascertainments [of a single particular] and [significative] words [for these ascertainments] in order to expel [wrong attributions to the particular] as there are [wrong] attributions [to it] of parts [ie properties of other particulars]. For this [reason] these [ascertainments and words] have their various ranges [of applicability, ie correct ascertainments and words have their own content apart from the real particular they refer to, and since this is so, they can be used to meaningfully refer to one

particular without being tautological] (50).
Otherwise, if one single real [particular] object could be [fully] comprehended [ie grasped in all its uniqueness] by one [single] word or [one single instance of conceptual] cognition, then there would be no other aspect [of the particular left that is not expressed by this one concept and word] and thus [all concepts and words referring to this one particular] would be fully equal in meaning [which in fact they are not]' (51).

Significative words and the concepts they symbolize do not grasp the real essence of a particular but only remove wrong notions about a particular. It is possible to entertain a great variety of wrong notions about a single particular, and many words can be used to keep away these wrong notions. Hence it is said 'there are just as many ascertainments and words in order to expel [wrong notions] as there are [wrong] attributions'. By removing as many wrong imaginations about a particular as possible with the help of ascertaining concepts and significative words, one is not left with the real essence of the particular but only with a useful delineation of, and a negatively-defined boundary around, the particular. In verse 51 Dharmakīrti gives a reductio ad absurdum: if it were true that one conceptual ascertainment and one single word could describe the absolute singularity of one given particular, then all other words that denote this particular would carry exactly the same meaning as the first word. But this is in reality not so, for we can and do use different concepts and words such as "sweet", "heavy", "cold" etc. to refer to and circumscribe one particular, without these concepts and words being identical in meaning, and these same concepts and words are used to circumscribe other different particulars.

Regarding PV II.3ab I will first quote a passage from PV I, which explains how the mind abstracts concepts of things from the direct perceptions of real particulars. According to Dharmakīrti, the conceptualizing mind mentally envelopes or encloses (saṁvṛti) the perceived, absolutely singular appearance of the particular. In this

way, the absolute singularity is obscured by the mind and the particular can be conceptually analysed into substances, properties as well as put in classes of seemingly similar objects. Thus, all notions of singularity, classes and universals (sāmānya) are constructions of the mind and do not have an existence independent of the mind. According to Dharmakīrti, a universal is not a real thing present in many particulars, but simply a convenient conceptual image that can be used in inference or verbal communication of knowledge.

pararūpaṁ svarūpeṇa yayā saṁvriyate dhiyā /
ekārthapratibhāsinyā bhāvān āśritya bhedinaḥ // 68 //
tayā saṁvṛtanānārthāḥ saṁvṛtyā bhedinaḥ svayam /
abhedina ivābhānti bhāvā rūpeṇa kenacit // 69 //
tasyā abhiprāyavaśāt sāmānyaṁ sat prakīrtitam /
tad asat paramārthena yathā saṁkalpitaṁ tayā // 70 //
(PV I.68-70)

'The [unique] form [of real particulars] which is [absolutely] different [from the form of the concept] is enclosed by the [conceptualizing] mind through [its equalizing and generalizing] own form, [the conceptualizing mind] contains the [uniform] appearance of one object, [although this seemingly uniform appearance] depends on [various] separate [unique particular] things (68). These things which are in themselves [absolutely] distinct, but whose particularity has been [conceptually] enclosed by the [conceptualizing mind which is] the enclosure, appear [in the mind of the perceiver] in some [general] form or other as if non-distinct [ie as if really similar] (69). On account of the intention [ie attributing one uniform appearance to various unique particulars] [present] in the [mind], the [seeming] similarity [of particulars] is called real, but in the manner in which this [similarity] is conceptually constructed by the [enclosure through the mind] the [conceptualized similarity] is not real in the highest sense [not as real as a particular] (70)'.

The mind's faculty of enclosing (saṁvṛti) the unique appearance of a particular and thus creating universals (sāmānya) brings us back to PV II. In PV II.3ab Dharma-

kīrti describes to what extent cognition produced by mental enclosure is not a pramāṇa.

3ab

<u>gṛhītagrahaṇān neṣṭaṁ sāṁvṛtaṁ</u>

(PVBh, p. 21.3; PVV, p. 5.1; PVV (S), p. 5.2)

'[The conceptual knowledge present in the mind of the speaker, which is] produced by [conceptually] enclosing [a particular perceived by him, we] do not regard [as a means of valid cognition for the perceiver nor for the hearer] because it [only] apprehends [a blurred, conceptualized image, a concept characterized in general by the inability to produce an effect, this concept is derived from an effect-producing particular] that has been [already fully] apprehended [by the power of direct perception belonging to the perceiver]'.

The internal mental cognition of concepts as a means of valid cognition for the perceiver and the hearer of statements about them is rejected here, because the concepts that are apprehended by this conceptual knowledge are ultimately unreal things that do not produce an effect, unlike the particulars that do produce effects. Verse 1ab teaches that only knowledge which possesses, viz grasps the effect-production by real particulars may be called pramāṇa, which leaves no room for knowledge of concepts as a pramāṇa, precisely because concepts do not produce a real noticable effect and cannot thereby warrant their trustworthiness; or to put it bluntly: a real fire gives heat, a concept of fire does not.

The adjective <u>sāṁvṛta</u>, 'produced by [mental, conceptual] enclosure', that is, produced by <u>saṁvṛti</u>, obviously refers to the <u>saṁvṛti</u>-theory in PV I.68-70, quoted just before. consequently, Devendrabuddhi interprets <u>sāṁvṛta</u> as 'knowledge of a particular as it is conceptually enclosed and put in a category of similar objects (<u>sāmānya</u>)'; thus <u>sāṁvṛta</u> could also simply mean 'concept'. His commentary runs:

<u>´di ltar bum pa daṅ / yod pa ñid daṅ / graṅs daṅ ´degs pa la sogs pa´i yul can gyi kun rdzob kyi śes pa ni tshad ma ñid du mi ´dod do // ci´i phyir źe na / bzuṅ ba ´dzin pa´i</u>

rgyu´i phyir ro // de la dañ por mthoñ ba ñid tshad ma ñid de ´jug par byed pa yin no //
(PVP (P), p. 4a.1-2), 'In this way, the knowledge which is produced by [mental, conceptual] enclosure and which has as its object [abstracted concepts] such as "pot" [or potness], "existence", "number", "upward motion" etc is not regarded as a means of valid cognition. Why not? Since [this kind of knowledge] apprehends [in a conceptual manner a particular] that has [already] been apprehended [by direct perception], [therefore it is not a pramāṇa]. With regard to this [particular], only the first perception, only this means of valid cognition, makes [the perceiver] act'.

Conceptual knowledge of a particular becomes knowledge of abstract concepts like "existence", "number" and "potness", but these concepts do not share the reality of the particulars that generated them. The particulars themselves and their effect-production can only be completely cognized through direct perception, which is thus the sole source of every other mode of valid knowledge.[19] Now one might ask to what extent conceptual knowledge is useful in daily practice and therefore valid. Dharmakīrti answers this in PV II.3bd.

3bd

dhīpramāṇatā /

pravṛttes tatpradhānatvād dheyopādeyavastuni //

(PVBh, p. 21.23-24; PVV, p. 5.1-2 PVV (S), p. 5.2-3)
'[Conceptual knowledge, ie knowledge of concepts produced by the conceptualizing] mind is a means of valid cognition [only] in so far as [succesful] activity [on the part of the hearer] with regard to a real [effect-producing] object that is to be avoided or obtained, has this [knowledge formulated in a coherent, meaningful sentence teaching suitable means to acquire the desired ends, as well as expressing ultimate human purposes] as [its, ie of succesful activity] basis'.

According to verse 3ab sāṁvṛta, the knowledge of a concept is not a means of valid cognition, as it does not grasp the effect-production of a real object. In this

passage, however, -- as in verse 4ac -- ,it is not the conceptual knowledge but the conceptualizing mind, dhī, itself which is called a pramāṇa. There seems to be a difference between the mind (dhī) and its products, the concepts (sāṁvṛta). This apparent difference does not pose a problem, because in Dignāga's and Dharmakīrti's epistemology the pramāṇa, here the dhī and its result, the pramāṇa-phala, here the sāṁvṛta, are not thought to be different.

savyāpārapratītatvāt pramāṇaṁ phalam eva sat /
(PS I.8cd)

'[We say that] a means of valid cognition is [identical with] the resultant [cognition and not different from it] because [the resultant cognition is] cognized together with the activity [of cognizing a thing through means of valid cognition]'. This is what Dignāga says and what Dharmakīrti accepts as principle.

Devendrabuddhi interprets dhī as conceptual knowledge in his paraphrase of PV II.3bd.

blaṅ bar bya ba daṅ dor bar bya ba'i dṅos po'i yul can daṅ / skyes bu'i don źes bya ba can gyi 'jug pa de'i la / de gtso bo ñid kyi phyir te / śes pa gtso bo ñid yin pa'i rgyu'i phyir / blo ni tshad ma ñid yin no //

(PVP (P), p. 4a.6-7), '"Of that activity" which refers to (yul can) the real object that is to be avoided or obtained and is called "the object of human pursuit ", "in so far as the [conceptual knowledge, formulated in coherent, meaningful sentences which teach means that are suitable for acquiring the desired goals of human pursuit], is the basis [of this activity]", [this means:] because [conceptual] knowledge is the basis [of this activity on the part of the hearer], [therefore] the [conceptualizing] mind [of the speaker] is a means of valid cognition [for the hearer]'.

Assemblages of correct concepts do not reveal the real individual nature of a particular, but they can, and do, give some sort of useful information about a particular. This useful information is conveyed through coherent meaningful sentences to a hearer, who can afterwards act in order to avoid or obtain the described

particular. This means that only statements on real particulars that produce useful effects are considered here. The idea that a hearer of such statements can use the statements as a kind of reliable pramāṇa is found in PV I.93 quoted before in my commentary on PV II.1cd.

The terms heya, 'what is to be avoided', and upādeya, 'what is to be obtained', are used in PV I.217 and the prose passage following on it, PVSV, p. 109.15 ff to describe the scheme of the four noble truths taught by the Buddha.

heyopādeyatattvasya sopāyasya prasiddhitaḥ /
pradhānārthāvisaṁvādād anumānaṁ paratra vā // 217 //

'Or [introducing the second explanation of PS II.5ab, an expert statement] about another [object, ie one that is not visible to the hearer,] is inference in so far as the main thing [which the statement describes] is trustworthy on the grounds that [this main thing, being the four noble truths taught by the expert, ie the Buddha:] [namely] the truth of what is to be avoided [ie suffering] and obtained [ie the destruction of suffering] together with the causes [ie the cause of suffering and the cause of the destruction of suffering, the eightfold path] is established [, ie ascertained, by the hearer to be trustworthy through his own power of perception and inference]'.

In this verse heyopādeya and upāya refer to the four noble truths whose trustworthiness can be directly verified by direct perception and inference. If the four noble truths, being the main object (pradhāna) of the statement, are proved to be trustworthy, then by inference it is to be established that the invisible object of the statement is also trustworthy. The prose more explicitly relates heyopādeya to the four noble truths.

heyopādeyatadupāyānāṁ tadupadiṣṭānām avaiparītyam avisaṁvādah / yathā caturṇām āryasatyānāṁ vakṣyamāṇanītyā (PVSV, p. 109.15-16), 'The fact that what is to be avoided [ie suffering] and obtained [ie the destruction of suffering] and the cause thereof [ie the cause of suffering and the cause of the end of suffering, the eightfold path] which have [all] been indicated by the [expert

speaker, the Buddha] are not contrary [to the perception and inference of the hearer] constitute the trustworthiness [of these objects that have been indicated by the Buddha]. As is the case with the subsequently explained [ie in PV II) scheme of the four noble truths'. What is to be avoided (heya) obviously refers to the first noble truth that there is suffering, for suffering is what one wishes to avoid. The cause (upāya) of heya, is the cause of suffering, the second noble truth. What is to be obtained (upādeya) is the destruction, the end of suffering which is the third noble truth. The cause (upāya) of upādeya, here the cause of what is to be obtained, the cause of the end of suffering, is the fourth noble truth. The term heyopādeya in PV II.3bd clearly alludes to these passages in PV I and PVSV.

The notion of an object that is to be avoided or obtained as the object of valid useful knowledge is older than Dharmakīrti. We find it also in NBh, p. 6.1-2:

heyaṁ tasya nirvartakaṁ hānam ātyantikaṁ
tasyopāyo'dhigantavya ity etāni catvāry arthapadāni
samyag buddhvā niḥśreyasam adhigacchati,

'What is to be avoided, the cause of what [is to be avoided], the complete avoidance, and the means of this [avoiding what is to be avoided] must be known; having perfectly understood these four words [designating four] facts [that must be realized] one obtains the supreme good'. We should compare this assertion with another one at the beginning of NBh:

pramāṇena khalv ayaṁ jñātā'rtham upalabhya tam
artham abhīpsati jihāsati vā

(NBh, p. 2.2), 'When a cognizer has cognized an object with a means of valid cognition, he either wishes to obtain (abhīpsati) that object or to avoid (jihāsati) it'. Pakṣilasvāmin uses the verbal forms that correspond semantically to the verbal adjectives heya and upādeya. About the object one wishes to obtain or avoid, Pakṣilasvāmin says:

arthas tu sukhaṁ sukhahetuś ca duḥkhaṁ duḥkhahetuś ca

(NBh, p. 3.1), 'As to the object, it is happiness and a

cause of happiness, as well as suffering and a cause of suffering'. To my mind, it is possible to relate NBh, p. 6.1-2, with this passage. We get the following relation: sukha, happiness, corresponds to hāna ātyantika, complete avoidance of suffering; sukhahetu, the cause of happiness, corresponds with upāya, the means of avoiding suffering; duḥkha, suffering, is heya, and is to be avoided; duḥkhahetu, the cause of suffering is tasya nirvartaka, the cause of what is to be avoided. Without much difficulty, we may recognize the four noble truths of Buddhism here. According to Pakṣilasvāmin, the avoidance of suffering and the obtainment of happiness is achieved on the basis of correct knowledge acquired through the pramāṇas. In this way, he wishes to prove the practical value of the pramāṇas. For almost the same purpose Dharmakīrti seems to use the same terms heya and upādeya in PV II.3bd, in order to show the practical value not of every pramāṇa, but especially of reliable statement, for the practical value of the conceptual knowledge contained in the statement, the being a pramāṇa of conceptual knowledge, consists in the fact that it gives the hearer of the statement useful information about things that should be avoided or obtained. If we ask ourselves why Dharmakīrti uses these terms, heya and upādeya, in PV I.217 and PV II.3bd, the answer could be that these two terms can be used to describe in a short basic formula the kind of objects regarding which the pramāṇas have practical value, and the formula also defines briefly the central doctrine of the Buddha, namely the four noble truths. As we have seen, Dharmakīrti interprets heya and upādeya in this way in PVSV, p. 109.15-16, thus making quite explicit the covert Buddhism of NBh, p. 6.1-2; p. 2.2; p. 3.1.

The mind is not only a means of valid cognition on the grounds that it can produce useful concepts that give images of useful or unuseful real objects, but is is also a means of valid cognition when it correctly grasps the unique features (cognized through direct perception) of the real objects. This is explained in PV II.4ac.

4ac

<u>viṣayākārabhedāc ca dhiyo'dhigamabhedataḥ</u> /
<u>bhāvād evāsya tadbhāve</u>

(PVBh, p. 22.20; p. 23.9; PVV, p. 5.10; 5.15; PVV(S), p. 5.4-5)

'And [the conceptualizing mind of a reliable speaker is also a means of valid cognition for the hearer] in so far as the [conceptualizing] mind (dhī) has a specific cognition (adhigama) [of the particular] owing to the specific form of the [real] object [ie the particular], because the [specific mental cognition of the particular] is only present [in the conceptualizing mind of the speaker], when the [specific form of the particular] is present [before the perceiver who is the speaker after he has conceptualized the specific form of the directly perceived particular and communicates the concepts of it to the hearer]'.

Dharmakīrti says here that the specific form in which a directly perceived object appears in the mind corresponds to the specific form of the object as it has been grasped by direct perception (pratyakṣa). And yet, the conceptual image of the object is not equal to the real proper form of it. Even if the image presents a very good likeness, it still remains an incorrect copy of the original particular. Dharmakīrti makes this clear in PV I.87:

<u>saṁṛjyante na bhidyante svato'rthāḥ pāramārthikāḥ</u> /
<u>rūpam ekam anekaṁ ca teṣu buddher upaplavaḥ</u> //

'Objects that are real in the highest sense [ie the real momentary particulars] are by [their] own [nature] neither united [in order to form a class of real universals], nor are they [, each individually, further] divided [into substances and properties]. [Thus,] a single or manifold form [which seems to be present] in these [particulars] is a disturbance [ie an error] of the [conceptualizing] mind [ie the single or manifold appearances of the particulars are simply created by the mind]'. As has been explained in PV I.68-70, the specific mental image of a particular is created in the mind by conceptually enclosing (saṁvṛti)

the perceived appearance of the real particular. The conceptualizing mind of the speaker makes the semblance into concepts and words which are spoken to the hearer. In so far as the verbal communication about the particular enables the hearer to find the particular for himself, is it a pramāṇa; not because the communication reveals the particular itself. The conceptualizing mind itself (namely the mind of the speaker) is a pramāṇa in so far as it has more or less correctly conceptualized the particular. For the correctness of the conceptualization by the mind is the basis of the correctness of the statement that is afterwards made regarding the conceptualized particular. Yet the solid basis of all these mental conceptual operations remains direct perception (pratyakṣa), for perception alone can give birth to correct concepts abstracted from actually perceived particulars. All correct concepts derive from the actual perception of particulars and from nothing else. By demanding that perception alone must be the source of accurate concepts (as is done here in PV II.4c), Dharmakīrti can warrant the truth, the being a pramāṇa of the mind that conceptualizes. The mind can only be a source of valid cognition for others if it apprehends and conceptualizes really perceived and existant particulars. Imaginations and fancies which could also be derived from the direct perception of things are here not considered to be pramāṇa.

4d-5a

svarūpasya svato gatiḥ //

prāmāṇyaṁ vyavahāreṇa

(PVBh, p. 25.2-3; PVV, p. 5.20-p 6.15; PVV (S), p. 6.2-3) The cognition (gati) [by the conceptualizing mind] of the proper form [of cognition as such takes place] by the self [-awareness of the mind's cognition], [but the cognition by the mind] is [known to be] valid cognition [only] through activity [based on this cognition and directed towards the cognized particular]'.

Devendrabuddhi paraphrases PV II.4d as follows; raṅ rig pa las tshad ma źes bya ba'i śes pa de'i śes pa yod pa ñid grub pa yin gyis / tshad ma ñid ni ma yin no //

(PVP (P), p. 5b.5-6), 'Even though by the self-awareness [of the mind's cognition] the cognitive nature (śes pa yod pa ñid) of this cognition which is called "means of valid cognition" is established, [still the cognition by the conceptualizing mind] is not a means of valid cognition'. Devendrabuddhi interprets svataḥ as raṅ rig pa las, svasaṁvedanāt, 'mental self-awareness'. This theory that mental cognitions cognize themselves and do not need another inner witness to be mentally perceived, is Dignāga's theory of mental self-awareness, svasaṁvedana, which is formulated in PS I.9 and its commentary (Hattori 1968, p. 183.18-19). This passage has been discussed in the chapter on Dignāga (p. 59).

Along with Devendrabuddhi, we could ask ourselves:
'o na ji ltar tshad ma ñid ṅes par bya źe na
(PVP (P), p. 6a.1), 'And how is it to be ascertained that [the cognition by the mind] is a means of valid cognition?'. The answer to this question is given in PV II.5a, prāmāṇyaṁ vyahāreṇa, which Devendrabuddhi paraphrases thus,
dus phyis 'byuṅ ba can gyi don byed pa'i yul can gyi śes pas so
(PVP (P), p. 6a.1-2), '[The cognition by the conceptualizing mind is a means of valid cognition only] through the cognition which refers to (yul can) the [actual] production [by the particular] of the [expected] effect which takes place at a later time.' This means that every cognition is a pramāṇa after the effect-production of a particular is actually perceived. Before that happens, there is no criterion by which one can ascertain the validity of a cognition. This would imply that coherent statements that form a philosophical or scientific reliable treatise (śāstra) really serve no purpose, since their validity as pramāṇa is proved only afterwards, not immediately. Devendrabuddhi introduces Dharmakīrti's solution of this epistemological problem with these words:
gal te tha sñad kyis tshad ma ñid rtogs pa yin pa de'i tshe bstan bcos don med pa can yin pa'i phyir brtsam par bya ba ma yin par 'gyur ro // don med pa can ma yin te

gaṅ gi phyir
(PVP (P), p. 6a.2-3), 'If the validity [of the cognition by the mind] is known [only] through activity [based on this cognition and directed towards the cognized particular], then, since a [meaningful scientific] treatise [made up of sentences mediating such cognition] is useless [as its validity can only be established after the indicated particular has really been experienced], [such a treatise] should not be composed [at all]. [However, Dharmakīrti says that a scientific treatise] is not useless, because...'.

5b

śāstraṁ mohanivartanam /
(PVBh, p. 29.19; PVV, p. 7.18; PVV (S), p. 7.2)
[The correct conceptual knowledge concerning particulars, formulated by a reliable speaker in a coherent scientific or philosophical] treatise [only serves to] dispel the confusion [or ignorance of the hearer regarding these particulars]'.

A scientific treatise is a set of coherent meaningful sentences -- ideally in the form of valid syllogisms, although this is not always necessary -- which convey more or less correct and useful conceptual images of a real object to the hearer. A treatise does not reveal the object itself, it only describes the useful effects the object is expected to produce. Thus, the validity of the treatise depends on the actual effect-production of the denoted particular. The real use of the reliable treatise lies in its power to remove the confusion and ignorance in the mind of the hearer. For the hearer is capable of forming some more or less correct notions, ie correct mental pictures, of a particular on the strength of the information from the treatise. Devendrabuddhi gives a reason for this description of the purpose of a śastra:
´jug par byed pa´i tshad ma´i mtshan ñid mi śes par ´jug pa na bslu ba srid pa´i phyir ro //
(PVP (P), p. 6a.3), '... because errors are possible if one acts without knowing the definition of the means of valid cognition as inducing [the hearer] to act [in order

to get the expected particular and its intended effect-production]'.

The prime use of a treatise or a reliable tradition is, of course, its information about real objects that the hearer does not at present perceive for himself. The treatise or tradition can incite the hearer to act in order to acquire the at present invisible thing. This is pointed out by Dharmakīrti in PVSV, p. 108.2-5:
nāyaṁ puruṣo 'nāśrityāgamaprāmāṇyam āsituṁ samarthaḥ, atyakṣaphalānāṁ keṣāṁcit pravṛttinivṛttyor mahānuśaṁsāpāpaśravaṇāt tadbhāve virodhādarśanāc ca,
'Man cannot [safely] exist without resorting to the [reliable] authority of tradition [consisting of reliable statements], because [from reliable tradition alone] he hears the great advantage and the [great] disadvantage of engaging in or abstaining from certain [acts] whose results are not [at present] perceivable, and [also he cannot safely exist without reliable tradition] in so far as he does not observe any contradiction [with the reliable tradition] when the [results predicted by the tradition] are [actually] there'. In the last clause, Dharmakīrti describes the validity of reliable tradition (āgama), which must be the same as the validity of a scientific treatise (śāstra), as both must necessarily be composed of meaningful, coherent sentences. Tradition and a scientific treatise are both valid in so far as the predicted results, the predicted particulars and their arthakriyā, are afterwards experienced by the hearer.

Dharmakīrti now proceeds with a statement which grammatically looks like a continuation of the assertion śāstraṁ mohanivartanam, but which is interpreted by Devendrabuddhi and all his successor commentators as an alternative, second general definition of pramāṇa.

5c

ajñātārthaprakāśo vā

(PVBh, p. 30.2; PVV, p. 8.1; PVV (S), p. 8.2)
'Or [perceptional and conceptual knowledge in order to be a genuine pramāṇa not only possesses trustworthiness, but also] reveals a [particular] object that was [previously]

not known [ie not cognized by any pramāṇa]'.

Devendrabuddhi explains this passage as follows: gźan mtshan ñid gñis pa yin no // rtogs pa pos mi śes pa'i don gyi dṅos po'i de kho na ñid kyi gsal bar byed pa ste / mṅon par gsal bar byed pa'i śes pa yaṅ tshad ma yin no // don byed par mi bslu ba ñid kyi phyir de daṅ de rtog par bya'o //

(PVP (P), p. 6b.1-2), 'This is another, second definition [of pramāṇa]; that which reveals an object, [ie] the reality of a thing (dṅos po'i de kho na ñid) that was [previously] not cognized by [the person] who [now] cognizes [it]:[20] cognition which clearly reveals [such an unknown object] is also a means of valid cognition. This [knowledge which reveals an unkown thing] must be investigated on the grounds of [its] trustworthiness with regard to the effect-production [by the particular that is revealed by this knowledge] together with that [cognition which is trustworthy]'. Dharmakīrti in his definition, and Devendrabuddhi in his explanation of it, demand that a pramāṇa, apart from being trustworthy, should reveal sound knowledge to the perceiver, of particulars that were unknown to him before he cognized them. In short: a pramāṇa should produce new, valid knowledge. This epistemological requirement as formulated in PV II.5c complements the definition of a pramāṇa given in PV II.1ab. We might say that a genuine means of valid cognition should reveal an effect-producing particular that was not known before. With the second definition in PV II.5c Dharmakīrti seems to justify the possibility of continuously acquiring more and more new, reliable knowledge of reality.[21] If we apply this definition to the individual pramāṇas, we find that, in fact, it only refers to direct perception, for only through direct perception is it possible to directly cognize new objects, previously unknown particulars. Through inference it is not possible to directly cognize new objects, but only previously unknown relations between objects. For example, we infer the presence of a particular A at a certain spot because that spot possesses particular B which is known to be invariably concomitant

with particular A. If PV II.5c is applied to reliable statement, tradition (āgama) and a scientific treatise (śāstra), it seems to define them as well in a way. For it is tenable to say that a correct statement describes an effect-producing particular that the hearer of the statement has never perceived for himself. Thus, a statement can also reveal a previously unknown particular. This interpretation of PV II.5c as referring to inference and reliable statement as well does not contradict the definition in PV II.1cd that the trustworthiness of a pramāṇa occurs with knowledge conveyed by words, in so far as they make known to the hearer a correct conceptual image with which he can search for the corresponding effect-producing particular. However, since sound, verifiable knowledge of particulars can only be had through direct perception which has a direct relation with particulars, it is justifiable to interpret PV II.5c as defining direct perception. The validity of the other pramāṇas is based on the validity of direct perception, for only through direct perception of a thing is the validity of inference and reliable statement made certain.

According to Devendrabuddhi, the use of the term "artha", the real object, in PV II.5c implies that Dharmakīrti wants to exclude false appearances, illusory objects from being appropriate objects of valid cognition.
don smos pas ni zla ba gñis la sogs par snaṅ
ba tshad ma ñid ma yin par bśad de
(PVP (P), p. 6b.2-3), 'Since he speaks of "objects" [Dharmakīrti] has explained that [cognition of unreal, false] appearances such as two moons etc, is not a means of valid cognition'. Cognition of illusory objects is not a means of valid cognition, because such unreal things -- even though they may have been previously unknown to the perceiver -- do not, and cannot, produce any useful effects (arthakriyā) for him.[22] Devendrabuddhi further argues that the word artha means the presence or absence of a particular:
don smos pas kyaṅ dṅos po'i yod pa daṅ med pa
ñid kyi de kho na ñid yin par bźed do

(PVP (P), p. 6b.4), 'By saying "object" [Dharmakīrti] also assumes that [this object] is the reality (de kho na ñid) of the presence and absence of a thing'. A means of valid cognition can reveal the presence of an effect-producing particular. In both cases, the knowledge is useful. Through direct perception it is possible to directly know the presence of a thing, for instance of a real fire; through inference we know only indirectly the presence of fire, namely through the concomitant smoke (if there is smoke). When a particular is not directly cognized through pratyakṣa, we can infer the absence of this particular. This inference constitutes -- as we will know -- Dharmakīrti's third kind of valid probans (hetu), namely the anupalabdhi-hetu, the non-perception of a perceivable object as the logical reason to infer the absence of this object. Devendrabuddhi has this probans in mind when he says that the pramāṇa as defined in PV II.5c reveals the hitherto unknown presence of a particular, as well as the hitherto unknown absence of a particular. By saying this, Devendrabuddhi makes this definition refer to direct perception and the valid inference as taught by Dharmakīrti in PV I.[23]

After giving his second definition of a real pramāṇa, a definition primarily referring to direct perception, Dharmakīrti goes on to show how this second definition would affect the possible validity of the conceptual knowledge of universals.

5d-6a

svarūpādhigateḥ param //

prāptaṁ sāmānyavijñānam

(PVBh, p. 30.28-29; PVV, p. 8.17-18; PVV (S), p. 84-5) 'Following upon cognition [through perception] of the proper form [of the particular], the [conceptual] knowledge of the [seeming] similarity (sāmānya) [of the perceived object with other objects] would be (prāpta)[24] [a genuine pramāṇa, which it is not according to our definition in PV II.5c in so far as conceptual knowledge does not reveal any hitherto unknown aspects of a particular, that would not have been perceived through

perception]'.

By rejecting conceptual knowledge of similarity as a pramāṇa, Dharmakīrti is asserting here that the source of all concepts (when they are correct, ie corresponding somewhat to the appearance of the real particular) is the direct perception of particulars. For the conceptual knowledge of similarity (sāmānyavijñāna) is abstracted from the appearance of particulars. Conceptual knowledge of an object is acquired only after (param) the cognition (adhigati) of the particular, or rather the proper form (svarūpa) of the particular. Devendrabuddhi paraphrases verse 5d-6a as follows:

ran gi mtshan ñid khon du chud pa las dus phyis spyi'i rnam par śes pa gan yin pa de mnon sum gyis ma bzun ba ñid kyi spyi yul ñid du bdag gir byed pa'i phyir / de yan tshad ma ñid thob na mi 'dod do

(PVP (P), p. 6b.5-6), 'If -- after the cognition [through perception] of the particular -- the [conceptual] cognition of the [seeming] similarity [of this particular with other particulars] is acquired [ie is regarded] as a means of valid cognition, in so far as it is assumed that this [conceptual cognition] has as its object a [special] similarity which cannot be apprehended through perception, [then we say that this] is not intended [ie no conceptual knowledge of similarity is pramāṇa]'. The reason that conceptual knowledge is rejected here as a means of valid cognition must be the fact that conceptual knowledge does not reveal anything new about the perceived particular (cf in this connexion also what was said in PV II.3a).

All mental abstractions in the form of universals, and the similarity in a certain number of objects, are made by the mind through its power of apoha, vyāvṛtti, excluding wrong concepts from a perceived particular. What Dharmakīrti briefly refers to in PV II.5d-6a, namely acquiring knowledge of similarity, he explains more fully in PV I.87-88:

samṛjyante na bhidyante svato 'rthāḥ pāramārthikāḥ /
rūpam ekam anekam ca teṣu buddher upaplavaḥ // 87 //
bhedas tato'yam bauddhe'rthe sāmānyam bheda ity api /

tasyaiva cānyavyāvṛttyā dharmabhedaḥ prakalpyate // 88 //

'Objects that are real in the highest sense [ie the real momentary particulars] are by [their] own [nature] neither united [in order to form a class of real universals] nor are they [each individually further] divided [into substances and properties]. [Thus,] a single or manifold form [which seems to be present] in these particulars] is a disturbance [ie an error] of the [conceptualizing] mind [ie the single or manifold appearances of the particulars are simply created by the mind] (87)'.

Therefore, also this [seemingly real] difference [between] "similarity" [among various particulars] and "particularity" [of one particular] is [in reality only made] with reference to an object which is conceptualized [by the mind]. Specific properties of this one [single, real particular] are conceptually constructed [in the mind merely] by way of excluding other [wrong attributions from this real particular] (88)'.

In the ontology of Dharmakīrti, reality is built up exclusively of evanescent momentary particulars (cf also the chapter on Dignāga). From this assumption it follows that every notion a perceiver might have of a lasting similarity, a universal, inherent in an indefinite number of particulars, is an erroneous mental construction of the mind. But also the lasting particularity of a single object is a mental construction since the single particular itself changes every moment, even though this may not be noticed by the perceiver. The only pramāṇa that could really convey a true notion of the particular is direct perception, for as long as the noticeable effect of the particular (arthakriyā) is conveyed, direct perception is the only verifiable pramāṇa. Conceptual knowledge, on the other hand, lacks this verifiability as it does not apprehend the actual effect-production.

In PV II.6bc Dharmakīrti gives the reason for not regarding conceptual knowledge as a means of valid cognition.

6bc

avijñāte svalakṣaṇe /

yaj jñānam ity abhiprāyāt
(PVBh, p. 31.3-4; PVV, p. 8.21-22; PVV (S), p. 9.1-2)
'Because [our] intention [with the definition in PV II.5c is] that [only sound, perceptual] knowledge of a [hitherto] unknown particular is [a genuine means of valid cognition]'.

Evidently, Dharmakīrti is merely paraphrasing the definition offered in PV II.5c. Devendrabuddhi rephrases PV II.6bc as follows:
ʼkhrul pa med pa kho na yin no // raṅ gi mtshan ñid ma rtogs paʼi yul can gyi śes pa gaṅ yin pa de ni tshad ma yin pa de ltar na / khyad par daṅ bcas paʼi mtshan ñid bśad pas spyi śes pa ni tshad ma ma yin no //
(PVP (P), p. 6b.8-7a.2), '[The definition given by Dharmakīrti in PV II.5c] is certainly (kho na) non-erroneous [in so far as it only refers to the apprehension of the effect-producing particular]. [Only] knowledge which refers to a [hitherto] unknown particular is a means of valid cognition; by thus explaining the definition [in PV II.5c] with a [limiting] specification, [Dharmakīrti makes clear that conceptual] knowledge of similarity is not a means of valid cognition'.

In conclusion, we might ask along with Devendrabuddhi why only knowledge of hitherto unknown particulars is a means of valid cognition.
ciʼi phyir raṅ gi mtshan ñid rtogs paʼi śes pa gaṅ yin pa de tshad mar ʼdod kyi gźan ma yin że na
(PVP (P), p. 7a.4), 'Why is [only] knowledge consisting in the cognition of a particular regarded as a means of valid cognition, but not [any] other [form of knowledge]?' The answer to this is given in PV II.6d.

6d

svalakṣaṇavicārataḥ //
(PVBh, p. 31.4; PVV, p. 9.5; PVV (S), p. 9.3)
'on the grounds that [a person who seeks to obtain useful things] examines [with the means of valid cognition] [real] particulars [which alone are capable of producing the intended useful effects]'.

Reality is built up of particulars, and a person who needs what is useful can only strive to obtain particulars which produce an effect that meets his demands. The criterion of truth of the pramāṇa is, therefore, its being helpful in making the perceiver obtain the desired effect of a particular. If knowledge is not instrumental in gaining the useful effects of a thing, then that knowledge is not a trustworthy pramāṇa. Devendrabuddhi says about PV II.6d
raṅ gi mtshan ñid kho na don gyi bya ba byed pa de ltar na de´i don du skyes bu raṅ gi mtshan ñid don byed pa´i rten ´dod pa yul de ñid la tshad ma tshol bar byed kyi / don byed pa ma yin pa´i yul gźan la ni ma yin no //
(PVP (P), p. 7a.4-5), 'Only a particular brings about the production of an effect; thus, for the purpose [of gaining what is useful and avoiding what is damaging,] a person who regards the particulars as the basis of the effect-production, searches for a means of valid cognition concerning only that [effect-producing] object, but not concerning other objects, [ie other than particulars, namely the conceptualized universals] that do not produce any effects [because the universals are not real in the highest sense]'. With this observation of Devendrabuddhi's, we can round off the discussion on the two pramāṇa-definitions of Dharmakīrti. We might summarize the epistemological position of the latter by saying that a true means of valid cognition should be verifiable knowledge of real objects that produce certain perceivable effects which are useful for the perceiver. Such knowledge is verifiable only in so far as the effect-production by the particulars is actually experienced (PV II.1). In order to be a source of new information about reality, a means of valid cognition should reveal particulars that were unknown before (PV II.5c).

In PV II.1-6 Dharmakīrti has discussed pramāṇa in general, thus defining the first word of PS I.1ab. He then applies the results of this discussion to the religious authority of the Buddha.

7a

<u>tadvat pramāṇaṁ bhagavān</u>

(PVBh, p. 32.4; PVV, p. 9.11; PVV (S), p. 9.5)

The Lord [Buddha] is a means of valid cognition such as that [which we have discussed in PV II.1-6]'.

Dharmakīrti implies here that the teachings of the Buddha constitute trustworthy knowledge and reveal to the hearer facts that were not known to him before. This implication is clearly set forth by Devendrabuddhi in his commentary.

<u>'di tshad ma daṅ yaṅ ci źig mtshuṅs na / gaṅ gis tshad ma daṅ 'dra bas tshad ma ñid yin / tshad ma'i mtshan ñid rnam pa gñis ñid daṅ mtshuṅs pa yin no // ji ltar mṅon par 'dod pa bźin du sgrub par bya ba'i don la mi slu ba'i don la mi slu ba'i phyir daṅ / mi śes pa'i don gsal bar byed pa'i phyir tshad ma ñid yin no // de ltar na bcom ldan 'das kyaṅ ṅes par legs pa la sogs pa'i mtshan ñid can gyi skyes bu'i don la mi slu bar mdzad pa daṅ / rtogs pa po'i skyes bu'i don bsgrub par bya ba mi śes ston par mdzad pa de'i phyir tshad ma ñid yin no</u> //

(PVP (P), p. 7b.2-5),

'In what way is the [Buddha] equal to a means of valid cognition, that through similarity to a means of valid cognition He is a means of valid cognition? He is equal to the two ways [in which] a definition of a means of valid cognition [has been given in PV II.1ab and 5c respectively]. In accordance with what has been admitted [in PV II.1-6 about a genuine pramāṇa, the Buddha] is a means of valid cognition in so far as [He] is trustworthy with regard to the [useful] thing that is to be realised, and in so far as [the Buddha] reveals [ie points out to others] a [real] thing that has been unknown [to them]. Thus, also the Lord [Buddha] does not deceive (<u>avisaṁvādayati</u>, <u>mi slu bar mdzad pa</u>) with regard to [ultimate] goals of human [aspiration, goals] defined as the highest good (<u>ṅes par legs pa</u>, <u>niḥśreyasa</u>)[25] etc and [the Lord Buddha] explains to a person who understands [Him] objects of human [interest] that have to be realised [by the hearer] and that are not [as yet] known [to the hearer];

therefore [the Buddha] is a means of valid cognition [as defined in PV II.1-6]'.

The trustworthiness of the Buddha is proved by the extent to which a person really acquires for himself the objects taught by the Buddha. The Buddha's teaching is trustworthy when the hearer finds the objects that constantly produce desired useful effects (arthakriyāsthiti). This is the trustworthiness with regard to visible things, things that are accessible to the perception and inference of the hearer. The Buddha's trustworthiness about invisible things must be inferred from his trustworthiness about visible things. This has been set forth by Dharmakīrti in PVSV, p. 109.15-19:

heyopādeyatadupāyānāṃ tadupadiṣṭānāṃ avaiparītyam avisaṃvādaḥ / yathā catūrṇāṃ āryasatyānāṃ vakṣyamāṇanītyā/ tasyāsya puruṣārthopayogino'bhiyogārthasyāvisaṃvādād viṣayāntare'pi tathātvopagamo na vipralambhāyānuparodhāt, niṣprayojanavitathābhidhānavaiphalyāc ca vaktuḥ,

'The fact that what is to be avoided [ie suffering] and obtained [ie the destruction of suffering] and the causes thereof [ie the cause of suffering and the cause of the end of suffering, the eightfold path] which have [all] been indicated by the [expert speaker, the Buddha] are not contrary [to the perception and inference of the hearer] constitutes the trustworthiness [of these objects that have been indicated by the Buddha]. As is the case with the subsequently explained [ie in PV II] scheme of the four noble truths [ie suffering, the cause of suffering, the destruction of suffering and the path leading to the destruction of suffering]. Because this [teaching] of the [Buddha about trustworthy facts that are accessible to the perception and inference of the hearer] is trustworthy [in so far as this teaching] is conducive to [ultimate] human goals and [in so far as this teaching] is capable of being put into practice [by the hearer], [therefore] one [must] admit the truth [of this teaching] also [when it is dealing] with another object [that is not accessible to the perception and inference of the hearer];[26] [the hearer] is not deceived [with this second kind of

teaching] since [the first kind about visible facts] is not disproved [by his own perception and inference] and [the second kind of teaching is true also] because a [reliable] speaker [of the greatness of the Buddha] does not gain [anything] by [uttering] untrue statements that [do] not [set forth human] aims'.

As for the invisible object that is indicated in the teachings of the Buddha, it seems that this sort of object will, in the course of time, have to become visible to the hearer. For if it can never be experienced at all, we could not with certainty call it existent. Moreover, the Buddha himself at some time should have experienced the object that is invisible at present, if he is to significantly talk about it. According to the definition in PV II.1 meaningful, coherent statements, in order to be pramāṇa, should refer to particulars that are constant in producing useful effects. But also statements about invisible things should ultimately refer to effect-producing particulars, not to things that remain absolutely imperceptible. It seems, therefore, that Dharmakīrti with his definition in PV II.1 introduces a more effective and explicit means of verifying the truth of statements about invisible things than the theory in PVSV, p. 109.15-19. According to the latter passage, the invisible object could theoretically remain invisible forever and still the hearer is obliged to believe in the existence of this invisible object, only because the reliable expert, ie the Buddha, who described the invisible object, does not profit by uttering false statements. According to PV II.1, however, a reliable statement about invisible objects should explicitly refer to real particulars that are only at present not perceptible to the hearer but will be so in the future, when the hearer actually perceives them.

As we have seen, Devendrabuddhi applies in his commentary the definitions of PV II.1 and 5c to the teachings of the Buddha, and says that the Buddha's doctrine reveals facts that the hearer did not know about before. This idea is not entirely new, because already Pakṣilasvāmin says that the reliable speaker reveals facts that his hearers

did not know themselves. The hearer could only know these facts from the correct instruction of the reliable speaker, the expert (āpta):

teṣāṁ khalu vai prāṇabhṛtāṁ svayam anavabuddhyamānānāṁ nānyad upadeśād avabodhakāraṇam asti

(NBh, p. 223.7-8), 'Now, when these [ordinary] living beings do not know for themselves [through their own power of cognition those things that should be avoided or obtained], then there is no other cause of [correct] knowledge [left for them] than the [valid] instruction [given by the expert speaker]'. It is very well possible that this statement influenced Devendrabuddhi when he wrote to the effect that the teachings of the Buddha reveal hitherto unknown facts to the hearer. Of course in Devendrabuddhi's view, the ideal and most elevated expert is the Buddha. Even Dharmakīrti may have been influenced by this NBh-passage, as he maintains in PV II.7a that the Buddha is a means of valid cognition equal to the sort of pramāṇa he has defined in PV II.1-6, thus implying that the words of the Buddha evince trustworthiness and revelation of new facts.

After explaining the term pramāṇa in connexion with the doctrine of the Buddha, Dharmakīrti explains the term bhūta, "has become" of PS I.1a.

7bc

abhūtavinivṛttaye /

bhūtoktiḥ

(PVBh, p. 32.8-9; PVV, p. 9.15; PVV (S), p. 9.6-7)

'In order to [make his readers] dismiss [the notion that something] that has not become [, ie something eternal like the Vedas or a Supreme God, could be a real means of valid cognition, Dignāga uses] the expression "has become" [in PS I.1a, thus saying that the Buddha is only a pramāṇa because he has become so as the result of a process of becoming].'

The Buddha has become an authoritative speaker on religious subjects because he has trained himself over many lives to become a fully enlightened one, a Buddha. The Buddha's authority is the result of a process of

growth, of becoming. By saying "has become" Dharmakīrti makes Dignāga reject the idea that an eternal supreme being or everlasting Vedic utterances could be regarded as a means of valid cognition. In PV II.8-9 Dharmakīrti rejects the possibility of the existence of an eternal pramāṇa.

Yet the process of becoming alone does not warrant a person's being a means of valid cognition; the authoritative speaker must have practiced certain moral excellences which are the conditions and cause of his authority. On the grounds of the speaker's possessing the required moral excellences, the hearer can validly infer the authoritativeness of the statements made by the speaker, as will be made clear later. Devendrabuddhi writes about 7bc:

bcom ldan ´das kyi ye śes gaṅ yin pa de daṅ de ni skyes pa yin gyi / ṅo bo ñid kyis grub pa ni ma yin no // gaṅ gi tshe skye ba yin pa de´i tshe yul daṅ dus daṅ raṅ bźin gyi ṅes par mi ruṅ ba´i phyir de ni glo bur bar rigs pa ma yin no źes don gyis (PVP (D), p. 7a.2 gyi) raṅ gi rgyu ston par byed do //

(PVP (P), p. 7b.6-7),

'That which is the higher knowledge (ye śes) of the Lord [Buddha], even though all that (de daṅ de, tattat) has come into existence, [yet it] is not perfected (grub pa, siddha) [as pramāṇa] [merely] through its own nature. When [this higher knowledge of the Buddha] comes into being, then -- since it is not correct that [this higher knowledge] is limited (ṅes par, niyata) to [some particular] place, time and nature (raṅ bźin, svabhāva) [but developed over many lives] -- this [knowledge] is not suitable for being [regarded as merely] incidental (glo bur bar, ākasmikam PVV, p. 10 note 1) [ie as something that emerged by accident, not through conscious effort over an enormous period of time]. Thus, he [Dharmakīrti] shows [in PV II.7cd], according to the [implied] sense, the proper cause (raṅ gi rgyu, svakāraṇam PVV, p. 10 note 1) [why the higher knowledge of the Buddha has become a pramāṇa]'.

PV II.7cd

sādhanāpekṣā tato yuktā pramāṇātā //

(PVBh, p. 32.9; PVV, p. 10.2; PVV (S), p. 9.8)
'The validity of the Buddha as a pramāṇa] depends on [specific] means, therefore [the Buddha] is an appropriate [ie correct and reliable] means of valid cognition'.

Devendrabuddhi says about this passage:
tshad ma de ni bcom ldan ʼdas kyis // sgrub byed la bltos pa (sādhanāpekṣā) / gaṅ gi phyir bcom ldan ʼdas tshad ma ñid du bźugs pa daṅ / deʼi sgrub par byed pa dag ʼchad par ʼgyur ro // deʼi sgrub par byed pa naṅ tan du byed pa las kyaṅ tshad ma ñid yod par ʼgyur ba deʼi phyir (tato) / bcom ldan ʼdas ni tshad ma ñid (pramāṇatā) yin par rigs so (yuktā) // sbyor ba ni gaṅ gis sgrub par byed pa gaṅ phyin ci ma log par naṅ tan du byas pa des ni / de thob par ʼgyur te / dper na nad pas nad med bsgrub par byed pa phyin ci ma log pa naṅ tan du byas pa lta buʼo //
(Skt fragment in PVV p. 11 note 1:)
yo yatsādhanam aviparītam anutiṣṭhati tasya tatprāptir bhavati / yathāturasyārogyasādhanam aviparītam anutiṣṭhataḥ. bcom ldan ʼdas kyaṅ tshad ma ñid kyi sgrub par byed pa phyin ci ma log pa naṅ tan mdzad pa can yin no źes bya ba ni raṅ bźin gyi gtan tshigs so /
(PVP (P), p. 7b.7-8a.2) (cf Skt fragment PVV, p. 11 note 1:)
anuṣṭhitaprāmāṇyāviparītasādhanaś ca bhagavān iti svabhāvahetuḥ,
'The validity [of the Buddha as pramāṇa] depends on [specific] means [developed] by the Lord [Buddha]. On which [grounds] the Lord [Buddha] is at present a means of valid cognition and the means for [becoming] that, will be [elaborately] explained [in the sequel of PV II]. Because [the Buddha] too undertakes [certain intentional] actions with regard to [acquiring] the means for the [higher knowledge], [His] being a pramāṇa could come into existence; therefore the Lord [Buddha] is an appropriate means of valid cognition. The formulation [of the proof in PV II.7cd] [runs] as follows: He who undertakes [specific] action (anutiṣṭhati, naṅ tan du byas pa) with regard to a

means [for obtaining] something [, in so far as this means is] correct [ie leading to the intended results], obtains that [for which he practiced the means], just as for a sick person who undertakes [specific] actions with regard to the means for [regaining his] health [, in so far as this means is] correct [ie really leading to health], [health will come back]. The Lord [Buddha] too is one who has undertaken [specific] action with regard to a correct [ie leading to the intended results] means for [becoming] authoritative [ie for becoming a means of valid cognition]. This is [an inference in which] the essential property ["correct means" is used] as probans[27]'.

The implied svabhāvahetu-inference Devendrabuddhi is formulating in the last part of this passage can be constructed as follows.

Two essential properties are involved; the first, with the wider extension, is "practicing a means (sādhana) which invariably leads to the intended results (aviparīta)"; the second, with the smaller extension, is "practicing this means with the specific purpose to become an authority (pramāṇa)".[28] The logical connexion between these two essential properties, ie their invariable concomitance, is based on the fact that both are forms of specific intentional actions (anuṣṭhāna, nan tan). Thus, it is possible to infer the epistemological authoritativeness (pramāṇatā) of the Buddha from His having practiced correct means (sādhana), since the latter by being the wider essence of the former, invariably includes the former. Devendrabuddhi had introduced the notion of intentional action (anuṣṭāna) in order to warrant the invariable concomitance of pramāṇatā with sādhana and the possibility of inferring pramāṇatā from sādhana, for sādhana has a wider extension than pramāṇatā. The only other possibility would have been to regard pramāṇatā as an invariably concomitant effect of sādhana (which it in reality seems to be), but then one could not validly infer the presence of pramāṇatā as effect from the presence of sādhana, the hypothetical cause of pramāṇatā. For, according to Dharmakīrti's logic, the inference of an effect from its cause is not conclusive.

In PV II.34a (Mi) Dharmakīrti tells us the means (sādhana) of the validity of the Buddha: sādhanaṁ karuṇābhyāsāt, 'The means [by which the Lord Buddha has become a means of valid cognition] is [his great[29]] compassion [on all living beings; this compassion is the solid ground of his authority] because [he has without end] practiced [his compassion]'. The Buddha's practice of compassion in many lives became the foundation of his authority, of his now being a means of valid cognition, because his intentional effort at being compassionate is not limited to one life, but it can be, and is, made over an enormous period of time.[30] For this reason, it becomes the solid basis of the epistemological truth and trustworthiness of a Buddha. In another passage Dharmakīrti says about the Buddha's compassion:

tāyaḥ svadṛṣṭamārgoktir vaiphalyād vakti nānṛtam /
dayālutvāt parārthaṁ ca sarvārambhābhiyogataḥ // 145 //
tataḥ pramāṇam
(PV II.145-146a trsl Vetter, p.52)
'Das Beschützen (tāya) besteht im Verkünden eines Pfads, den er selbst [als zum Ziel der Leidlosigkeit führend] erfahren hat. [Er ist also sachkundig.] Er verkündet [aber auch] nicht [mit Absicht] Unwahres; denn [für sich selbst braucht er] nichts mehr zu erreichen und er tut alles, was er unternimmt, da er ganz von Mitleid erfüllt ist, um anderer willen. Daher ist er Erkenntnismittel'.

In this verse Dharmakīrti sums up the religious and epistemological authority of the Buddha and his doctrine. The Buddha has realized for himself (svadṛṣṭa) the supreme goal; he teaches (ukti) the way (mārga) to this goal in a reliable manner because he would not profit by making untrue statements (anṛta), for there is not anything he has to gain (vaiphalya). This disinterestedness is caused by his great compassion (dayālutva), and it is out of compassion that the Buddha acts, lives and teaches (sarvārambhābhiyoga) in order to promote the supreme welfare of the world (parārtham). This statement by Dharmakīrti on the validity of the Buddha strongly reminds us of Pakṣilasvāmin's three criteria of the reliability of an expert

speaker:

kiṁ punar āptānāṁ prāmāṇyaṁ sākṣātkṛtadharmatā bhūtadayā yathābhūtārthacikhyāpayiṣeti

(NBh, p. 223.4-5), 'Now, what is the [epistemological] validity of the expert [speakers]? It is the fact of having directly perceived the dharma [the true state of things], compassion on living beings, and the desire to communicate the thing as it really is'. Now Dharmakīrti's svadṛṣṭamārga corresponds to Pakṣilasvāmin's sākṣātkṛtadharmatā (cf about this term Oberhammer 1974, p. 50), Dharmakīrti's vakti nānṛtam, "the [Buddha] does not utter untrue [statements]", is similar to Pakṣilasvāmin's yathābhūtārthacikhyāpayiṣā, while both regard compassion as a criterion of validity (dayālutva in PV II.145 and dayā in the NBh). It is very likely that Dharmakīrti more or less adopted Pakṣilasvāmin's three criteria, at the same time giving compassion priority over the other two in order to emphasize the specialness of the Buddha's authority. For according to Dharmakīrti, the first cause and driving force behind the Buddha's religious and epistemological authority is his compassion, as an attentive reading of PV II trsl Vetter will show (consult the index of that book on karuṇā, kṛpā, dayā). Pakṣilasvāmin's list suggests a temporal order of the criteria. The authoritative speaker first has perceived a thing or fact himself, then he is compassionate, and out of compassion he seeks to correctly describe the thing or fact to others.

āptāḥ khalu sākṣātkṛtadharmāna idaṁ hātavyam idam asya hānihetur idam asyādhigantavyam idam asyādhigamahetur iti bhūtāny anukampante. teṣāṁ khalu vai prāṇabhṛtāṁ svayam anavabuddhyamānānāṁ nānyad upadeśād avabodhakāraṇam asti ... hanta vayam ebhyo yathādarśanaṁ yathābhūtam upadiśāmas ta ime śrutvā pratipadyamānā heyaṁ hāsyanty adhigantavyam evādhigamiṣyanti iti evam āptopadeśaḥ

(NBh, p. 223.5-224.3), 'The experts having directly perceived the dharma [the true state of things], show compassion on living beings in the following way: this is [something] to be abandoned, this is the cause of the abondonment for him [ie for the living being the expert

wishes to instruct], this is [something] to be attained by him, this is the cause of the attainment for him. For, when these [ordinary] living beings do not know for themselves [through their own power of cognition those things that should be avoided or obtained], then there is no other means of [correct] knowledge [left for them] than the [valid] instruction [given by the expert speaker]... [the compassionate experts think:] Let us instruct these [helpless living beings about the things that should be avoided and obtained] in the way [we have] perceived [these things for ourselves] and according to how [these things] really are. When these [helpless living beings] have heard [our accurate instructions], then, while [correctly] understanding [them] [ie in so far as they correctly understand the instructions], they will avoid what is to be avoided and attain what is to be attained; in this way the instruction by the experts [is a pramāṇa].'

The real difference between Pakṣilasvāmin and Dharmakīrti seems to be the following: Pakṣilasvāmin does not say how or why the āpta has directly perceived the true state of things (sākṣātkṛtadharmatā); the āpta simply has acquired his direct experience of higher things. Out of compassion, he relates his experience and knowledge to others and therefore his reliable statements can be regarded as pramāṇa (cf also Oberhammer 1974, p. 50 ff on this). Dharmakīrti, on the other hand, does tell us how and why the āpta par excellence, the Buddha, has acquired his direct experience of important religious facts; the Buddha was moved by compassion and therefore exerted himself to attain the complete freedom from suffering in order to teach others the way to that same goal. Before he reached the goal himself, the Buddha had heard from reliable tradition (āgama) about the cause of suffering, so that he knew what to strive for, namely the ultimate end of suffering for the sake of teaching to others the way to it. Dharmakīrti says this in these two verses.

dayāvān duḥkhahānārtham upāyeṣv abhiyujyate //
parokṣopeyataddhetos tadākhyānaṁ hi duṣkaram //

(PV II.131cd-132ab trsl Vetter, p. 39)

'[Nach langer Übung nun] voll Mitleid wendet er [ie the Buddha] die Mittel an, um [sein eigenes] Leid zu überwinden [obwohl er als einer, der voll Mitleid ist, die eigene Erlösung gar nicht mehr anstrebt. Dennoch ist es nötig, die Mittel anzuwenden, um das eigene Leid zu überwinden;] denn wer das Ziel [der Erlösung vom Leid] und die Mittel dazu nicht selbst erfahren [und angewendet] hat (parokṣa), dem dürfte es kaum gelingen, sie [d.h. Ziel und Mittel] [anderen gut] zu verkünden'.

yuktyāgamābhyāṁ vimṛśan duḥkhahetuṁ parīkṣate //
tasyānityādirūpaṁ ca duḥkhasyaiva viśeṣaṇaiḥ /

(PV II.132cd-133ab trsl Vetter, p. 40)

'[Der Anwendung der Mittel geht voraus:] Forschend mit Hilfe von Argumenten und Überlieferung stellt er eine Ursache des Leids fest und ausserdem, dass diese [Ursache] eine nichtewige usw. Natur hat, [und zwar stellt er dies fest] an Hand von Bestimmungen, die dem Leid selbst [anhaften]'.

NOTES

1. Cf Frauwallner 1954, p. 143; Nagatomi 1959, p. 264, 266; Vetter 1964, p. 32; Hattori 1968, p. 73-74.

1a. Vetter interprets pramāṇabhūta as 'der Erkenntnismittel ist' in Vetter 1984, p. 14 and note 6 on the same page.

2. It seems that Dignāga is deliberately playing with two connotations of the term pramāṇa; the first is of course "source of valid knowledge" in a purely epistemological sense, the second more general connotation is "authority", "right measure" (cf Burrow 1980 on the etymology of pramāṇa). If pramāṇa, in both connotations, is predicated of the Buddha it would mean that he has become an expert or authority on religious questions of ultimate concern to mankind and that his statements on religious matters could safely be regarded to be as valid as the knowledge derived from perception and inference. Cf also Hattori's remark on pramāṇabhūta, 'The term "pramāṇabhūta" is used in a double sense. First it means "authoritative" or "standard"... Second, it has the more technical meaning, "to have to come into existence" (bhūta) as a "means of valid cognition" (pramāṇa)', Hattori 1968, p. 74, note 1.2.

3. Cf the scheme in Hattori 1968, p. 74, note 1.2.

4. Cf Steinkellner 1982, p. 8, 'The fact that the Buddha has become a means of valid cognition is the result of the development of certain qualities to perfection. The qualities are further differentiated as perfections in cause (hetu) and perfections in effect (phala), where the two terms "cause" and "effect" bear the meaning they have as categories of describing the career of a Bodhisattva'.

5. Cf Hattori 1968, p. 75, note 1.5: "Mahāvastu, I, 92,13 and Avadānaśataka, I,188,1 ff, relate the story of Surūpa, a legendary king, who, in exchange for religious instruction, gave up his son, his wife, and himself to be

eaten by an ogre. His religious ardor is praiseworthy. However, here "surūpa" is to be taken as a common noun according to Durvekamiśra, who states, in explaining "praśastatā", that those who make a living by their beauty of form are called surūpa; see DhP, p. 3.15: surūpā rūpājīvāḥ."

6. Steinkellner seems to object to what he calls "secularistic" interpretations of the Buddhist epistemological tradition (Steinkellner 1982, p. 6-7). He disagrees with certain modern scholars who praise the Buddhist epistemological tradition (as founded by Dignāga with the Pramāṇasamuccaya) 'highly for the very reason that it is assumed to present a development of rational secularization within Buddhist monastic culture ... that it presents dawning of "modern, Western" progress within the "dark ages" of traditional religious India' (Steinkellner 1982, p. 6). According to Steinkellner, the 'secularistic' understanding by modern authors of Buddhist epistemology is mistaken as it represents this epistemological tradition as 'an essential deviation from the spirit of Buddhism' (op cit, p. 6). The fact remains that the Pramāṇasamuccaya can very well be regarded as a 'secularistic' work on epistemology (only two means of valid cognition are accepted, ie perception and inference), syllogistic reasoning, dialectics and semantics, since -- apart from PS I.1ab -- the book does not link its theories to Buddhist spirituality. Of course Dignāga did write about Buddhist spirituality, but not in the Pramāṇasamuccaya. Thus, it is not hard to understand why some modern scholars, reading the Pramāṇasamuccaya (as well as a good many works of Dharmakīrti), have come to the abovementioned judgement that Buddhist epistemology is 'secularistic' and even 'modern'. One could only say that these modern scholars show a too great positive bias towards what they consider to be 'western progress'. In the Pramāṇasamuccaya the only link with the Buddhist religion is PS I.1ab and the commentary on it by Dignāga himself; therefore Steinkellner has to say that 'its [ie

of PS I.1ab] importance is not only underlined by the literary masses written as a commentary to it, but also by the attitude toward it in later Buddhist history' (op cit, p. 7). To me it seems that this 'important' verse (or rather half-verse) is made important by the earliest and most important commentary on it, Pramāṇa-siddhi chapter, being Pramāṇavārttika II. In this work Dharmakīrti is trying to put (secular) epistemology, the pramāṇavāda, in the context of Buddhist religion and spirituality. This explains very well the 'literary masses written as commentary to' and the 'attitude toward' PS 1.1ab; in fact the really important Pramāṇavārttika II could be regarded as the starting-point of the blending of epistemology and Buddhist spirituality, rather than the statement in PS I.1ab itself.

7. We will remember that Dignāga regarded the statement by an expert, āptavāda, as a kind of inference in PS II.5ab: āptavādāvisaṃvādasāmānyād anumānatā /
'The statement by an expert is [to be regarded as] inference in so far as there is similarity in trustworthiness [between real inference and reliable statement]'. In accordance with this thesis, Dignāga could interpret the words of the Buddha as a kind of valid inference; this is probably the reason why he did not, in the PS, further discuss the epistemological problems with regard to the doctrines taught by the Buddha. The notion that reliable statements -- in so far as they are trustworthy -- are a kind of inference, seems to be adumbrated in the following passage from NBh:
tadāśrayāv anumānāgamau. tasmin sati syātām anumānāgamāv asati ca na syātām
(NBh, p. 10.4-5), 'Inference and tradition [consisting of reliable statements] are [both] based on a [generally-accepted fact, dṛṣṭānta]. When that is present, inference and [reliable] tradition [as pramāṇas] are possible; when that is absent, [inference and tradition] are impossible'. The point here in the NBh is that the validity of inference and reliable tradition / reliable

statement is necessarily based on a fact perceived by all to be true. If both inference and tradition are only valid through a sound dṛṣṭānta, it follows that both are similar in that respect. There is yet another NBh-passage in which it is said that the validity of an expert statement can be inferred when it is possible to infer the existence of the object the statement refers to and when finally the described object is directly perceived by the hearer of the statement.

asty ātmā ity āptopadeśāt pratīyate, tatrānumānam icchādveṣaprayatnasukhaduḥkhajñānāny ātmano liṅgam iti, pratyakṣaṁ yuñjānasya yogasamādhijam ātmamanasoḥ saṁyogaviśeṣād ātmā pratyakṣa iti

(NBh, p. 25.1-4), '"The soul [really] exists", this is known from the [reliable] teaching of an expert. With regard to [the existence of this object and the validity of] this [teaching about it], there is [the following] inference: "Desire, aversion, effort, joy, grief and knowledge are the mark [ie the traits in a person through which we can infer the existence] of a soul [which has these properties, in that person] (NS 1.1.10)". The direct perception [of the soul] for him who exercises himself [in yoga] is brought forth by contemplation [taught] in a Yoga[-system]; the soul is directly perceivable through [a yoga-contemplation consisting in] a special union of the soul with the mind'. This passage teaches that a metaphysical object (like the soul), at present not perceived by the hearer, is known to him at first through a statement by an expert. After that, the hearer infers the existence of the object the statement has referred to, and by inferring this, he has also inferred the reliability and the truth of the statement. If the hearer makes correct efforts to exercise contemplation (samādhi), he can direclty perceive the object of the statement. This would be the ultimate proof of the trustworthiness of the statement. Thus, Pakṣilasvāmin seems to imply that statements on metaphysical objects can be and must be subjected to rational inquiry before they are accepted as pramāṇa. The next logical step would be to say that ultimately

there are only two pramāṇas, perception and inference, and to subsume reliable statement under inference, as Dignāga has done.

8. Vetter 1964, p. 31.: 'Keinesfalls soll das überlieferte Buddhawort als solches schon Autorität sein, nur weil es jemand gesagt hat, der für heilig gilt, und es von vielen für massgebliche Überlieferung (āgamaḥ) gehalten wird. Erst wenn gezeigt ist: diese Worte stammen von jemand, der durch seinen Wandel beweist, das er nicht lügt und etwas zu sagen hat, was nicht jedermanns Besitz ist, kann er als Erkenntnismittel angenommen werden. Das höchste Ziel des Handelns muss von einer solchen Autorität gegeben werden. Es ist nämlich nicht unmittelbar gegeben, sonst wäre es nicht das höchste Ziel'.

9. That Dharmakīrti regards tradition, āgama, as a statement by an expert, āptavāda, is evident from PVSV, p. 108.1 where he quotes PS II.5ab in which the term āptavāda occurs, and says: ity āgamasyānumānatvam uktam (PVSV, p. 108.1-2), 'thus [Dignāga] has said that tradition is inference'.

10. According to Frauwallner, Devendrabuddhi "is said to have been a personal pupil of Dharmakīrti; a fact which is in itself worthy of credence. He must, therefore, have lived about 630-690 A.D." (Frauwallner 1961, p. 145) ; or earlier, if we believe Lindtner 1980.

11. My method of interpreting is as follows: I try to understand PV II.1-7 by examining earlier texts that are implicitly or explicitly referred to in it, and which have formed the basis of the theories propounded in this text. Since the NBh, the PS and PV I preceded PV II, it is, to my mind, a sound method to understand theories in PV II as having grown out of these earlier works, especially in so far as these earlier texts have formulated a particular theory for the first time. In order not to neglect the authoritative explanations given in later times, I have

made use of the oldest commentary, the PVP by Devendrabuddhi, who was a direct pupil of Dharmakīrti. Therefore, it is very likely that the PVP is closest to Dharmakīrti's own intentions, rather than later commentaries such as, for instance, Prajñākaragupta's PVBh. This interpretative translation and explanation of PV II.1-7 are, above all, intended to investigate and make clear what Dharmakīrti himself wished to say, not what later commentators thought he said, or should have said.

12. The term avisaṁvādin is a derivative of avisaṁvāda. Already in Pali the term avisaṁvāda and variants like avisaṁvādaka and avisaṁvādana occur, cf The Pali Text Society's Pali-English Dictionary under these entries and the entries of this term without the privative a-. For avisaṁvādaka and variants it gives the following meanings, "not deceiving", "not lying", 'honest", "faithful", while the Critical Pali Dictionary vol I gives for this "not deceiving", "not breaking one's word", "not false". The PTS Pali Dictionary gives for visaṁvāda etc, "deceiving", "untrustworthy", "disappointing", the Critical Pali Dictionary vol I, p. 477 gives "untrustworthiness". Vetter interprets the word avisaṁvāda as "sich bewähren" (Vetter 1964, p. 27) and Katsura as "non-contradictoriness" (Katsura 1984, p. 219). Taking into consideration the meanings of avisaṁvāda in Pali and the interpretations of this term in relation to Dharmakīrti's epistemology and ontology by Vetter and Katsura, it seems to me that "trustworthiness" renders the various aspects of the term quite well in English.

13. In PV II.1ab Dharmakīrti equates the means of valid cognition, pramāṇa, with the resulting cognition, valid knowledge, jñāna. In this, he follows Dignāga who has stated in PS I.8cd:
savyāpārapratītatvāt pramāṇaṁ phalam eva sat //
'[We say that] a means of valid cognition is the resultant [cognition and not different from it] because [the resultant cognition is] cognized together with the activity [of

cognizing the thing through means of valid cognition]'. For more details about this tenet, consult the chapter on Dignāga, p. 58 ff.

14. Frauwallner thinks that Śākyamati could have been a direct pupil of Devendrabuddhi; Śākyamati lived ca 660-720, Frauwallner 1961, p. 145.

15. My rendering of this term follows Hattori 1968, p. 80. For a fuller discussion of the interpretation and translation of arthakriyā consult Vetter 1964, p. 13; Nagatomi 1967/68 and Steinkellner 1971, p. 182. Vetter proposes to interpret it as "das Erfüllen (kriyā) eines Zweck (artha)". He says '... der Gegenstand alles Erkennens, auch mittelbar der Schlussfolgerung, [ist] ein Individuelles (svalakṣaṇam), nach Raum und Zeit Einmaliges und Unteilbares, das fähig ist, einen Zweck zu erfüllen (arthakriyāsamartham)', Vetter 1964, p. 13. Nagatomi, however, criticizes various interpretations, among them Vetter's, of arthakriyā (in Nagatomi 1967/68, p. 53-54) for not being satisfactory in all contexts. He thinks arthakriyā has two distinct meanings, first an ontological one: padārthasya kriyā, "the action of a thing, its causal efficiency", and second an epistemological meaning: prayojanabhūtā kriyā, "action that serves a purpose" (op cit, p. 53-54, 72), I fail to see a significant difference between the ontological and the epistemological meanings, since in both cases arthakriyā is a fact, a power predicated of a thing, not an aspect of the knowledge of the thing. Consequently, arthakriyā would only be an ontological notion, not an epistemological notion. Steinkellner sums up the problem as follows: 'Die Dinge "erfüllen einen Zweck" durch ihr Wirken (kriyā), sofern der Mensch eine solche Zweckerfüllung von ihnen erwartet (arthaḥ); sie (arthaḥ) erfüllen einen Zweck (kriyā) aber auch -- im Sinne ihres Zugewandtseins auf ein Ziel -- unabhängig von dieser Erwartung des Menschen. Nimmt man also die kleine Undeutlichkeit in Kauf, dass "Zweck" im rein ontologischen Kontext den Sinn von "Ziel" hat, scheint es wohl am

besten, für das Deutsche bei ... "Erfüllen eines Zweckes" zu bleiben', (Steinkellner 1971, p. 182). To me it seems that the English "production" (kriyā) of an "effect" (artha) is as neutral as the German interpretation of Vetter discussed by Steinkellner in the above quotation.

16. Cf Vetter's interpretation of PV II.1-2 in the following extremely compressed passage: 'Erkenntnismittel ist Wissen, das sich in (wir können ergänzen: auf die Erlösung gerichtetem) Handeln bewährt. Auch wenn dieses Wissen durch das Wort übermittelt wird, ist es doch Erkenntnismittel, da man erkennt, was der Sprecher meint, und was er als Gegenstand seines Handelns hat, auch wenn einem die Sache selbst nicht unmittelbar zugänglich ist (Vetter 1964, p. 32)'.

17. Vetter 1964, p. 59-60, 'Begriff ist ein Wort, wenn es im Satz steht. Satz ist ein Hinweis im Zusammenhang des Handelns. Während die Dinge beim einzelnen eine Vorstellung auslösen, die ihre Beurteilung enthält, versucht man, wenn ein anderer Mensch da ist, durch Worte in diesem Vorstellungen zu erregen, die ihn auf das entsprechende Ding führen. Dazu müssen zuerst Wörter vereinbart werden. Sie sind nicht von Natur mit den Vorstellungen oder gar Dingen verknüpft... Verständigungsmittel ist das Wort also nur unter Menschen, die eine gleiche Bedeutung mit seinen Klang verbinden'.

18. Cf Steinkellner 1971, p. 198, note 66: 'Die Lesart mthun-dños (Skt sabhāva, "having the same nature"] ist ... sinngemäss richtiger. Eine Konjektur gegen alle Überlieferung und die anderen tibetischen Versionen möchte ich ... nicht vorschlagen. Dennoch bleibt nicht einsichtig, warum Dharmakīrti an dieser Stelle svabhāva- schreibt'. It is, however, possible to interpret svabhāva here as "being" (bhāva) belonging to their own (sva) [being]", hence "sharing in similar being", "having the same nature", which semantically would be similar to sabhāva. We must keep in mind that the use of homonyms is

a confusing peculiarity of Dharmakīrti's style of writing, cf for instance his playing with words such as bhāva, artha, bheda, bhinna, hetu etc in PV I.

19. This sound epistemological principle is already formulated in NS 1.1.5 in connexion with correct inference when it says: atha tatpūrvakaṁ trividham anumānam, 'And preceded by this [ie by direct perception as pramāṇa] there is threefold inference'. Here it is maintained that valid inference is generated by valid perception. When this principle is applied to Dharmakīrti's epistemology, which accepts only perception and inference as pramāṇas, we could say that valid inferences are drawn only on the basis of correct and valid direct perceptions of things, and furthermore, that a valid reliable statement, āptavāda, must be verified by valid perception and inference. Thus, the ultimate source of knowledge is direct perception. Cf also NBh, p. 25.1-4 quoted in note 7.

20. Prof. E. Steinkellner in Vienna called my attention to a passage in Dignāga's Pramāṇasamuccaya which seems to imply the same principle, viz that a pramāṇa must make known hitherto unknown facts. In the commentary on PS I.3b we read;
dper na dran pa daṅ ´dod pa daṅ źe sdaṅ la sogs pa snar rtogs pa´i don la tshad ma gźan ma yin pa bźin no //
(Hattori 1968, p. 176.25-26), '... Like [various instances of knowledge] such as recollection, desire, repugnance etc [which operate] with regard to an object that has previously been cognized [by direct perception] are not different [ie separate] means of valid cognition'. The implication here seems to be that the first instance in which an object is cognized, is an instance in which a previously unknown object is cognized. This constitutes the direct perception of it, whereas recollection of an object or desire for and repugnance to an object are subsequent mental reflections, but not means of valid cognition, precisely because they do not cognize any new aspects of an object.

21. Katsura 1984, an interesting article investigating PV II.1-6, mentions the <u>two</u> pramāṇa-definitions and notices that direct perception alone generates new knowledge of particulars. The two pramāṇa-definitions are called by Katsura 'the pragmatic criterion of true knowledge' whereas the fact that perception alone can reveal hitherto unknown particulars is called by him 'the purely epistemological criterion of true knowledge' (Katsura 1984, p. 214-215). On p. 230 he states his conclusions: '(1) from a pragmatic point of view ... both perception ... and inference (including verbal knowledge) are non-contradictory and true in the sense that they can lead to the fulfillment of a human purpose and give new information about the object. (2) From a purely epistemological point of view .. only perception is non-erroneous and true in the sense that it alone possesses the true representation of its object'. This distinction between pragmatic and purely epistemological does not seem to have been made by Dharmakīrti himself in this way, nor by Devendrabuddhi. If it is to be maintained, we should say that the definition in PV II.1 and the discussion on it in PV II.2-5b is the pragmatic one and the definition offered in PV II.5c is a purely epistemological one. This is done by Prajñākaragupta in PVBh, p. 30.22 (referred to in Katsura 1984, p. 232, note 28):

<u>tatra pāramārthikapramāṇalakṣaṇam etat,</u>
<u>pūrvaṁ tu sāṁvyahārikasya</u>,

'With regard to the [passage PV II.5c], this is a definition of a means of valid cognition related with what [exists] in the surpreme sense, but the previous [definition given in PV II.1] is [one] of [a means of valid cognition as] related with practical [results]'. But since epistemology, according to Dharmakīrti's own theory, has got value only in so far as it leads to the effect-producing particular, that is, in so far as it has pragmatic value, we need not make this distinction, as it adds nothing to our understanding of Dharmakīrti's thoughts about epistemology.

22. The notion that knowledge of illusory objects is not pramāṇa is already expressed in the pratyakṣa-definition in NS 1.1.4; knowledge arising from the contact of the senses with an object is a means of valid cognition in so far as this knowledge is avyabhicārin, non-erroneous. Cf the first chapter which deals with the old Nyāya.

23. More details about anupalabdhi are found in the third chapter of this book.

24. Grammatically, prāpta means "has been acquired", but Prof Steinkellner in Vienna suggested that I should interpret it as indicating an unacceptable consequence. Thus prāpta would mean something like prasajyate, "it [wrongly] follows that". Even though this interpretation of the perfect passive participle prāpta seems somewhat forced, it agrees with Devendrabuddhi's commentary.

25. The term niḥśreyasa is used in NS 1.1.1 to designate the ultimate goal of Nyāya-philosophy, namely the highest good, defined in NS 1.1.22 as complete freedom from suffering, tadatyantavimokṣa.

26. Already in the Nyāya-Sūtra, we have come across the division of reliable statements into those that deal with visible objects and that describe invisible objects: sa dvividho dṛṣṭādṛṣṭārthatvāt (NS 1.1.8), 'It [reliable statement] is of two kinds according to whether the object [it refers to] is [something] manifest [to the senses] or not manifest [to the senses]'.

27. In the translation I follow the Sanskrit which seems to be the original text on which the Tibetan translation was based. I owe the Sanskrit fragment to Prof. Steinkellner in Vienna.

28. We will remember from the chapter on Dharmakīrti's logic that the svabhāva which functions as probans in a

svabhāvahetu - inference/syllogism must be the same property (with a wider extension) as the property that is to be proved. For example, this thing is a śiṁśapā-tree because it is a tree in general. Śiṁśapā-ness as probandum has a smaller extension than the probans "treeness in general".

29. That the compassion of the Buddha is great is expressed in PV II.198cd trsl Vetter, p. 99:
tiṣṭhanty eva parādhīnā yeṣāṁ tu mahatī kṛpā //
'Diejenigen aber, die [weil sie dies früher schon geübt hatten] grosses Mitleid haben, leben in der Tat um anderer willen [auch nach dem vom Karma festgelegten Lebensende] weiter'.

30. Cf PV II.136, trsl Vetter, p. 44:
bahuśo bahudhopāyaṁ kālena bahunāsya ca /
gacchanty abhyasyatas tatra guṇadoṣāḥ prakāśatām //
'Ihm, der intensiv (bahuśo) und über eine lange Zeit hin (kālena bahunā) auf vielerlei Weise (bahudhā) ein Mittel übt [um die aus Überlieferung und Nachdenken gewonnene Einsicht zu verwirklichen und dann diese und die zu ihrer Verwirklichung einsetzbaren Mittel anderen zu lehren], gelangen diesbezüglich [d.h. bezüglich der verschiedenen Mittel] die Vor- und Nachteile zu [voller] Klarheit'.

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IMPRESSUM

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